AbstractThis paper considers the impact over time of the German “Economic Growth and Stability Law”, which had its 40th anniversary on the 6th June, 2007. After looking at the history and development of the law and the associated expectations, the intended functions are analysed critically. Inappropriate use of the law is analysed from the perspective of public choice, as well as the insufficient consideration of reaction delays and, above all, the underestimation of the role of expectations. Furthermore, attention is paid to the fact that planning and coordination problems have not been satisfactorily resolved. A comparison with a control group from major European countries is then used to determine whether one can talk meaningfully in the German context of particular success stories in countering fluctuations in business cycles, the development of governmental debt and of legal objectives with respect to “price level stability”, “high levels of employment”, “current account equilibrium” and “satisfactory economic growth”. It becomes evident that government debt and unemployment have risen more in Germany and that growth rates have declined more sharply than in the countries on which the comparison is based. After discussing the hypotheses for explaining the weak German growth, growth accounting demonstrates that changes in the demographic structure, the substantial shortening of working hours and early retirement, blunders in the reunification process and an aggressive wage policy on the part of trade unions, particularly in the seventies, are the main reasons for low growth. This wage policy was triggered by the expectation of the trade unions that, with the aid of the Stability and Growth Law, the state would ensure full employment. In reality, however, the wage policy led to a reduced rate of investment and growth. This process could only be terminated by the restrained wage policy of the past few years.
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