The Soviet Economy: A Collection of Western and Soviet Views, The Economies of the Soviet Bloc: A Study of Decision Making and Resource Allocation, Foundations of Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth: Selected Soviet Essays, 1924–1930 and Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth

1965 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-145
Author(s):  
Alfred Zauberman
2010 ◽  
pp. 39-55
Author(s):  
M. Ellman

This article is an overview of the contribution made by economic Sovietology to mainstream economics. The long debate about the universal applicability of mainstream economics is reconsidered in the light of the Soviet experience. Information is provided on the contribution of the study of the Soviet economy to fields as diverse as the measurement of economic growth, institutional economics, economic administration, the economics of property rights, the economics of the informal sector, the economics of famines, the Austrian critique of general equilibrium theory, and incentives.


Author(s):  
Isabel Cepeda ◽  
Pedro Fraile Balbín

ABSTRACT This paper explores Alexis de Tocqueville's thought on fiscal political economy as a forerunner of the modern school of preference falsification and rational irrationality in economic decision making. A good part of the literature has misrepresented Tocqueville as an unconditional optimist regarding the future of fiscal moderation under democracy. Yet, although he initially shared the cautious optimism of most classical economists with respect to taxes under extended suffrage, Tocqueville's view turned more pessimistic in the second volume of his Democracy in America. Universal enfranchisement and democratic governments would lead to higher taxes, more intense income redistribution and government control. Under democracy, the continuous search for unconditional equality would eventually jeopardise liberty and economic growth.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 1092-1102
Author(s):  
Tal Gilead ◽  
Iris BenDavid-Hadar

Purpose The method by which the state allocates resources to its schooling system can serve as an important instrument for achieving desired improvements in levels of educational attainment, social equity and other social policy goals. In many school systems, the allocation of school resources is done according to a needs-based funding formula. The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of some significant tradeoffs involved in employing needs-based funding formulae. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on theoretical investigations of normative aspects involved in using needs-based funding formulae. Findings There are a number of underexplored complications and difficulties that arise from the use of needs-based funding formulae. Dealing with these involves significant tradeoffs that require taking normative decisions. Understanding these tradeoffs is important for improving the use of needs-based funding formulae. Originality/value The paper highlights three under-examined issues that emerge from the current use of needs-based funding formulae. These issues are: to what extent funding formulae should be responsive to social and economic needs? To what extent should funding formulae allow for the use of discretion in resource allocation? To what degree needs-based formulae funding should be linked to outcomes? By discussing these issues and the tradeoffs involved in them, the paper provides a deeper understanding of significant aspects stemming from the use of needs-based funding formulae. This, in turn, can serve as a basis for an improved and better informed process for decision making regarding the use of funding formulae.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Chulkov

Purpose – This study aims to examine the economic factors that determine innovation pattern in centralized and decentralized economies and organizations. Design/methodology/approach – Empirical evidence on innovation in the centralized economy of the Soviet Union is reviewed. Existing theoretical literature in this area relies on the incentives of decision-makers in centralized organizations and on the concept of soft budget constraint in centralized command economies and hard budget constraint in market economies. This study advocates applying the hierarchy/polyarchy model of innovation screening to explain the pattern of innovation in centralized economic systems. Findings – Screening and development of innovation projects can be organized in a centralized or decentralized fashion. The differences in innovation between centralized and decentralized economic systems may be explained by elements of the principal-agent theory, the soft budget constraint model, and the theory of decision-making in hierarchies and polyarchies. Empirical evidence shows a sharp slowdown in both innovation and economic growth in the Soviet economy following the economic decision-making reform of 1965. The theoretical explanation most consistent with this evidence is the hierarchy decision-making model. Originality/value – Comparisons of innovation in centralized and decentralized economies traditionally relied on decision-makers' incentives and the concept of soft budget constraint. Upon analysis of empirical evidence from the centralized Soviet economy, this study advocates explaining innovation patterns based on decision-making theory of hierarchy.


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