Risk-Sharing and Vulnerability under Hetergeneous Risk Preferences

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Matteo Miller
2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (10) ◽  
pp. 3114-3115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Mazzocco ◽  
Shiv Saini

1992 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. O'Brien

In this paper the empirical validity of the binary lottery preference inducing technique is tested in a real world market institution. In each market the potential gains to exchange arise from induced risk preferences, and the predicted competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the Pareto optimal risk sharing allocation. Price convergence to (and near) the competitive equilibrium price was rapid in each market, and most trades were individually rational with respect to induced certainty equivalents. This evidence implies that preferences can be induced in an oral double auction institution, using this technique.


2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (10) ◽  
pp. 3104-3113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Shrinivas ◽  
Marcel Fafchamps

Mazzocco and Saini (2012) propose and implement a test of efficient risk sharing that allows for preference heterogeneity. They motivate their approach as yielding different results from those of a standard efficiency test with homogeneous preferences. We show that the standard efficiency test results are misreported in their paper and that the correctly reported results do not present as compelling a case for the importance of accounting for heterogeneous preferences. (JEL D12, D81, G22, O12, O18, R23, Z13)


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 428-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Mazzocco ◽  
Shiv Saini

We propose a method that enables one to test efficient risk sharing even when households have different risk preferences. The method is composed of three tests. The first one determines whether in the data households have homogeneous risk preferences. The second and third tests evaluate efficient risk sharing when the hypothesis of homogeneous risk preferences is rejected. We use this method to test efficient risk sharing in rural India. Using the first test, we strongly reject the hypothesis of identical risk preferences. Using the second and third tests, we reject efficiency at the village but not at the caste level. (JEL D12, D86, G22, O12, O18, R23, Z13)


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jolie Martin ◽  
Martin Reimann ◽  
Michael I. Norton
Keyword(s):  

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