The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 494-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ved P. Nanda

Only a few hours after ordering the U.S. military forces to Panama on December 20, 1989, President Bush explained that General Manuel Noriega had declared “a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.” This, he said, had been followed by the murder of an unarmed American serviceman by Noriega’s forces and beatings and harassment of others. He added that, as General Noriega’s “reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama” had created an “imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama,” he as President was obligated “to safeguard the lives of American citizens.”

Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

International Law in the U.S. Legal System provides a wide-ranging overview of how international law intersects with the domestic legal system of the United States, and points out various unresolved issues and areas of controversy. Curtis Bradley explains the structure of the U.S. legal system and the various separation of powers and federalism considerations implicated by this structure, especially as these considerations relate to the conduct of foreign affairs. Against this backdrop, he covers all of the principal forms of international law: treaties, executive agreements, decisions and orders of international institutions, customary international law, and jus cogens norms. He also explores a number of issues that are implicated by the intersection of U.S. law and international law, such as treaty withdrawal, foreign sovereign immunity, international human rights litigation, war powers, extradition, and extraterritoriality. This book highlights recent decisions and events relating to the topic, including various actions taken during the Trump administration, while also taking into account relevant historical materials, including materials relating to the U.S. Constitutional Founding. Written by one of the most cited international law scholars in the United States, the book is a resource for lawyers, law students, legal scholars, and judges from around the world.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 123-127
Author(s):  
Stephen Pomper

We are having this conversation now because of the April 7 strikes on the Shayrat Airfield in Syria, but the question of how one justifies forcible measures in the context of a humanitarian emergency, and in the face of a deadlocked Security Council, is one that deserves urgent attention beyond the context of any single event. Progress toward answering this question has, however, been mired in a long-standing debate between those who believe that there is no credible international law justification for humanitarian intervention—and that the U.S. government should instead justify interventions like those taken at Kosovo and Shayrat as morally “legitimate”—and those who believe a legal justification can and should be put forward. I am very much in the latter camp and will use my time now to explain how I arrived at this position as a policy and as a legal matter by looking at three questions: the first question is whether legal justification is the direction that the United States should go in as a matter of policy. The second question is whether legal justification is credibly available as a matter of international law. The third question (which assumes the answer to the first and second is yes) is how to go about articulating and disseminating such a justification. Let me take these in order.


1977 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adolf Sprudzs

Among the many old and new actors on the international stage of nations the United States is one of the most active and most important. The U.S. is a member of most existing intergovernmental organizations, participates in hundreds upon hundreds of international conferences and meetings every year and, in conducting her bilateral and multilateral relations with the other members of the community of nations, contributes very substantially to the development of contemporary international law. The Government of the United States has a policy of promptly informing the public about developments in its relations with other countries through a number of documentary publication, issued by the Department of State


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 13-20
Author(s):  
Andrew Morton ◽  
Wendy A. Young

This article outlines U.S. policy toward children asylum seekers. It highlights the gaps in U.S. detention and asylum policy which jeopardize the protection of children. It also discusses advances made in recent years, such as issuance of the U.S. “Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims” which establish evidentiary, procedural, and legal standards for asylum adjudicators dealing with children’s claims. Finally, it suggests reforms that are necessary to bring the United States into compliance with international law and to ensure that children are provided the refuge they deserve.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Andrew Sanger

As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) must “touch and concern the territory of the United States … with sufficient force” for federal courts to recognize a federal common law cause of action for violations of international law.


2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel L. Byman

U.S. allies that are fighting al-Qaida-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism and the U.S. goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Nash

On June 20, 1994, Ambassador Harriet C. Babbit, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, deposited on behalf of the U.S. Government the instrument of ratification of the “Protocol of Washington,” adopted on December 14, 1992, by the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States and signed by the United States on January 23, 1993, and the “Protocol of Managua,” adopted by the Nineteenth Special Session of the OAS General Assembly on June 10, 1993, and signed that day by the United States. The U.S. Senate had given its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocols on May 17, 1994, with two-thirds of the Senators present and concurring.


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