Discussion of The LIFO/FIFO Choice: An Asymmetric Information Approach

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
John Fellingham
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Approach

The LIFO/FIFO Choice: An Asymmetric Information Approach

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia J. Hughes ◽  
Eduardo S. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Approach

scholarly journals Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (43) ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza ◽  
◽  
Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Debt Maturity ◽  
Information Approach

scholarly journals Crowdfunding Under Market Feedback, Asymmetric Information And Overconfident Entrepreneur

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Miglo
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Behavioral Finance ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Pecking Order ◽  
Pecking Order Theory ◽  
Information Approach ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Market Feedback ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence

AbstractThis article is the first one that considers a model of the choice between the different types of crowdfunding, which contains elements of the asymmetric information approach and behavioral finance (overconfident entrepreneurs). The model provides several implications, most of which have not yet been tested. Our model predicts that equity-based crowdfunding is more profitable than reward-based crowdfunding when an entrepreneur is overconfident. This is because the entrepreneur learns from the sale of shares before making production decisions. The model also predicts that an equilibrium can exist where some firms use equity-based crowdfunding, which contrasts the results of traditional theories (which have rational managers), for example, the pecking-order theory. It also contrasts traditional behavioral finance literature (e. g. Fairchild, R. 2005. “The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.” ICFAI Journal of Behavioral Finance 2 (4).) where equity is not issued in equilibrium.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document