Balancing Monetary and Fiscal Policy Objectives: Central Bank Independence During the Global Pandemic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Global Pandemic ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

Central Bank Independence and Co-ordinating Monetary and Fiscal Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-13
Author(s):  
Brian Henry ◽  
James Nixon ◽  
Stephen Hall
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

scholarly journals Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Hughes Hallett ◽  
Diana N. Weymark
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Government ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

Abstract The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.

Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roberts Clark ◽  
Mark Hallerberg
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Mobile Capital ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe.

Public investment, inflation persistence and central bank independence

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 976-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanos Papadamou ◽  
Eleftherios Spyromitros ◽  
Panagiotis Tsintzos
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Inflation Persistence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Central Banker ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Uk

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the institutional setting of monetary policy making that mitigates the effects of productive public investment on inflation persistence. Design/methodology/approach In the theoretical approach, the authors consider a simple monetary game model à la Barro-Gordon introducing, apart from stochastic output shocks, indexed wage contracts and public investment effects. Then, the authors empirically produce inflation persistence and public investment persistence by estimating a first-order autoregressive model in a fixed rolling window of 36 months for the UK and also use a dummy in order to incorporate the regime switch in monetary policy since 1997, giving a clear increase in the level of central bank independence. Findings The theoretical framework suggests that an independent central banker could better manage inflation expectations and therefore inflation persistence despite the occurrence of persistent public investment shocks. From the perspective of fiscal policy, the appointment of a conservative and independent central banker could absorb adverse effects on inflation dynamics resulting from persistent expansionary fiscal policies. Empirical evidence in the UK indicates that the creation of an independent monetary policy committee reduces the positive link between public investment and inflation persistence. Practical implications From a monetary policy perspective view, the best response to public investment policies is to increase the degree of independence to alleviate effects on inflation dynamics. From the perspective of fiscal policy, an independent central banker can provide the necessary conditions to undertake a long-run public investment plan, since long-run growth will not be undermined by adverse inflation inertia. Originality/value The authors introduce, in the debate of inflation persistence, both theoretically and empirically, the role of public investment and monetary policy design.

scholarly journals Monetary Commitment and Fiscal Discretion: The Optimal Policy Mix

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-216
Author(s):  
Stefano Gnocchi
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Policy Mix ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Policy Game ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy ◽  
Fiscal Authority

We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E52, E58, E62)

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bernhard ◽  
J. Lawrence Broz ◽  
William Roberts Clark
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Exchange Rate Arrangements

In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives.

Fiscal and Monetary Policy under External Volatility

2006 ◽  
pp. 4-27
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Trade Balance ◽  
Commodity Prices ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Fiscal And Monetary Policy

Specific requirements on macroeconomic policy, stemming from the impact of external volatility on trade balance and fiscal revenues are studied. Income gains or losses of the Russian economy due to variation in the commodity prices are found to range from -9 to +12% of GDP over the last decade. Contribution of the government and the Central Bank to neutralizing windfall revenues is evaluated, an approach to sharing their functions is suggested. It is demonstrated that monetary policy in the post-crisis period has been aimed rather at restraining ruble appreciation, than at smoothing the effect of external volatility. Expediency to formulate fiscal policy objectives and budget rules in terms of structural deficit (adjusted for windfall revenues) is argued.

Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 809-830 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Mawuko Agoba ◽  
Joshua Yindenaba Abor ◽  
Kofi Osei ◽  
Jarjisu Sa-Aadu ◽  
Benjamin Amoah ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Quality ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fiscal Performance ◽  
Fiscal Balance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970–2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Findings The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI’s effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Practical implications The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years. Originality/value The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain government spending. It also compares findings in Africa to other developing countries, noting some differences.

Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Russia

2009 ◽  
pp. 9-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kudrin
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Energy Prices ◽  
Russian Government ◽  
The Real

The article examines the causes of origin and manifestation of the current global financial crisis and the policies adopted in developed countries in 2007—2008 to deal with it. It considers the effects of the financial crisis on Russia’s economy and monetary policy of the Central Bank in the current conditions as well as the main guidelines for the fiscal policy under different energy prices. The measures for fighting the crisis that the Russian government and the Central Bank use to support the real economy are described.

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