Why are Firms Challenging Conventional Wisdom on Moral Hazard? Revisiting the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Arocena ◽  
Mikel Villanueva ◽  
Raquel Arevalo-Tome ◽  
Xosé H. Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

Why are firms challenging conventional wisdom on moral hazard? Revisiting the fair wage-effort hypothesis

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 433-455 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Arocena ◽  
M. Villanueva ◽  
R. Arevalo ◽  
X. H. Vazquez
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

2011 ◽  
pp. 458-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE A. AKERLOF ◽  
JANET L. YELLEN
Keyword(s):  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

1990 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 255 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Akerlof ◽  
Janet L. Yellen
Keyword(s):  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

Can the fair wage–effort hypothesis be interpreted as a safe effort hypothesis?

2001 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-246
Author(s):  
Carl M. Campbell ◽  
Eliakim Katz
Keyword(s):  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

The Uncertain Wage - Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy

2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Gan
Keyword(s):  
Random Variable ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Fair Wage ◽  
Effort Hypothesis

Abstract In this paper, we introduce uncertainty into Akerlof and Yellen (1990)'s fair wage effort hypothesis. In this uncertain fair wage hypothesis, employers do not have perfect information concerning an employee's perception of a fair wage, but assume the perceived fair wage is distributed as a random variable with a known distribution. Our wage model, built on this hypothesis, is applied to analyze the widely adopted policy of wage secrecy, suggesting a wage secrecy policy is more likely to produce higher satisfaction for employees and higher profit for employers.

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