The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

1990 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 255 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Akerlof ◽  
Janet L. Yellen
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
pp. 458-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE A. AKERLOF ◽  
JANET L. YELLEN
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Arocena ◽  
Mikel Villanueva ◽  
Raquel Arevalo-Tome ◽  
Xosé H. Vázquez

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 433-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Arocena ◽  
M. Villanueva ◽  
R. Arevalo ◽  
X. H. Vazquez

2001 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-246
Author(s):  
Carl M. Campbell ◽  
Eliakim Katz
Keyword(s):  

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Gan

Abstract In this paper, we introduce uncertainty into Akerlof and Yellen (1990)'s fair wage effort hypothesis. In this uncertain fair wage hypothesis, employers do not have perfect information concerning an employee's perception of a fair wage, but assume the perceived fair wage is distributed as a random variable with a known distribution. Our wage model, built on this hypothesis, is applied to analyze the widely adopted policy of wage secrecy, suggesting a wage secrecy policy is more likely to produce higher satisfaction for employees and higher profit for employers.


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