The Philosophical Significance of the One-Way Speed of Light

Noûs ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley C. Salmon
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1032-1035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman

The research on quasi-luminal neutrinos has sparked several experimental studies for testing the "speed of light limit" hypothesis. Until today, the overall evidence favors the "null" hypothesis, stating that there is no significant difference between the observed velocities of light and neutrinos. Despite numerous theoretical models proposed to explain the neutrinos behavior, no attempt has been undertaken to predict the experimentally produced results. This paper presents a simple novel extension of Newton's mechanics to the domain of relativistic velocities. For a typical neutrino-velocity experiment, the proposed model is utilized to derive a general expression for . Comparison of the model's prediction with results of six neutrino-velocity experiments, conducted by five collaborations, reveals that the model predicts all the reported results with striking accuracy. Because in the proposed model, the direction of the neutrino flight matters, the model's impressive success in accounting for all the tested data, indicates a complete collapse of the Lorentz symmetry principle in situation involving quasi-luminal particles, moving in two opposite directions. This conclusion is support by previous findings, showing that an identical Sagnac effect to the one documented for radial motion, occurs also in linear motion.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianfranco Spavieri ◽  
Espen Gaarder Haug

We consider a thought experiment, equivalent to the Sagnac effect, where a light signal performs a round trip over a closed path. If special relativity (SR) adopts Einstein synchronization, the result of the experiment shows that the local light speed cannot be c in every section of the closed path. No inconsistencies are found when adopting absolute synchronization. Since Einstein and absolute synchronizations can be discriminated, the conventionality of the one-way speed of light holds no longer. Thus, as sustained by specialists, it might be a viable formulation of SR that reinstates the conservation of simultaneity, even though it allows for relativistic effects, such as time dilation. Such an approach may lead to the discovery of new effects and a better understanding of relativistic theories.


2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-342
Author(s):  
Caslav Koprivica

In this text, the work of Serbian writer Stanislav Krakov, between the two world wars, the famous, and later, due to ideological divisions, repressed and forgotten figure, is ovserverd through the lens of philosophy of existence and phenomenology. The ?philosophical? significance of Krakov?s autobiographical war prose, which in the aesthetic, especially formal-innovative aspect, represented the pinnacle of the genre of that time Serbian literature, is that it can be viewed as a first-class document of phenomenological introspection of a man in situation of mortal combat; and the ragne his prose of his prose is, in some respects, without exaggeration, comparable to war prose of Ernst J?nger. But besides his authentic documentality, Krakov?s writing is characterized by brilliant insights. So, on the one hand, Krakov can be viewed as a thinker of war and corporeality avant lettre, and, on the other hand, the interpretative contextualization of his prose within the aforementioned philosophical tradition helps us to better understand his literature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (11) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Henneaux ◽  
Patricio Salgado-Rebolledo

Abstract We consider Carroll-invariant limits of Lorentz-invariant field theories. We show that just as in the case of electromagnetism, there are two inequivalent limits, one “electric” and the other “magnetic”. Each can be obtained from the corresponding Lorentz-invariant theory written in Hamiltonian form through the same “contraction” procedure of taking the ultrarelativistic limit c → 0 where c is the speed of light, but with two different consistent rescalings of the canonical variables. This procedure can be applied to general Lorentz-invariant theories (p-form gauge fields, higher spin free theories etc) and has the advantage of providing explicitly an action principle from which the electrically-contracted or magnetically-contracted dynamics follow (and not just the equations of motion). Even though not manifestly so, this Hamiltonian action principle is shown to be Carroll invariant. In the case of p-forms, we construct explicitly an equivalent manifestly Carroll-invariant action principle for each Carroll contraction. While the manifestly covariant variational description of the electric contraction is rather direct, the one for the magnetic contraction is more subtle and involves an additional pure gauge field, whose elimination modifies the Carroll transformations of the fields. We also treat gravity, which constitutes one of the main motivations of our study, and for which we provide the two different contractions in Hamiltonian form.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4 Jul-Aug) ◽  
pp. 424
Author(s):  
L. Nanni

In this study the tachyon-like Dirac equation, formulated by Chodos to describe superluminal neutrino, is solved. The analytical solutions are Gaussian wave packets obtained using the envelope method. It is shown that the superluminal neutrino behaves like a pseudo-tachyon, namely a particle with subluminal velocity and pure imaginary mass that fulfils the energy-momentum relation typical of classical tachyons. The obtained results are used to prove that the trembling motion of the particle position around the median, known as Zitterbewegung, also takes place for the superluminal neutrino, even if the oscillation velocity is always lower than the speed of light. Finally, the pseudo-tachyon wave packet is used to calculate the probability of oscillation between mass states, obtaining a formula analogous to the one obtained for the ordinary neutrino. This suggest that in the experiments concerning neutrino oscillation is not possible to distinguish tachyonic neutrinos from ordinary ones.


Author(s):  
Flavio Mercati

By applying the principles of relational field theory to the gravitational field, and using 3D diffeomorphism invariance as our symmetry principle for best matching, it is feasible to reduce the working possibilities to just a few cases. One is a field-theory version of (GR), which is the limit of General Relativity in which the speed of light goes to infinity and the light cones open up to provide a notion of absolute simultaneity. Another is the opposite limit, dubbed ‘Carrollian Relativity’ by Levy–Leblond, in which the speed of light goes to zero and each point is causally isolated from the other. This limit is related to the so-called ‘BKL’ behaviour that appears to be universal near singularities. The penultimate possibility is (GR), while the last one is SD, which emerges as the unique generalization of the theory that allows for an arbitrary value of the one free coefficient in the supermetric.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-354
Author(s):  
Stephan J. G. Gift

Three tests of the one-way speed of light relative to a moving observer, which invalidate the principle of light speed constancy, are reviewed. These tests are corroborated by easily demonstrating light speed variation using Doppler shift for moving observers.


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 695-709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Scott

I have two aims in this paper. My wide one is to discuss what it is for philosophy to enlighten. I am using the same concept of enlightenment that Kant wrote about: It is what brings a rational outlook to social and political life, in opposition to superstition, self-deception and other forms of immaturity. If philosophy is to do this, it is not sufficient for it to have a rational theory about society, nor is having such a theory even necessary, since philosophers can try to make a community more reasonable without formulating a social philosophy. The Vienna Circle is an example. The point of enlightenment is to change society rather than to develop research programs. The difference is between involvement with real life on the one hand and an idle theory on the other.My narrow aim is to display the self-image of the Vienna Circle as philosophers of enlightenment. They agreed that the important task of any philosophical school was to enlighten and that positivism did so because it expressed the scientific spirit. This is the second concept I discuss. I will show that what they meant by ‘the scientific spirit’ was a moral outlook present in socialism and hostile to fascism. This is not what people usually understand by it. I am also not giving the received historical view of the Circle. Rather the English and American idea is that positivism was entirely an academic movement. The social concerns of its advocates were incidental to its philosophical significance. The Frankfurt School's view is that it had a hidden alliance with technology. My purpose is to counter both these misinterpretations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.


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