Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital

1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Buser ◽  
Andrew H. Chen ◽  
Edward J. Kane
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital*

1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN A. BUSER ◽  
ANDREW H. CHEN ◽  
EDWARD J. KANE
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Systemic Risk, Bank Capital, and Deposit Insurance Around the World

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denefa Bostandzic ◽  
Matthias Pelster ◽  
Gregor N. F. Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
The World

The Risk Assessment Enhancement Process at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

2021 ◽  
pp. 407-420
Author(s):  
Rania Mousa
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Assessment Process ◽  
Technology Selection ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Process System ◽  
Banking Institutions ◽  
Timely Fashion ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance

Supervisory banking institutions are often daunted by the volume and complexity of the data received on a regular basis from filer banks. Chief technology officers and data strategists face challenges as they strive to implement a technology that could facilitate the data collection and processing to produce secure, timely and reliable information for decision making purpose. Technology selection might be a concern for adopting government agencies, but the methodology of developing and implementing technologies could present a bigger challenge. This is due to the fact that government agencies may not adapt easily to new technologies in a timely fashion or accommodate further developments to their current systems while operating under strict budget. To strengthen its bank supervisory role and develop its bank examination applications, the FDIC decided to adopt The Rational Unified Process System Methodology, known as the RUP®. The chapter examines how the FDIC followed the RUP® to develop an existing bank examination tool application to support its risk assessment process.

Origins of too-big-to-fail policy in the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
George C. Nurisso ◽  
Edward Simpson Prescott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Interstate Banking ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
Federal Deposit Insurance ◽  
Over Time

This article traces the origin of too-big-to-fail policy in modern US banking to the bailout of the $1.2b Bank of the Commonwealth in 1972. It describes this bailout and those of subsequent banks through that of Continental Illinois in 1984. During this period, market concentration due to interstate banking restrictions is a factor in most of the bailouts and systemic risk concerns were raised to justify the bailouts of surprisingly small banks. Finally, most of the bailouts in this period relied on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's use of the Essentiality Doctrine and Federal Reserve lending. A discussion of this doctrine is used to illustrate how legal constraints on regulators may become less constraining over time.

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