scholarly journals Decidable fragments of first-order modal logics

2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 1415-1438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Wolter ◽  
Michael Zakharyaschev
Keyword(s):  
Free Variable ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Modal Predicate Logics

AbstractThe paper considers the setof first-order polymodal formulas the modal operators in which can be applied to subformulas of at most one free variable. Using a mosaic technique, we prove a general satisfiability criterion for formulas in, which reduces the modal satisfiability to the classical one. The criterion is then used to single out a number of new, in a sense optimal, decidable fragments of various modal predicate logics.

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

μ-definable sets of integers

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Lubarsky
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inductive Definition ◽  
Natural Class ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inductive Definitions ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Universe

Inductive definability has been studied for some time already. Nonetheless, there are some simple questions that seem to have been overlooked. In particular, there is the problem of the expressibility of the μ-calculus.The μ-calculus originated with Scott and DeBakker [SD] and was developed by Hitchcock and Park [HP], Park [Pa], Kozen [K], and others. It is a language for including inductive definitions with first-order logic. One can think of a formula in first-order logic (with one free variable) as defining a subset of the universe, the set of elements that make it true. Then “and” corresponds to intersection, “or” to union, and “not” to complementation. Viewing the standard connectives as operations on sets, there is no reason not to include one more: least fixed point.There are certain features of the μ-calculus coming from its being a language that make it interesting. A natural class of inductive definitions are those that are monotone: if X ⊃ Y then Γ (X) ⊃ Γ (Y) (where Γ (X) is the result of one application of the operator Γ to the set X). When studying monotonic operations in the context of a language, one would need a syntactic guarantor of monotonicity. This is provided by the notion of positivity. An occurrence of a set variable S is positive if that occurrence is in the scopes of exactly an even number of negations (the antecedent of a conditional counting as a negation). S is positive in a formula ϕ if each occurrence of S is positive. Intuitively, the formula can ask whether x ∊ S, but not whether x ∉ S. Such a ϕ can be considered an inductive definition: Γ (X) = {x ∣ ϕ(x), where the variable S is interpreted as X}. Moreover, this induction is monotone: as X gets bigger, ϕ can become only more true, by the positivity of S in ϕ. So in the μ-calculus, a formula is well formed by definition only if all of its inductive definitions are positive, in order to guarantee that all inductive definitions are monotone.

scholarly journals KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF STRICTLY POSITIVE MODAL LOGICS OVER MEET-SEMILATTICES WITH OPERATORS

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (02) ◽  
pp. 533-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
STANISLAV KIKOT ◽  
AGI KURUCZ ◽  
YOSHIHITO TANAKA ◽  
FRANK WOLTER ◽  
MICHAEL ZAKHARYASCHEV
Keyword(s):  
Computer Science ◽  
Monotone Operators ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
Consequence Relations ◽  
First Order ◽  
Completeness Problem ◽  
Relational Structures ◽  
Kripke Frames

AbstractOur concern is the completeness problem for spi-logics, that is, sets of implications between strictly positive formulas built from propositional variables, conjunction and modal diamond operators. Originated in logic, algebra and computer science, spi-logics have two natural semantics: meet-semilattices with monotone operators providing Birkhoff-style calculi and first-order relational structures (aka Kripke frames) often used as the intended structures in applications. Here we lay foundations for a completeness theory that aims to answer the question whether the two semantics define the same consequence relations for a given spi-logic.

Simulating polyadic modal logics by monadic ones

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Goguadze ◽  
Carla Piazza ◽  
Yde Venema
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logics ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Finite Model Property ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Definability

AbstractWe define an interpretation of modal languages with polyadic operators in modal languages that use monadic operators (diamonds) only. We also define a simulation operator which associates a logic Λsim in the diamond language with each logic Λ in the language with polyadic modal connectives. We prove that this simulation operator transfers several useful properties of modal logics, such as finite/recursive axiomatizability, frame completeness and the finite model property, canonicity and first-order definability.

Solution of a problem of Leon Henkin

1955 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. H. Löb
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Recursive Function ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Order Predicate Calculus

If Σ is any standard formal system adequate for recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its Gödel number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula with Gödel number q is provable in Σ. Is this formula provable or independent in Σ? [2].One approach to this problem is discussed by Kreisel in [4]. However, he still leaves open the question whether the formula (Ex)(x, a), with Gödel-number a, is provable or not. Here (x, y) is the number-theoretic predicate which expresses the proposition that x is the number of a formal proof of the formula with Gödel-number y.In this note we present a solution of the previous problem with respect to the system Zμ [3] pp. 289–294, and, more generally, with respect to any system whose set of theorems is closed under the rules of inference of the first order predicate calculus, and satisfies the subsequent five conditions, and in which the function (k, l) used below is definable.The notation and terminology is in the main that of [3] pp. 306–326, viz. if is a formula of Zμ containing no free variables, whose Gödel number is a, then ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, a) (read: the formula with Gödel number a is provable in Zμ); if is a formula of Zμ containing a free variable, y say, ({}) stands for (Ex)(x, g(y)}, where g(y) is a recursive function such that for an arbitrary numeral the value of g() is the Gödel number of the formula obtained from by substituting for y in throughout. We shall, however, depart trivially from [3] in writing (), where is an arbitrary numeral, for (Ex){x, ).

On deciding the truth of certain statements involving the notion of consistency

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos
Keyword(s):  
Free Variable ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Image Position

Friedman has posed (see [F, p. 117]) the following problem: “35. Define the set E of expressions by (i) Con is an expression; (ii) if A, B are expressions so are (~ A), (A&B), and Con(A). Each expression ϕ in E determines a sentence ϕ in PA [classical first-order arithmetic] by taking Con* to be “PA is consistent,” ( ~ A) * to be ~ (A*), (A&B)* to be A*&B*, and Con(A)* to be “PA + ‘A*’ is consistent.” The set of expressions ϕ ∈ E such that ϕ* is true is recursive.The formalized second incompleteness theorem readsIn order to simplify notation, we will reformulate Friedman's problem slightly. Let Con be the usual sentence of PA expressing the consistency of PA, ~ A the negation of A, (A&B) the conjunction of A and B, etc., and Bew(A) the result of substituting the numeral for the Gödel number of A for the free variable in the usual provability predicate for PA. Let Con(A) = ~ Bew(~ A). (Con(A) is equivalent in PA to the usual sentence expressing the consistency of PA + A.) And let the class of F-sentences be the smallest class which contains Con and which also contains ~ A, (A&B) and Con(A) whenever it contains A and B. Since ⊦PA Bew(A) ↔ Bew(B) if ⊦PAA ↔ B, Friedman's problem is then the question whether the class of true F-sentences is recursive.The answer is that it is recursive. To see why, we need a definition and a theorem.Definition. An atom is a sentence Conn for some n ≥ 1, where Cont = Con and Conn + 1 = Con(Conn).

scholarly journals Problem Libraries for Non-Classical Logics

10.29007/mkdw ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Otten ◽  
Thomas Raths
Keyword(s):  
Theorem Proving ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Automated Theorem Proving ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
First Order ◽  
Problem Library ◽  
Future Plans

Problem libraries for automated theorem proving (ATP) systems play a crucial role when developing, testing, benchmarking and evaluating ATP systems for classical and non-classical logics. We provide an overview of existing problem libraries for some important non-classical logics, namely first-order intuitionistic and first-order modal logics. We suggest future plans to extend these existing libraries and discuss ideas for a general problem library platform for non-classical logics.

scholarly journals Recursive enumerability and elementary frame definability in predicate modal logic

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 549-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Rybakov ◽  
Dmitry Shkatov
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
First Order ◽  
Elementary Class ◽  
Recursive Enumerability ◽  
Kripke Frames ◽  
Recursively Enumerable ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract We investigate the relationship between recursive enumerability and elementary frame definability in first-order predicate modal logic. On one hand, it is well known that every first-order predicate modal logic complete with respect to an elementary class of Kripke frames, i.e. a class of frames definable by a classical first-order formula, is recursively enumerable. On the other, numerous examples are known of predicate modal logics, based on ‘natural’ propositional modal logics with essentially second-order Kripke semantics, that are either not recursively enumerable or Kripke incomplete. This raises the question of whether every Kripke complete, recursively enumerable predicate modal logic can be characterized by an elementary class of Kripke frames. We answer this question in the negative, by constructing a normal predicate modal logic which is Kripke complete, recursively enumerable, but not complete with respect to an elementary class of frames. We also present an example of a normal predicate modal logic that is recursively enumerable, Kripke complete, and not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted frames, but is complete with respect to an elementary class of frames that are not rooted.

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