scholarly journals Does managerial discretion affect debt maturity in Chilean firms? An agency cost and asymmetric information approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (43) ◽  
pp. 65-87
Author(s):  
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza ◽  
◽  
Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
Marco A. Espinosa ◽  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Nathan H. Miller

1988 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia J. Hughes ◽  
Eduardo S. Schwartz

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 159-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chakkappanthodiyil Namitha ◽  
Santhakumar Shijin

2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (60) ◽  
pp. 1-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen N. Berger ◽  
◽  
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega ◽  
W. Scott Frame ◽  
Nathan H. Miller

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 789-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidhan K. Goyal ◽  
Wei Wang

AbstractAsymmetric information models suggest that a borrower’s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities, that is, borrowers with favorable information prefer short-term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long-term debt. We test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk following debt issuances. We find that short-term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers’ asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default. The opposite is true for long-term debt issues. The results suggest that borrowers’ private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices.


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