Comparing Public Goods with Common Pool Resources: Three Experiments

1997 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Sell ◽  
Yeongi Son
2019 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 143-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence R. De Geest ◽  
John K. Stranlund

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne van Aaken

AbstractCollective action problems with public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in public goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with global public goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 376-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Samuel Barkin ◽  
Yuliya Rashchupkina

AbstractThe concept of public goods is often operationalized in the literature as anything that demands some form of international cooperation. While this may be politically useful in generating international cooperation, it is analytically problematic for designing international law with the purpose of enhancing international cooperation. Many of the issues characterized as public goods are in fact common pool resources, which pose distinct issues for international cooperation and demand different legal architectures than public goods for effective international cooperation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas D. Lancaster ◽  
Reem Abdalla

This article argues that the study of political monitoring can be used to help situate the study of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). Building upon previous work on the management of common pool resources and other literature on monitoring as a component of governance in larger systems, it looks broadly at liberal democracies’ use of IRAs as monitoring mechanisms. Identifying fundamental concepts and theoretical components in the study of political monitoring, this article argues that they can be used as a lens through which policy analysts can observe and compare IRAs, and thus move beyond descriptive analysis. While focusing on monitoring, as one of the functions of IRAs, it highlights theoretical concerns about how to best institutionalise policy-implementation mechanisms, especially in the area of market interventions and the governance of public goods.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Mader

This article critically evaluates attempts to create public goods via microfinance loans in reference to the specific example of water and sanitation. The microfinancing of water and sanitation is a private business model which requires households to privately recognise, internalise and capitalise the bene-fits from improved water and sanitation. But household water and sanitation, being closely linked to underlying common pool resources, and being merit goods, have strong public goods characteristics and therefore depend on collective solutions. Two cases, from Vietnam and India, are presented and evaluated. Despite their dissimilar settings and designs, evidence is found that both projects encountered similar and comparable problems at the collective level which individual microfinance loans could not address. The problems encountered warn against an emergent micro-privatisation of water and sanitation through microfinance. JEL Classification: O16, O18, Q25, Z18


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