Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roberts Clark ◽  
Mark Hallerberg
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Mobile Capital ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe.

scholarly journals A Theory of Foreign Exchange Interventions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastián Fanelli ◽  
Ludwig Straub
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Small Open Economy ◽  
Bond Markets ◽  
Pecuniary Externality ◽  
Optimal Intervention ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Intervention Policy

Abstract We study a real small open economy with two key ingredients (1) partial segmentation of home and foreign bond markets and (2) a pecuniary externality that makes the real exchange rate excessively volatile in response to capital flows. Partial segmentation implies that, by intervening in the bond markets, the central bank can affect the exchange rate and the spread between home- and foreign-bond yields. Such interventions allow the central bank to address the pecuniary externality, but they are also costly, as foreigners make carry trade profits. We analytically characterize the optimal intervention policy that solves this trade-off: (1) the optimal policy leans against the wind, stabilizing the exchange rate; (2) it involves smooth spreads but allows exchange rates to jump; (3) it partly relies on “forward guidance,” with non-zero interventions even after the shock has subsided; (4) it requires credibility, in that central banks do not intervene without commitment. Finally, we shed light on the global consequences of widespread interventions, using a multi-country extension of our model. We find that, left to themselves, countries over-accumulate reserves, reducing welfare and leading to inefficiently low world interest rates.

Debt dollarisation poses dilemmas in Argentina

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
Economic Downturn ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

Subject Monetary, fiscal and debt concerns. Significance After falling to nearly 16 pesos/dollar in early March, the exchange rate stabilised, mainly due to rising domestic interest rates, which climbed to a peak of 38.0%. Monetary tightening and the deepening of the economic downturn helped to bring down inflation, which is expected to reach a monthly rate of 1.5% in the last quarter. Lower interest rates and decreasing inflation are needed to drive an economic rebound, key to the government's prospects in October 2017 mid-term elections. Impacts Dollarisation of financial liabilities will leave the economy more vulnerable to negative external shocks. The economy may show further decline in third-quarter figures. Moderating inflation and monetary and fiscal policy support are expected to help turn growth positive in 2017.

Central Bank Independence and Co-ordinating Monetary and Fiscal Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-13
Author(s):  
Brian Henry ◽  
James Nixon ◽  
Stephen Hall
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

scholarly journals Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Hughes Hallett ◽  
Diana N. Weymark
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Government ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

Abstract The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.

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