Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. By James M. Goldgeier. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. xii, 218 pp. Notes. Index. $42.95, hard bound. $18.95, paper,

Slavic Review ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 206-206
Author(s):  
Andrew A. Michta
Worldview ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
Walter C. Clemens

Americans can be thankful for their many wise and articulate analysts in such places as the Brookings Institution and Time's Washington bureau, as well as in the State Department and other branches of the U.S. Government. Leon V. Sigal, for example, was a visiting scholar at' Brookings when he wrote Nuclear Forces in Europe. His already wide reading knowledge had been enriched by experience as assistant director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in 1970-80 and by discussions with others at Brookings (for instance, Raymond L. Garthoff, former executive secretary of the SALT I delegation). Strobe Talbott has written two previous books on arms control and foreign policy while working in Washington as Time's diplomatic correspondent. Trained at Yale and Oxford, he has served also in the London and Moscow offices of Time. Talbott has read widely and seems to have easy access to many U.S. policymakers on arms control. Sigal and Talbott display not only a powerful mastery of the relevant facts, but also an ability to present complexities with elegant clarity. They have additional gifts of empathy, wisdom, and cautious realism concerning what can and should be done about arms limitation.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 208-209
Author(s):  
Sharyl Cross

James M. Goldgeier makes a major contribution to the contemporary case study literature concerning American foreign policy formation. Based on extensive interviews with more than 75 key participants (William Perry, Richard Holbrooke, John Shalikashvili, Leon Panetta, Anthony Lake, Strobe Talbott, and so forth), Goldgeier reconstructs a richly detailed account of the policy process that culminated in the decision to expand the NATO alliance eastward. The study illuminates the complex interplay of political considerations, bureaucratic interests, and individual preferences and skills (even chutzpah) that led to the admission of the first tier of new NATO member nations in Eastern/Central Europe.


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