Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects

2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Laux
Keyword(s):  
Limited Liability ◽  
Incentive Contracting

Multiperiod Contracting and Salesperson Effort Profiles: The Optimality of “Hockey Stick,” “Giving Up,” and “Resting on Laurels”

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinshuk Jerath ◽  
Fei Long
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Sales Force ◽  
Hockey Stick ◽  
Repeated Moral Hazard ◽  
Incentive Contracting ◽  
Hazard Scenario ◽  
Increasing Demand ◽  
Neutral Agent ◽  
Short Time

The authors study multiperiod sales force incentive contracting in which salespeople can engage in effort gaming, a phenomenon that has extensive empirical support. Focusing on a repeated moral hazard scenario with two independent periods and a risk-neutral agent with limited liability, the authors conduct a theoretical investigation to understand which effort profiles the firm can expect under the optimal contract. The authors show that various effort profiles that may give the appearance of being suboptimal, such as postponing effort exertion (“hockey stick”) and not exerting effort after a bad or a good initial demand outcome (“giving up” and “resting on laurels,” respectively) may indeed be induced optimally by the firm. This is because, under certain conditions that depend on how severe the contracting frictions are and how effective effort exertion is in increasing demand, the firm wants to concentrate rewards on extreme demand outcomes. Doing this induces gaming and reduces expected demand but also makes motivating effort cheaper, thus saving on incentive payments. On introducing dependence between time periods, such as when the agent can transfer demands between periods, this insight continues to hold and, furthermore, “hockey stick,” “giving up,” and “resting on laurels” can be optimal for the firm even under repeated short time horizon contracting. The results imply that one must carefully consider the setting and environmental factors when making inferences about contract effectiveness from dynamic effort profiles of agents.

Limited Liability Leverage (L³): A New Measure of Leverage

CFA Digest ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-94
Author(s):  
Natalie Schoon
Keyword(s):  
Limited Liability
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