Optimal Risk-Sharing When Risk Preferences are Uncertain

1987 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Pamela Clark Brown
1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. O'Brien

In this paper the empirical validity of the binary lottery preference inducing technique is tested in a real world market institution. In each market the potential gains to exchange arise from induced risk preferences, and the predicted competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the Pareto optimal risk sharing allocation. Price convergence to (and near) the competitive equilibrium price was rapid in each market, and most trades were individually rational with respect to induced certainty equivalents. This evidence implies that preferences can be induced in an oral double auction institution, using this technique.


2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (10) ◽  
pp. 3114-3115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Mazzocco ◽  
Shiv Saini

2014 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 41-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejian Tian ◽  
Weidong Tian

2008 ◽  
Vol 78 (10) ◽  
pp. 1181-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ludkovski ◽  
Ludger Rüschendorf

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