The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907–1990

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow ◽  
Randolph M. Siverson ◽  
Tressa E. Tabares
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Flows ◽  
The Political ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
The Third ◽  
Political Determinants ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Gravity Model Of Trade ◽  
Political Variables

We test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows. The first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests, the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads, and the third that trade flows are greater between allies. We examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990. This period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically. We estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added. Our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad, but alliances generally do not, even when controlling for polarity of the system.

Correction to “The Political Determinants of International Trade”

1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 931-933 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow ◽  
Randolph M. Siverson ◽  
Tressa E. Tabares
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Trade Flows ◽  
Standard Errors ◽  
The Political ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
The Third ◽  
Political Determinants ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Common Interests

Efforts to replicate our study of the effects of politics on trade flows between the major powers have revealed that the computer program written to calculate the estimates produced errors in both the coefficients and the standard errors. Furthermore, these errors have some consequences for the results. In this brief corrigendum, we present corrected tables for our research note and a slightly modified interpretation of the results.Our study examined evidence to assess three arguments about how politics may affect trade. The first contends that positive political relations in a dyad result in higher levels of trade. This argument leads to two hypotheses: States in conflict will have a lower level of trade than those not in conflict, and trade will increase with the degree of common interests between a pair of states. The second argument concludes that democratic dyads will have a higher level of trade than other dyads. The third argument focuses on the security concerns of states and leads to the hypotheses that alliances will increase trade in a bipolar system but will have no effect in a multipolar system. We refer readers to the original article for a fuller statement of the logic of these arguments, their respective hypotheses, and a complete statement of our research design and operationalization of the variables (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998).

The Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006: the international repercussions

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-286
Author(s):  
Hassan Nafaa
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
The Third ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Political Management ◽  
The Way

This article deals with the international repercussions of the recent Israeli attack on Lebanon, and the way in which it differs from previous Arab-Israeli wars. The first part addresses the root causes of the conflict and considers the reasons that made the war on Lebanon a joint American–Israeli–European–United Nations war. The second part looks at the political management of the war and the steps that led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and the various aspects of this resolution. The third assesses the war's international repercussions by looking at the potential positions of the world's major powers vis-à-vis obstacles that could impede the implementation of the resolution.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 1005-1030 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Pagano ◽  
Paolo F Volpin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
The Political ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
International Panel ◽  
Political Determinants ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Political Variables

We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Personnel Expenditures: Brazilian States, 1965-1994

2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRY AMES ◽  
TAEKO HIROI ◽  
LUCIO RENNO
Keyword(s):  
Political Competition ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
State Legislators ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Electoral Cycle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Political Variables

ABSTRACT The main purpose of the paper is to test a model that explains variation in the ratio of expenditure with personnel in Brazilian states from 1965 to 1994. The independent variables include indicators of the political environment in the distinct states, such as number of veto players and level of political competition. Furthermore, variables that model the business electoral cycle and institutional changes during the period were also included in the model. The budgetary, electoral and legislative data were collected for 22 states from 1965 to 1995. OLS Regression with panel corrected standard errors was used to test the main hypotheses. Results indicate that the impact of political variables appears to be conditioned by the broader national institutional framework. During the authoritarian period expenditures with personnel were influenced by the electoral business cycle and by the presence of more than one party in the state legislature. In the democratic period, electoral vulnerability of state legislators and the electoral cycle are the most important political factors influencing expenditures with personnel.

scholarly journals An Empirical Investigation of the Internet and International Trade: The case of Bolivia

2004 ◽  
pp. 33-55
Author(s):  
Caroline L Freund ◽  
Diana Weinhold
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Relative Number ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Trade Flows ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Trading Patterns ◽  
Percent Increase ◽  
Gravity Model Of Trade ◽  
Global Exchange

This paper builds on Freund and Weinhold (2000) to show that the results of that paper can be applied to the case of Bolivia. We review the implications of the Freund and Weinhold model, emphasizing the effects of the Internet on increasing trade and lessening the effects of historical trading patterns in determining trade flows. Specifically, using a gravity model of trade for 56 countries including Bolivia, we show that the Internet stimulates trade and that Bolivia stands to gain an economically significant benefit from increased Web connectivity. Our results imply that a 10 percent increase in the relative number of web hosts in Bolivia would have led to about 1 percent greater trade in 1998 and 1999. The evidence is consistent with a model in which the internet creates a global exchange for goods, thereby reducing market-specific sunk costs of exporting.

The Political Economy of Trade Openness Reform: Consequences of Reform for Russian Border Regions

2011 ◽  
pp. 118-138
Author(s):  
N. Ryzhova
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Openness ◽  
Income Redistribution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Trade Reform ◽  
Border Regions

The article deals with the incentives for increasing international trade centralization and restricting trade border regions openness in reformed economy. Two groups of incentives are determined in terms of new political economy approaches: fear of separatism and reluctance of income redistribution. The situation with the radical international trade reform in Russia, followed by correction of trade openness, illustrates key moments in the concepts.

Issues Surrounding the Development of the Neo-Nazi Scene in East Berlin

2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Brothers
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
German Democratic Republic ◽  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
Communist Regime ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Culture ◽  
East Berlin ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Reich

The rise of neo-Nazism in the capital of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was not inspired by a desire to recreate Hitler's Reich, but by youthful rebellion against the political and social culture of the GDR's Communist regime. This is detailed in Fuehrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Naxi by Ingo Hasselbach with Tom Reiss (Random House, New York, 1996). This movement, however, eventually worked towards returning Germany to its former 'glory' under the Third Reich under the guidance of 'professional' Nazis.

The Stabilization Process Then and Now

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Political Communication ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Stabilization Process ◽  
The Third ◽  
Stabilization Phase ◽  
Over Time

This chapter shifts the focus to the third and final stabilization phase of the political communication cycle (PCC). During the stabilization phase, a new political communication order (PCO) takes shape through the building of norms, institutions, and regulations that serve to fix the newly established status quo in place. This status quo occurs when formerly innovative political communication activities become mundane, yet remain powerful. Much of the chapter details the pattern of communication regulation and institution construction over time. In particular, this chapter explores the instructive similarities and key differences between the regulation of radio and the internet, which offers important perspectives on the significance of our current place in the PCC and the consequences of choices that will be made over the next few years.

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