Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine

1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 590-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang-Myon Rhee

The United States and Canada agreed, by the Boundary Settlement Treaty of March 29, 1979, to submit their decade-long dispute over the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to an ad hoc court of arbitration. The treaty, however, has not yet taken effect because the interrelated Fisheries Agreement, which was concluded on the same day and was to take effect simultaneously, was Unilaterally scrapped by the United States Government on March 6, 1981, on grounds of its allegedly unfair and inflexible provisions. On April 29, the United States Senate unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the Government's position to delink the two treaties and to settle the maritime boundary problem first by a third-party procedure. Whether or not a new fisheries agreement is concluded in the near future, it is expected that the maritime boundary dispute will ultimately be resolved by binding third-party settlement. The purpose of this article is to examine the legal position taken by each Government regarding the maritime boundary issues, and to suggest equitable principles that should govern their resolution.

Author(s):  
D.M. McRae

On March 29, 1979 Canada and the United States signed a treaty to submit their dispute over the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine to binding settlement. The event is worthy of note not only because it is the first occasion since the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, in 1910, that the two countries have submitted a dispute over their offshore jurisdiction to third party settlement but also because it constitutes the first reference by any state of a question to a chamber of the International Court of Justice. However, this reference to the Court is only conditional and the parties have provided for the possible removal of the case from the Court and for its submission to an ad hoc court of arbitration. Thus, as well as providing a further opportunity for an international tribunal to consider the law relating to the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the treaty raises some interesting questions about recourse to a chamber of the International Court of Justice.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 578-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davis R. Robinson ◽  
David A. Colson ◽  
Bruce C. Rashkow

On October 12, 1984, a five-member Chamber of the International Court of Justice rendered its decision in the maritime boundary dispute between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine area. The Chamber delimited the continental shelves and 200-nautical-mile fisheries zones by setting one line between the two countries off the East Coast of North America. The Chamber’s Judgment, which under Article 27 of the Statute of the Court is considered as if it were rendered by the full 15-member Court, is likely to attract considerable comment. We will resist the temptation to add our views to that substantive commentary, leaving analysis for the time being to others not so closely associated with the case.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 539-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Schneider

Pursuant to the recent four to one Judgment by a Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Canada and the United States are to share Georges Bank. Canada has jurisdiction over approximately one-sixth of the Bank, including the resource-rich “Northeast Peak” and most of the “Northern Edge,” and the United States the remaining area. Since Georges Bank is one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds, and this was consequently a case about fish more than a traditional continental shelf delimitation, the Judgment means that these North American neighbors may have to work out cooperative arrangements for the conservation and management of the shared living resources of Georges Bank. The question naturally arises as to how this outcome was reached, and why it purports to fulfill the fundamental norm of the law of delimitation of maritime boundaries—namely, to achieve an “equitable result.”


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold G. Maier

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan I. Charney

Judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and awards of ad hoc arbitration tribunals carry special weight in international maritime boundary law. On its face, the international maritime boundary law codified in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is indeterminate. For the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, the legal obligation of coastal states is to delimit the boundary “by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” The article on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the territorial sea is no more determinative despite the fact that it makes direct references to the equidistant line, special circumstances and historic title. In spite of this indeterminacy, if not because of it, coastal states have found that third-party dispute settlement procedures can effectively resolve maritime boundary delimitation disputes. As a consequence, there are more judgments and awards on maritime boundary disputes than on any other subject of international law, and this trend is continuing.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis A. Boyle

The only significant point of disagreement this author might have with the June 27, 1986 decision on the merits by the International Court of Justice in the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America concerns its failure to hold the United States Government fully responsible for the violations of the laws and customs of warfare committed by the contra forces in Nicaragua. The Court carefully premised this result on the finding that it had insufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion on such a delicate matter. Nevertheless, the Court held it established that the U.S. Government largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. Somewhat questionably, in the Court’s estimation, it remained to be proven that the Reagan administration actually exercised operational control over the contra forces.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-166
Author(s):  
Fred L. Morrison

The opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case will be of interest primarily because of its general pronouncements on questions of international law. Its impact on the immediate controversy appears slight; the United States Government has strongly indicated its view that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, has vetoed subsequent proposed Security Council resolutions on the subject, and is appropriating additional funds for the contested activities, without apparent reference to the Court’s decision. This Comment is limited to the general theoretical and legal issues and will not treat the underlying factual issues, the Court’s disposition of the immediate case or the implications of the opinion for the evolution of the dispute.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Chinkin

Until lately, the procedure of third-party intervention before the International Court of Justice provided for by Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute of the Court had been underutilized; as a result, there was scant judicial authority and comparatively little academic discussion on its use and limitations. This situation has now dramatically changed, as three recent cases before the Court have involved claims of third-party intervention: that between Tunisia and Libya, where Malta made the request to intervene; that between Libya and Malta, where Italy was the requesting state; and, most recently, the case between Nicaragua and the United States, where El Salvador made a declaration of intervention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 363-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donat Pharand

The international law applicable to maritime boundary delimitation is very imprecise and, consequently, decisions of international tribunals are of the utmost importance. The recent decision of a Chamber of the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Maine Case, between Canada and the United States, makes a significant contribution to the development and clarification of the applicable law. The Chamber's judgment, which is considered as one rendered by the Court itself, clarifies the difference between principles and rules of international law, on the one hand, and equitable criteria and practical methods, on the other. Principles of law are limited to a few basic norms, such as the obligation to seek an agreement and, if one cannot be reached, to have recourse to third party procedure with a view to arriving at an equitable delimitation by taking all relevant circumstances into account. Equitable criteria, such as the geographical configuration of the area, and practical methods, such as that of equidistance, are numerous and vary with each concrete situation.


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