Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods

1969 ◽  
Vol 79 (315) ◽  
pp. 567 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Head ◽  
Carl S. Shoup
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Goods

scholarly journals Swords and Plowshares: Property Rights, Collective Action, and Nonstate Governance in the Jewish Community of Palestine 1920–1948

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
DAVID MUCHLINSKI
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Jewish Community ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Agricultural Communities ◽  
Institutional Variation ◽  
Subnational Governance

Developing states lacking a monopoly over the use of force are commonly seen as having failed to live up to the ideal Weberian sovereign type. Yet rather than being a calling card of anarchy, the devolution of important state functions to subnational actors is a rational strategy for developing states to effectively provide important public goods. The case study of the Jewish Community of Palestine demonstrates one instance where subnational communities provided public goods. This study highlights the causal effect of property rights within institutions to drive behavior consistent with the provision of public and private goods. Analyzing temporal and institutional variation across two agricultural communities demonstrates a unique strategy of subnational governance and public goods provision in a developing state. Devolution of public goods provision to subnational actors may be an alternative strategy of governance for developing states that are not yet able to effectively provide important public goods.

Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Target Individual ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Over Time

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.

Public Goods, Private Goods

2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leigh Turner
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Goods

Applying a New Sub-Systems Model to Analyze Economic Policy and the Question of Systemic Persistence

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-87
Author(s):  
James C. Schopf
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Systems Theory ◽  
Political System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Systemic Model ◽  
Insight Into

Easton's systems theory greatly contributed to the field of political science by providing a useful holistic framework, demonstrating how the political system functions, by meeting societal demands with policy outputs. Easton's interest lay in the political system's persistence, which in his model, merely required the existence of community. Communities, however, require state-provided security to survive in a hostile international environment. Hence, this paper builds a sub-systemic governance model able to explain domestic political system and state persistence. The model argues that large input generating groups require sufficient allocation of public goods for the long term maintenance of the domestic political system. Application of the model to the successful South Korean case demonstrated that the share of public goods increased along with the size of the input generating group. Long term disruption of this critical subsystem in countries with large input generating groups, however, can destabilize the state and its domestic political system with increased pressure from unmet societal demands. This new sub-systemic model seeks to advance understanding of the operation of the system and open up new areas of research into the persistence of the domestic political system. The systems approach has greatly contributed to the study of politics. David Easton's seminal Systems Theory drew attention to important aspects of political life and provided a critical framework with which to understand and analyze inputs into the political system and policy outputs to the social environment. The advancement of systems theory in political science was hobbled, however by methodological shortcomings. Easton failed to operationalize key concepts, and as a result, the theory was neither applied nor tested. In addition, Easton's all-inclusive system design was unable to give insight into several systems-related questions areas of interest to social scientists, including the survival or collapse of states and their domestic political systems, regime change, and variation in the nature of policy outputs or societal inputs. Combining Easton's policy process framework with methodologically rigorous approaches sharing key system's theory assumptions helps to deepen understanding of these issues. By narrowing Easton's system to a critical subsystem comprised of the leader and his/her supporters, it becomes evident that changes in the size of the input-generating group can markedly affect the quality of government policy outputs. This new sub systemic model yields the prediction that leader's seeking to maintain power will allocate an increased ratio of public goods to private goods, the larger the size of the input generating group. After operationalizing the size of the input-generating group and the share of public vs. private goods allocated through economic policy, this paper applies this sub systemic hypothesis to explain recent changes in economic policy making in South Korea. Modernization theory provides the added insight that the forces of industrialization and economic development are increasing the size of the input-generating group in societies throughout the world, which are calling for public policy goods, in the form of democratic political rights as well as improved overall living standards. Leadership failing to respond to these increased demands over a prolonged period not only provokes regime change, but, in certain circumstances, can destabilize and trigger the collapse of states and of domestic political systems. Research into underdeveloped institutions, economic power concentration, sectarian division and other factors impeding delivery of public goods to large input generating groups, can offer further insight into the question of systemic persistence, the central concern of Easton's systems theory. The article first critiques the strengths and weaknesses of Easton's systems theory. A sub-systemic model is offered to ameliorate the methodological shortcomings of Easton's systems theory while making it applicable to questions concerning the persistence of domestic political systems and state maintenance. Applied to two cases of Korean industrial restructuring, the predictions of the sub-systemic model hold true: small input generating groups under authoritarian rule were associated with provision of private goods, whereas larger input generating groups under democracy produced policies that allocated public goods. The final section of the paper then explores the possible collapse of the domestic political system in cases where leadership is unable to provide public goods to large input generating groups.

Specifics of the Production of Pensionary Good in Russia

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (3) ◽  
pp. 200-219
Author(s):  
Viktoriya Moseiko
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Pension Fund ◽  
Pension System ◽  
The State ◽  
Secondary Importance ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Merit Goods ◽  
The Russian Federation

The author considers the concept of «pensionary good» and the specifics of its production at the state and non-state levels. The purpose of the study is to analyze the actions aimed at creating a «pensionary good» under the influence of incentives and coercion. Drawing on the theory of goods, the author comes to conclusion that the elements of pensionary good can be produced in the form of public goods, merit goods, club goods and private goods. The author identifies the specifics of pensionary good structure at the analyzed levels and shows that national pension in the Russian Federation is based on coercion, with stimulation being of secondary importance. Non-state-funded retirement also uses the coercion and incentives. It has been established that coercion and incentives provide contradictory results as mechanisms used in the process of producing a pensionary good. While preparing the article, the author used the data from the Federal Statistic Service, the Pension Fund of Russia and various sociological surveys and scientific works on pensions and insurance. The conclusions of the study may be useful for further research on the development of Russian pension system.

scholarly journals The Business of Business is Business: Why (Some) Firms Should Provide Public Goods when they Sell Private Goods

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-Yu Lai ◽  
Andreas Lange ◽  
John List ◽  
Michael Price
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Goods

scholarly journals Democracy, consumption, and growth in sub-Saharan Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-48
Author(s):  
John A Doces
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Empirical Estimates ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan

This article studies the effect of political regime type on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy promotes growth because it conditions government consumption so that consumption is used for public purposes rather than private needs and this in turn leads to faster growth. By conditioning consumption towards public goods and away from private goods, we should see that consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more public goods like roads and education while in authoritarian regimes consumption yields less of these goods. Likewise, consumption should be associated with falling fertility in democratic regimes and rising fertility in authoritarian regimes. Using several measures of growth, the empirical estimates from a large- n fixed-effects regression show that democracy conditions consumption so that the latter is associated with faster growth. Moreover, the empirical analysis indicates that government consumption in democratic regimes is associated with more education completion and lower fertility rates.

Energy R&D: in tepid pursuit of collective goods

1979 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davis B. Bobrow ◽  
Robert T. Kudrle
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Liquid Fuel ◽  
Liquid Fuels ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Before And After ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Economy Approach

Continued dependence on expensive imported liquid fuels puts stress on the relations among and the domestic performance of the members of OECD. Coordinated energy R&D could in principle lessen those stresses and also benefit other liquid fuel consumers. A political economy approach can help explain the tepid pursuit of this possibility in two ways. First, it can clarify the reasons for the weak collective action energy R&D record of the members of the OECD both before and after the oil events of 1973. Second, it can demonstrate and identify the nature of the undersupply of the public good of energy knowledge. The history of this area illustrates several general obstacles to the provision of public goods in realistically complex political situations. These include the uncertain and distant nature of commitments to actually deliver collective goods in the absense of self-enforcing agreements, unwillingness to jeopardize possible future private advantages, and the tendencies to link provision of particular public goods to cooperation by other parties with the provider on a host of other matters. In effect, the attempts of particular statesmen to tie energy R&D cooperation to other issues reinforce tendencies to view the choices not as ones about the level of provision of public goods, but rather as ones about national shares of private goods—economic, military, and political.

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