Behavioral Aspects of the International Law of Global Public Goods and Common Pool Resources

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne van Aaken
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
International Law ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Collective Action Problems

AbstractCollective action problems with public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in public goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with global public goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.

Public Goods, Common Pool Resources, and International Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 376-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Samuel Barkin ◽  
Yuliya Rashchupkina
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Common Pool

AbstractThe concept of public goods is often operationalized in the literature as anything that demands some form of international cooperation. While this may be politically useful in generating international cooperation, it is analytically problematic for designing international law with the purpose of enhancing international cooperation. Many of the issues characterized as public goods are in fact common pool resources, which pose distinct issues for international cooperation and demand different legal architectures than public goods for effective international cooperation.

The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Krisch
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Community ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Community Values ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
The Face ◽  
Common Policies ◽  
The Cost

The consensual structure of the international legal order, with its strong emphasis on the sovereign equality of states, has always been somewhat precarious. In different waves over the centuries, it has been attacked for its incongruence with the realities of inequality in international politics, for its tension with ideals of democracy and human rights, and for standing in the way of more effective problem solving in the international community. While surprisingly resilient in the face of such challenges, the consensual structure has seen renewed attacks in recent years. In the 1990s, those attacks were mainly “moral” in character. They were related to the liberal turn in international law, and some of them, under the banner of human rights, aimed at weakening principles of nonintervention and immunity. Others, starting from the idea of an emerging “international community,” questioned the prevailing contractual models of international law and emphasized the rise of norms and processes reflecting community values rather than individual state interests. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the focus has shifted, and attacks are more often framed in terms of effectiveness or global public goods. Classical international law is regarded as increasingly incapable of providing much-needed solutions for the challenges of a globalized world; as countries become ever more interdependent and vulnerable to global challenges, an order that safeguards states’ freedoms at the cost of common policies is often seen as anachronistic. According to this view, what is needed—and what we are likely to see—is a turn to nonconsensual lawmaking mechanisms, especially through powerful international institutions with majoritarian voting rules.

scholarly journals Computational Behavioral Models in Public Goods Games with Migration Between Groups

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Tomassini ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Heterogeneous Behavior ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Human Participants ◽  
Simple Sets

Abstract In this study we have simulated numerically two models of linear Public Goods Games where players are equally distributed among a given number of groups. Agents play in their group by using two simple sets of rules that are inspired by the observed behavior of human participants in laboratory experiments. In addition, unsatisfied agents have the option of leaving their group and migrating to a new random one through probabilistic choices. Stochasticity, and the introduction of two types of players in the population, help simulate the heterogeneous behavior that is often observed in experimental work. The numerical simulation results of the corresponding dynamical systems show that being able to leave a group when unsatisfied favors contribution and avoids free-riding to a good extent in a range of the enhancement factor where defection would prevail without migration. Our numerical simulation results are qualitatively in line with known experimental data when human agents are given the same kind of information about themselves and the other players in the group. This is usually not the case with customary mathematical models based on replicator dynamics or stochastic approaches. As a consequence, models like the ones described here may be useful for understanding experimental results and also for designing new experiments by first running cheap simulations instead of doing costly preliminary laboratory work. The downside is that models and their simulation tend to be less general than standard mathematical approaches.

Defending public goods and common-pool resources

2019 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 143-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence R. De Geest ◽  
John K. Stranlund
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Common Pool

scholarly journals The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1798) ◽  
pp. 20141994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel dos Santos
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Additional Condition ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Second Order ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Social Trap

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

scholarly journals The Case for ‘Human Diplomacy’

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 670-680
Author(s):  
Javier Solana
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Climate Change ◽  
Food Security ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
Shared Governance ◽  
Human Security ◽  
Global Public Goods

Summary Apocalyptic predictions on the world’s future after COVID-19 are unfounded. Structures of global governance can be reinforced through greater subsidiarity; that is, by enhancing the participation of local authorities, by the involvement of civil society and the private sector and by regionalising initiatives, where appropriate. Furthermore, globalisation’s scope should be extended to comprise the shared governance of all global public goods and elements affecting human security. This essay outlines how this transformation could work for the four policy areas of global trade, food security, public health and climate change.

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