A first approach to abstract modal logics

1989 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 1042-1062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep M. Font ◽  
Ventura Verdú
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Inference Rule ◽  
Heyting Algebras ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Algebraic Models ◽  
Abstract Logic ◽  
Sequent Systems ◽  
Abstract Logics ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Modal Systems

AbstractThe object of this paper is to make a study of four systems of modal logic (S4, S5, and their intuitionistic analogues IM4 and IM5) with the techniques of the theory of abstract logics set up by Suszko, Bloom, Brown, Verdú and others. The abstract concepts corresponding to such systems are defined as generalizations of the logics naturally associated to their algebraic models (topological Boolean or Heyting algebras, general or semisimple). By considering new suitably defined connectives and by distinguishing between having the rule of necessitation only for theorems or as a full inference rule (which amounts to dealing with all filters or with open filters of the algebras) we are able to reduce the study of a modal (abstract) logic L to that of two nonmodal logics L− and L+ associated with L. We find that L is “of IM4 type” if and only if L− and L+ are both intuitionistic and have the same theorems, and logics of type S4, IM5 or S5 are obtained from those of type IM4 simply by making classical L−, L+ or both. We compare this situation with that found in recent approaches to intuitionistic modal logic using birelational models or using higher-level sequent-systems. The treatment of modal systems with abstract logics is rather new, and in our way to it we find several general constructions and results which can also be applied to other modal systems weaker than those we study in detail.

On finite and infinite modal systems

1938 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. West Churchman
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Complex Modal

In Oskar Becker's Zur Logik der Modalitäten four systems of modal logic are considered. Two of these are mentioned in Appendix II of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic. The first system is based on A1–8 plus the postulate,From A7: ∼◊p⊰∼p we can prove the converse of C11 by writing ∼◊p for p, and hence deriveThe addition of this postulate to A1–8, as Becker points out, allows us to “reduce” all complex modal functions to six, and these six are precisely those which Lewis mentions in his postulates and theorems: p, ∼p, ◊p, ∼◊p, ∼◊∼p, and ◊∼p This reduction is accomplished by showingwhere ◊n means that the modal operator ◊ is repeated n times; e.g., ◊3p = ◊◊◊p. Then it is shown thatBy means of (1), (2), and (3) any complex modal function whatsoever may be reduced to one of the six “simple” modals mentioned above.It might be asked whether this reduction could be carried out still further, i.e., whether two of the six “irreducible” modals could not be equated. But such a reduction would have to be based on the fact that ◊p = p which is inconsistent with the set B1–9 of Lewis and Langford's Symbolic logic and independent of the set A1–8. Hence for neither set would such a reduction be possible.

scholarly journals On the Decidability of Intuitionistic Tense Logic without Disjunction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Liang ◽  
Zhe Lin
Keyword(s):  
Proof Theory ◽  
Tense Logic ◽  
Heyting Algebras ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Algebraic Proof ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Algebraic Models ◽  
Finite Axiomatizability ◽  
Finite Model Property ◽  
Modal Operators

Implicative semi-lattices (also known as Brouwerian semi-lattices) are a generalization of Heyting algebras, and have been already well studied both from a logical and an algebraic perspective. In this paper, we consider the variety ISt of the expansions of implicative semi-lattices with tense modal operators, which are algebraic models of the disjunction-free fragment of intuitionistic tense logic. Using methods from algebraic proof theory, we show that the logic of tense implicative semi-lattices has the finite model property. Combining with the finite axiomatizability of the logic, it follows that the logic is decidable.

Modal logic, philosophical issues in

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Claim ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Modal Semantics ◽  
Bull's Eye ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Richard Montague

In reasoning we often use words such as ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘must’ and so on. For example, if we know that an argument is valid, then we know that it is necessarily true that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. Modal logic starts with such modal words and the inferences involving them. The exploration of these inferences has led to a variety of formal systems, and their interpretation is now most often built on the concept of a possible world. Standard non-modal logic shows us how to understand logical words such as ‘not’, ‘and’ and ‘or’, which are truth-functional. The modal concepts are not truth-functional: knowing that p is true (and what ‘necessarily’ means) does not automatically enable one to determine whether ‘Necessarily p’ is true. (‘It is necessary that all people have been people’ is true, but ‘It is necessary that no English monarch was born in Montana’ is false, even though the simpler constituents – ‘All people have been people’ and ‘No English monarch was born in Montana’– are both true.) The study of modal logic has helped in the understanding of many other contexts for sentences that are not truth-functional, such as ‘ought’ (‘It ought to be the case that p’) and ‘believes’ (‘Alice believes that p’); and also in the consideration of the interaction between quantifiers and non-truth-functional contexts. In fact, much work in modern semantics has benefited from the extension of modal semantics introduced by Richard Montague in beginning the development of a systematic semantics for natural language. The framework of possible worlds developed for modal logic has been fruitful in the analysis of many concepts. For example, by introducing the concept of relative possibility, Kripke showed how to model a variety of modal systems: a proposition is necessarily true at a possible world w if and only if it is true at every world that is possible relative to w. To achieve a better analysis of statements of ability, Mark Brown adapted the framework by modelling actions with sets of possible outcomes. John has the ability to hit the bull’s-eye reliably if there is some action of John’s such that every possible outcome of that action includes John’s hitting the bull’s-eye. Modal logic and its semantics also raise many puzzles. What makes a modal claim true? How do we tell what is possible and what is necessary? Are there any possible things that do not exist (and what could that mean anyway)? Does the use of modal logic involve a commitment to essentialism? How can an individual exist in many different possible worlds?

New foundations for Lewis modal systems

1957 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Lemmon
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal System ◽  
New Foundations ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Classical Propositional Calculus ◽  
Modal Systems

The main aims of this paper are firstly to present new and simpler postulate sets for certain well-known systems of modal logic, and secondly, in the light of these results, to suggest some new or newly formulated calculi, capable of interpretation as systems of epistemic or deontic modalities. The symbolism throughout is that of [9] (see especially Part III, Chapter I). In what follows, by a Lewis modal system is meant a system which (i) contains the full classical propositional calculus, (ii) is contained in the Lewis system S5, (iii) admits of the substitutability of tautologous equivalents, (iv) possesses as theses the four formulae:We shall also say that a system Σ1 is stricter than a system Σ2, if both are Lewis modal systems and Σ1 is contained in Σ2 but Σ2 is not contained in Σ1; and we shall call Σ1absolutely strict, if it possesses an infinity of irreducible modalities. Thus, the five systems of Lewis in [5], S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, are all Lewis modal systems by this definition; they are in an order of decreasing strictness from S1 to S5; and S1 and S2 alone are absolutely strict.

Liberated Brouwerian Modal Logic

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Modal Systems ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In an attempt to “purify” logic of existential presuppositions, attention has recently focused on modal logics, where one usually assumes that at least one possible world exists. Systems very analogous to some of the standard modal systems have been developed which drop this presupposition. We will here treat the removal of the existential assumption from Brouwerian modal logic and discuss the relationship of the system so derived to other modal systems.

scholarly journals A Fractional Ramp Generator with Improved Linearity and Phase-Noise Performance for the Use in Heterodyne Measurement Systems

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 75-81
Author(s):  
T. Musch ◽  
B. Schiek
Keyword(s):  
Phase Noise ◽  
Prototype System ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Measurement Sensitivity ◽  
Ramp Generator ◽  
Basic Measurement ◽  
Phase Noise Performance ◽  
Linearity Error ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Frequency Detector

Abstract. Concepts for the generation and the measurement of highly linear frequency ramps are presented. The fractional ramp synthesiser concept shown here is able to generate frequency ramps with a very low phase noise level, a very good frequency linearity and reproducibility. Related to the bandwidth of the generated frequency ramps of 4.5 GHz a relative linearity error below 4·10–10 is demonstrated in a prototype system. This linearity error is close to the limit set by the phase noise floor of the ramp generators and marks a significant improvement over existing aproaches (Musch and Schiek, 2000). The basic measurement sensitivity due to the phase noise is 1.8·10–10 without averaging. As the phase noise is important for the linearity of the frequency ramp the set-up has to be optimised for a good phase noise behaviour, too. In order to achieve this good phase noise a special phase-frequency detector is introduced that is especially designed for the use in a fractional phase locked loop.

scholarly journals STABLE MODAL LOGICS

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
GURAM BEZHANISHVILI ◽  
NICK BEZHANISHVILI ◽  
JULIA ILIN
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
General Concept ◽  
Modal Logics ◽  
Normal Modal Logic ◽  
Superintuitionistic Logics ◽  
Modal Systems

AbstractStable logics are modal logics characterized by a class of frames closed under relation preserving images. These logics admit all filtrations. Since many basic modal systems such as K4 and S4 are not stable, we introduce the more general concept of an M-stable logic, where M is an arbitrary normal modal logic that admits some filtration. Of course, M can be chosen to be K4 or S4. We give several characterizations of M-stable logics. We prove that there are continuum many S4-stable logics and continuum many K4-stable logics between K4 and S4. We axiomatize K4-stable and S4-stable logics by means of stable formulas and discuss the connection between S4-stable logics and stable superintuitionistic logics. We conclude the article with many examples (and nonexamples) of stable, K4-stable, and S4-stable logics and provide their axiomatization in terms of stable rules and formulas.

scholarly journals KRULL DIMENSION IN MODAL LOGIC

2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 1356-1386 ◽  
Author(s):  
GURAM BEZHANISHVILI ◽  
NICK BEZHANISHVILI ◽  
JOEL LUCERO-BRYAN ◽  
JAN VAN MILL
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Krull Dimension ◽  
Heyting Algebras ◽  
Topological Spaces ◽  
Tychonoff Space ◽  
Dimension Functions

AbstractWe develop the theory of Krull dimension forS4-algebras and Heyting algebras. This leads to the concept of modal Krull dimension for topological spaces. We compare modal Krull dimension to other well-known dimension functions, and show that it can detect differences between topological spaces that Krull dimension is unable to detect. We prove that for aT1-space to have a finite modal Krull dimension can be described by an appropriate generalization of the well-known concept of a nodec space. This, in turn, can be described by modal formulaszemnwhich generalize the well-known Zeman formulazem. We show that the modal logicS4.Zn:=S4+ zemnis the basic modal logic ofT1-spaces of modal Krull dimension ≤n, and we construct a countable dense-in-itselfω-resolvable Tychonoff spaceZnof modal Krull dimensionnsuch thatS4.Znis complete with respect toZn. This yields a version of the McKinsey-Tarski theorem forS4.Zn. We also show that no logic in the interval [S4n+1S4.Zn) is complete with respect to any class ofT1-spaces.

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