On deciding the truth of certain statements involving the notion of consistency

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos
Keyword(s):  
Free Variable ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Image Position

Friedman has posed (see [F, p. 117]) the following problem: “35. Define the set E of expressions by (i) Con is an expression; (ii) if A, B are expressions so are (~ A), (A&B), and Con(A). Each expression ϕ in E determines a sentence ϕ in PA [classical first-order arithmetic] by taking Con* to be “PA is consistent,” ( ~ A) * to be ~ (A*), (A&B)* to be A*&B*, and Con(A)* to be “PA + ‘A*’ is consistent.” The set of expressions ϕ ∈ E such that ϕ* is true is recursive.The formalized second incompleteness theorem readsIn order to simplify notation, we will reformulate Friedman's problem slightly. Let Con be the usual sentence of PA expressing the consistency of PA, ~ A the negation of A, (A&B) the conjunction of A and B, etc., and Bew(A) the result of substituting the numeral for the Gödel number of A for the free variable in the usual provability predicate for PA. Let Con(A) = ~ Bew(~ A). (Con(A) is equivalent in PA to the usual sentence expressing the consistency of PA + A.) And let the class of F-sentences be the smallest class which contains Con and which also contains ~ A, (A&B) and Con(A) whenever it contains A and B. Since ⊦PA Bew(A) ↔ Bew(B) if ⊦PAA ↔ B, Friedman's problem is then the question whether the class of true F-sentences is recursive.The answer is that it is recursive. To see why, we need a definition and a theorem.Definition. An atom is a sentence Conn for some n ≥ 1, where Cont = Con and Conn + 1 = Con(Conn).

Note on the fan theorem

1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. S. Troelstra
Keyword(s):  
Consistency Proof ◽  
Conservative Extension ◽  
First Order ◽  
Fan Theorem ◽  
Elementary Analysis ◽  
Elementary Methods ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Image Position

The principal aim of this paper is to establish a theorem stating, roughly, that the addition of the fan theorem and the. continuity schema to an intuitionistic system of elementary analysis results in a conservative extension with respect to arithmetical statements.The result implies that the consistency of first order arithmetic cannot be proved by use of the fan theorem, in addition to standard elementary methods—although it was the opposite assumption which led Gentzen to withdraw the first version of his consistency proof for arithmetic (see [B]).We must presuppose acquaintance with notation and principal results of [K, T], and with §1.6, Chapter II, and Chapter III, §4-6 of [T1]. In one respect we shall deviate from the notation in [K, T]: We shall use (n)x (instead of g(n, x)) to indicate the xth component of the sequence coded by n, if x < lth(n), 0 otherwise.We also introduce abbreviations n ≤* m, a ≤ b which will be used frequently below:

Ordinal bounds for κ-consistency

1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Warren D. Goldfarb
Keyword(s):  
Nonnegative Integer ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Axiom Schema ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Primitive Recursive

In [1] the ω-consistency of arithmetic was proved by a method which yields fine ordinal bounds for κ-consistency, κ ≥ 1. In this paper these bounds are shown to be best possible. The ω-consistency of a number-theoretic system S can be expressed thus: for all sentences ∃xM,where ProvS is the proof predicate for S, if n is a nonnegative integer then n is the formal numeral (of S) for n, and if G is a formula then ˹G˺ is the Gödel number of G. The κ-consistency of S is the restriction of (1) to Σκ0 sentences ∃xM. The proof in [1] establishes the no-counterexample interpretation of (1), that is, the existence of a constructive functional Φ such that, for all sentences ∃xM, all numbers p, and all functions f,(see [1, §2]). A functional Φ is an ω-consistency functional for S if it satisfies (2) for all sentences ∃xM, and a κ-consistency functional for S if it satisfies (2) for all Σκ0 sentences ∃xM.The systems considered in [1] are those obtained from classical first-order arithmetic Z, including the schema for definition of primitive recursive (p.r.) functions, by adjoining, for some p.r. well-founded ordering ≺ of the nonnegative integers, the axiom schemathat is, the least number principle on ≺; it is equivalent to the schema of transfinite induction on ≺.

Reflection principles and iterated consistency assertions

1979 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Reflection Principle ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Reflection Principles ◽  
Order Arithmetic

This paper compares the strength of two sorts of sentences of PA (classical first-order arithmetic with induction): reflection principles and sentences that may be called iterated consistency assertions.Let Bew(x) be the standard provability predicate for PA, and for any sentence S of PA, let ⌈S⌉ be the numeral for the Gödel number of S. The reflection principle for S is the sentence Bew(⌈S⌉) → S, and a reflection principle is simply the reflection principle for some sentence. Nothing false (in the standard model for PA) is provable in PA, and therefore every reflection principle is true. Löb's theorem asserts that S is provable (in PA) if the reflection principle for S is provable.We shall suppose that the 0-ary propositional connectives ⊤ and ⊥ are taken as primitives in the formulation of PA. We define the iterated consistency assertions Conm by: Con0 = ⊤; Conm−1 = − Bew(⌈ − Conm⌉). Con1 may be taken to be the sentence of PA that expresses the consistency of PA; Conn−1, the sentence that expresses the consistency of PA ⋃ {Conn}.Our starting point is the observation that Con1 is equivalent (in PA) to the reflection principle for ⊥. (The second incompleteness theorem thus follows in a well-known way from Löb's theorem: if PA is consistent, then ⊥ is not provable, the reflection principle for ⊥ is not provable, and the consistency of PA is not provable either.)

On deciding the provability of certain fixed point statements

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-193
Author(s):  
George Boolos
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Functional Combination

Terminology. PA is Peano Arithmetic, classical first-order arithmetic with induction. ⌈A⌉ is the formal numeral in PA for the Gödel number of A. – A is the negation of A, (A&B) is the conjunction of A and B, and Bew(x) is the usual provability predicate for PA. neg(x), conj(x, y), bicond(x, y), and bew(x) are terms of PA such that for all sentences A and B of PA ⊢PA, neg(˹A˺) = ˹−A˺ ⊢PA Conj(˹A˺, ˹B˺)= ˹(A&B)˺ ⊢PA bicond(˹A˺, ˹B˺)= ˹(A ↔ B)˺, and ⊢PA bew(˹A˺) = ˹Bew(˹A˺)˺. T is the sentence ‘0 = 0’ and Con is the usual sentence expressing the consistency of PA. If A (x) is any formula of PA, then a fixed point of A(x) is a sentence S such that ⊢PAS ↔ A(˹S˺). (It is well known that every formula of PA with one free variable has a fixed point.) The P-terms are defined inductively by: the variable x is a P-term; if t(x) and u(x) are P-terms, so are neg(t(x)), conj(t(x), u(x)), and bew(t(x)). A basic P-formula is a formula Bew(t(x)), where t(x) is a P-term; and a P-formula is a truth-functional combination of basic P-formulas. An F-sentence is a member of the smallest class that contains Con and contains −A, (A&B), and −Bew(˹−A˺) whenever it contains A and B. In [B] we gave a decision procedure for the class of true F-sentences.−Bew(x), Bew(x), and Bew(neg(x)) are examples of P-formulas, and fixed points of these particular P-formulas have been studied by Gödel, Henkin [H] and Löb [L], and Jeroslow [J], respectively. In this note we show how to decide whether or not a fixed point of any given P-formula is provable in PA.

scholarly journals REFERENCE IN ARITHMETIC

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAVINIA PICOLLO
Keyword(s):  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Past Century ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Past ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Self Reference

AbstractSelf-reference has played a prominent role in the development of metamathematics in the past century, starting with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Given the nature of this and other results in the area, the informal understanding of self-reference in arithmetic has sufficed so far. Recently, however, it has been argued that for other related issues in metamathematics and philosophical logic a precise notion of self-reference and, more generally, reference is actually required. These notions have been so far elusive and are surrounded by an aura of scepticism that has kept most philosophers away. In this paper I suggest we shouldn’t give up all hope. First, I introduce the reader to these issues. Second, I discuss the conditions a good notion of reference in arithmetic must satisfy. Accordingly, I then introduce adequate notions of reference for the language of first-order arithmetic, which I show to be fruitful for addressing the aforementioned issues in metamathematics.

Relativized realizability in intuitionistic arithmetic of all finite types

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas D. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Extension Theorem ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Conservative Extension ◽  
First Order ◽  
New Information ◽  
Reflection Theorem ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Dependent Choice ◽  
Intuitionistic Arithmetic

In this paper we introduce a new notion of realizability for intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types. The notion seems to us to capture some of the intuition underlying both the recursive realizability of Kjeene [5] and the semantics of Kripke [7]. After some preliminaries of a syntactic and recursion-theoretic character in §1, we motivate and define our notion of realizability in §2. In §3 we prove a soundness theorem, and in §4 we apply that theorem to obtain new information about provability in some extensions of intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types. In §5 we consider a special case of our general notion and prove a kind of reflection theorem for it. Finally, in §6, we consider a formalized version of our realizability notion and use it to give a new proof of the conservative extension theorem discussed in Goodman and Myhill [4] and proved in our [3]. (Apparently, a form of this result is also proved in Mine [13]. We have not seen this paper, but are relying on [12].) As a corollary, we obtain the following somewhat strengthened result: Let Σ be any extension of first-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA) formalized in the language of HA. Let Σω be the theory obtained from Σ by adding functionals of finite type with intuitionistic logic, intensional identity, and axioms of choice and dependent choice at all types. Then Σω is a conservative extension of Σ. An interesting example of this theorem is obtained by taking Σ to be classical first-order arithmetic.

Resolution of T. Ward's Question and the Israel–Finch Conjecture: Precise Analysis of an Integer Sequence Arising in Dynamics

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
JEFFREY GAITHER ◽  
GUY LOUCHARD ◽  
STEPHAN WAGNER ◽  
MARK DANIEL WARD
Keyword(s):  
Weighted Average ◽  
Analytic Number Theory ◽  
Combinatorial Structure ◽  
Asymptotic Growth ◽  
First Order ◽  
Integer Sequence ◽  
Precise Analysis ◽  
Formula Group ◽  
Fourth Author ◽  
Image Position

We analyse the first-order asymptotic growth of \[ a_{n}=\int_{0}^{1}\prod_{j=1}^{n}4\sin^{2}(\pi jx)\, dx. \] The integer an appears as the main term in a weighted average of the number of orbits in a particular quasihyperbolic automorphism of a 2n-torus, which has applications to ergodic and analytic number theory. The combinatorial structure of an is also of interest, as the ‘signed’ number of ways in which 0 can be represented as the sum of ϵjj for −n ≤ j ≤ n (with j ≠ 0), with ϵj ∈ {0, 1}. Our result answers a question of Thomas Ward (no relation to the fourth author) and confirms a conjecture of Robert Israel and Steven Finch.

μ-definable sets of integers

1993 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Lubarsky
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Free Variable ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inductive Definition ◽  
Natural Class ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inductive Definitions ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Universe

Inductive definability has been studied for some time already. Nonetheless, there are some simple questions that seem to have been overlooked. In particular, there is the problem of the expressibility of the μ-calculus.The μ-calculus originated with Scott and DeBakker [SD] and was developed by Hitchcock and Park [HP], Park [Pa], Kozen [K], and others. It is a language for including inductive definitions with first-order logic. One can think of a formula in first-order logic (with one free variable) as defining a subset of the universe, the set of elements that make it true. Then “and” corresponds to intersection, “or” to union, and “not” to complementation. Viewing the standard connectives as operations on sets, there is no reason not to include one more: least fixed point.There are certain features of the μ-calculus coming from its being a language that make it interesting. A natural class of inductive definitions are those that are monotone: if X ⊃ Y then Γ (X) ⊃ Γ (Y) (where Γ (X) is the result of one application of the operator Γ to the set X). When studying monotonic operations in the context of a language, one would need a syntactic guarantor of monotonicity. This is provided by the notion of positivity. An occurrence of a set variable S is positive if that occurrence is in the scopes of exactly an even number of negations (the antecedent of a conditional counting as a negation). S is positive in a formula ϕ if each occurrence of S is positive. Intuitively, the formula can ask whether x ∊ S, but not whether x ∉ S. Such a ϕ can be considered an inductive definition: Γ (X) = {x ∣ ϕ(x), where the variable S is interpreted as X}. Moreover, this induction is monotone: as X gets bigger, ϕ can become only more true, by the positivity of S in ϕ. So in the μ-calculus, a formula is well formed by definition only if all of its inductive definitions are positive, in order to guarantee that all inductive definitions are monotone.

scholarly journals ON PRODUCTS OF ELEMENTARILY INDIVISIBLE STRUCTURES

2016 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 951-971
Author(s):  
NADAV MEIR
Keyword(s):  
New Products ◽  
Elementary Substructure ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Image Position

AbstractWe say a structure ${\cal M}$ in a first-order language ${\cal L}$ is indivisible if for every coloring of its universe in two colors, there is a monochromatic substructure ${\cal M}\prime \subseteq {\cal M}$ such that ${\cal M}\prime \cong {\cal M}$. Additionally, we say that ${\cal M}$ is symmetrically indivisible if ${\cal M}\prime$ can be chosen to be symmetrically embedded in ${\cal M}$ (that is, every automorphism of ${\cal M}\prime$ can be extended to an automorphism of ${\cal M}$). Similarly, we say that ${\cal M}$ is elementarily indivisible if ${\cal M}\prime$ can be chosen to be an elementary substructure. We define new products of structures in a relational language. We use these products to give recipes for construction of elementarily indivisible structures which are not transitive and elementarily indivisible structures which are not symmetrically indivisible, answering two questions presented by A. Hasson, M. Kojman, and A. Onshuus.

scholarly journals Existence of nonoscillatory solutions of first order nonlinear neutral equations

1990 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Wudu
Keyword(s):  
Nonoscillatory Solution ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Neutral Equation ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Nonoscillatory Solutions ◽  
Neutral Equations ◽  
First Order ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

AbstractConsider the nonlinear neutral equationwhere pi(t), hi(t), gj(t), Q(t) Є C[t0, ∞), limt→∞hi(t) = ∞, limt→∞gj(t) = ∞ i Є Im = {1, 2, …, m}, j Є In = {1, 2, …, n}. We obtain a necessary and sufficient condition (2) for this equation to have a nonoscillatory solution x(t) with limt→∞ inf|x(t)| > 0 (Theorems 5 and 6) or to have a bounded nonoscillatory solution x(t) with limt→∞ inf|x(t)| > 0 (Theorem 7).

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