The Economies of the Soviet Bloc: A Study of Decision-making and Resource Allocation. Stanislaw Wellisz

1964 ◽  
Vol 72 (5) ◽  
pp. 533-534
Author(s):  
John M. Montias
2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (7) ◽  
pp. 1092-1102
Author(s):  
Tal Gilead ◽  
Iris BenDavid-Hadar

Purpose The method by which the state allocates resources to its schooling system can serve as an important instrument for achieving desired improvements in levels of educational attainment, social equity and other social policy goals. In many school systems, the allocation of school resources is done according to a needs-based funding formula. The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper understanding of some significant tradeoffs involved in employing needs-based funding formulae. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on theoretical investigations of normative aspects involved in using needs-based funding formulae. Findings There are a number of underexplored complications and difficulties that arise from the use of needs-based funding formulae. Dealing with these involves significant tradeoffs that require taking normative decisions. Understanding these tradeoffs is important for improving the use of needs-based funding formulae. Originality/value The paper highlights three under-examined issues that emerge from the current use of needs-based funding formulae. These issues are: to what extent funding formulae should be responsive to social and economic needs? To what extent should funding formulae allow for the use of discretion in resource allocation? To what degree needs-based formulae funding should be linked to outcomes? By discussing these issues and the tradeoffs involved in them, the paper provides a deeper understanding of significant aspects stemming from the use of needs-based funding formulae. This, in turn, can serve as a basis for an improved and better informed process for decision making regarding the use of funding formulae.


2017 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 64-84
Author(s):  
Eun Kyong Choi

AbstractThis article reviews the decision-making process behind the creation of a new rural pension between the early 2000s and 2009. It finds that although policymaking was initially delegated to the bureaucratic level and hence involved a protracted bureaucratic struggle, the issue was resolved by a fiat imposed by top leaders rather than by bureaucratic compromise as a bureaucratic politics model would suggest. I call this policymaking process “delegation and then intervention.” Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOLSS) persistently argued in favour of creating the new rural pension, the Ministry of Finance obstinately objected to it. This study finds that when bureaucratic organizations are in conflict because of their core beliefs, rather than resource allocation, they are less likely to reach a consensus. Faced with a prolonged bureaucratic deadlock, top leaders decided in favour of the MOLSS policy initiative, thereby adopting a progressive measure that would provide a completely subsidized basic pension for the rural elderly.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah E. Friedkin ◽  
Anton V. Proskurnikov ◽  
Wenjun Mei ◽  
Francesco Bullo

2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402093808
Author(s):  
J. Andrew Harris

Decisions about how to organize and run an election can shape political participation. Policy choices may distribute election resources unequally, skewing voting outcomes. In low- and middle-income countries where electoral capacity and resources are scarce and decision-making highly centralized, election administration has the potential to shape results on a large scale. In the context of Kenya’s August 2017 elections, I study the consequences of a legislated threshold that determines the capacity of polling centers to quickly serve voters by reducing election-day lines. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that turnout is 2.4% lower in congested polling places just below the threshold relative to polling places above the threshold. Relative to other hypothetical thresholds, the chosen threshold benefits the incumbent president, as incumbent strongholds receive more polling resources than opposition areas. The results demonstrate how electoral resource allocation shapes political behavior and election outcomes.


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