Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel L. Byman

U.S. allies that are fighting al-Qaida-linked insurgencies often suffer illegitimate regimes, civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup, economic backwardness, and discriminatory societies. These problems, coupled with allies' divergent interests, serve to weaken allied military and security forces tactically, operationally, and strategically. The ability of the United States to change its allies' behavior is limited, despite the tremendous difficulties these problems create, because relying on allied forces is a key component of U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism and the U.S. goal of handing off security to Iraqi military forces. To reduce the effects of allies' weaknesses, the United States should try to increase its intelligence on allied security forces and at times act more like a third party to a conflict. In addition, Washington must have realistic expectations of what training and other efforts can accomplish.

Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Robert Conway

U.S. policies can play a major part in influencing change in South Africa, but before this can occur there is much faulty thinking to correct. Traditional academic commentary on the matter prescribes for the U.S. the role of honest broker; indeed, the State Department often categorizes its own role in such terms. This is a myth that must be exploded immediately. The United States has too much at stake in the area; it can't pretend to be neutral or play the role of a third party mediator. It is a major partner.


2019 ◽  
pp. 452-468
Author(s):  
Robert Paul Churchill

The United States is now relying on Reaper and Predator drone strikes as its primary strategy in the continuing War on Terrorism. This paper argues for the rational scrutiny drone warfare has yet to receive. It is argued that drone warfare is immoral as it fails both the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum conditions of Just War theory. Drone warfare cannot be accepted on utilitarian grounds either, as it is very probable that terrorists will acquire drones capable of lethal strikes and deploy them against defenseless civilians. Moreover, by examining the psychological bases for reliance on drone warfare, as well as the message the United States is sending adversaries, we need to be concerned that, rather than reduce the likelihood of terrorists strikes, the U.S. reliance on drones strikes threatens to institutionalize terrorism as the status quo for the foreseeable future.


Author(s):  
Moeed Yusuf

This chapter examines the 2001–2002 military standoff that kept India and Pakistan on the verge of war for ten months. Brokered bargaining characterized crisis behavior of the rivals and the U.S.-led third party. India threatened to use military force but pulled back at critical junctures as the United States acted as a guarantor of Pakistan’s promises of curbing cross-border terrorism and raised India’s costs of defying third-party demands to de-escalate. Pakistan promised retaliation against India and harmed the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan by withdrawing forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but this “autonomous” behavior was trumped by its propensity to oblige the United States by accepting some responsibility for anti-India terrorism and acting tangibly against militants. The chapter also analyzes the several risks of escalation introduced by India’s and Pakistan’s misperceptions of the third party’s leverage over the opponent.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 494-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ved P. Nanda

Only a few hours after ordering the U.S. military forces to Panama on December 20, 1989, President Bush explained that General Manuel Noriega had declared “a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.” This, he said, had been followed by the murder of an unarmed American serviceman by Noriega’s forces and beatings and harassment of others. He added that, as General Noriega’s “reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama” had created an “imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama,” he as President was obligated “to safeguard the lives of American citizens.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2/2021) ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Stevan Nedeljkovic ◽  
Merko Dasic

The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan during August 2021 puts an end to the longest war that America has ever fought and the first phase of the Global War on Terrorism. In this regard, two important questions arise, which we will try to answer in this paper. First, what are the main external and internal consequences that the United States has faced due to engaging in the “War on Terror”? Second, did the U.S. achieve its goals in that war? The external effects we have identified are the crisis of global leadership, the weakening of relations with the allies, the growth of China in the lee, and the rise of populism. Among the internal ones, we included the strengthening of the presidential function, the increase of state power, more profound social polarization, an increase in budget expenditures, and a growing deficit, as well as human casualties. In the end, we contributed to the debate on the nature of the U.S. “victory”. We are providing the argumentation in the direction that the final output of War on Terror should be named Pyrrhic victory.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Eversman

This ongoing dispute clearly concerns the United States, the long-term third party in peace negotiations, and a close ally of Israel. However, now more than ever European and Middle Eastern states are invested in the resolution of this conflict. The stability of Israel and the humanitarian status of the Palestinians depend upon the resolution of this conflict. So, what should President Barack Obama hope to accomplish in the coming months, in light of the overwhelming array of issues already on his agenda? And what should the rest of the world expect from U.S. foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under Mr. Obama’s administration? Political maneuvering is already underway and the recent elections in Israel have shifted the power structure of Israeli politics significantly to the right with Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud Party, elected as Prime Minister and sworn in at the end of March 2009. Furthermore, Egyptian negotiators are attempting to bridge the deep divide between Fatah and Hamas in order to strengthen the unity of Palestinian politics, but the outcome of this endeavor remains to be seen. As the global economic crisis continues to worsen, the attention of the world shifted from the Israeli- Palestinian conflict to the G-20 Summit and NATO meetings. Therefore, it is the role of world leaders, particularly the United States, to maintain focus on rebuilding Gaza and acting as intermediaries in any Israeli and Palestinian negotiations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must ensure the State Department keeps its finger firmly on the pulse of political and social activities in the region in order to prevent renewed fighting. The United States and Europe should have anticipated more aware of this impending crisis and in the aftermath of the conflict, neither can afford to watch from the sidelines. Dialogue and diplomacy are the way out of this mess, and it is in the interests of both Europe and the U.S. to engage both sides in this dispute if further violence is to be prevented. If Mr. Obama wants to have peace in the Middle East in our time, he will have to persuade all of the actors to sit around a table and to talk about the conflict. The Bush administration’s strategy of strengthening Fatah and isolating Hamas has not worked. Secret negotiations are just as ineffectual as the exclusion of certain actors. Only a common platform for dialogue will enable the U.S. and the European Union to fulfill their peacemaking mission.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
E. DeMichele ◽  
P. S. Machno ◽  
L. A. Stone

The U.S. National Biosolids Partnership (NBP), an alliance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA) and Water Environment Federation (WEF), was formed in 1997 in response to public acceptance issues dealing with biosolids management. The United States Congress provides funding to assist public agencies to improve existing biosolids management programs to maintain/achieve public support. The key to a successful program is systematic management and an independent third party audit to assure organizations are managing biosolids to meet the requirements of an excellent biosolids management program. The NBP program utilizes the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System principles. The program has defined 17 components of excellent biosolids management and the independent third party audit program. One hundred organizations are participating in the program and 16 agencies have been “certified” though a third party audit. The smallest agency serves a community of 200 people and the largest treats over a billion gallons a day. Participants are benefiting through cost savings, efficiencies and better public trust.


2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 288-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Pfiffner

George W. Bush certainly did not expect to be a war president. In his private sector career and as Governor of Texas he had seldom traveled abroad, and he did not demonstrate much interest in international affairs. In his campaign for the presidency he expressed skepticism about foreign entanglements and a disdain for “nation building.” Yet events conspired to make war the central concern of his presidency; after the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001, Bush saw the war on terrorism as the primary mission of his presidency. “I'm here for a reason, and this [the war on terrorism] is going to be how we're to be judged.”1 Soon thereafter he decided that the U.S. should conduct a campaign for regime change in Iraq, by military means, if necessary.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the relevance of international law within the U.S. legal system to the United States’ initiation and conduct of war. After briefly reviewing some of the most relevant treaties relating to war and warfare, the chapter considers the Constitution’s distribution of war authority between Congress and the President. It then discusses how international law, including the provisions in the UN Charter relating to the authority of the Security Council, as well as collective self-defense treaties, might affect the President’s war authority. The chapter then shifts to the “war on terrorism” and discusses the relevance of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, to issues concerning the scope of the military’s detention authority in that conflict, with particular reference to the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. International law and other issues relating to the use of military commissions to try terrorist suspects are also considered. The chapter concludes by discussing legal debates relating to coercive interrogation and targeted killing.


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