The Hellenic Crisis from the Point of View of Constitutional and International Law

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 796-812
Author(s):  
Theodore P. Ion

We now come to the last part of what one might call the Greek tragedy, which was played in Hellas during the first three years of this world war with such marvelous success under Teutonic guidance. The events of June, 1916, laid bare the whole plot, unmasked the royal actors at Athens, and compelled France and England, the protecting Powers of Greece, at last to take drastic measures.The surrender of the “key” to Eastern Macedonia (the Roupel fortress) by Constantine to the Germano-Bulgarian forces was rightly considered by the guardians of Greece as a hostile act directed against them, demanding the adoption of appropriate measures for the security of their armies on the Balkan front. Their first measure to this end was the substitution of Allied authorities for those of Greece in the city of Salonika. The second was the refusal by Great Britain to supply coal to Greek ships. The three Entente Powers had previously warned the Greek Government that if it allowed the armies of their enemies to advance freely into Greek territory, such action would lead to serious consequences. Therefore, the Royal Government of Greece, fearing lest the Allies institute repressive measures of a more drastic character, informed the Entente Governments that the further advance of the Bulgarian troops into Greek territory would be prevented.

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-337
Author(s):  
Theodore P. Ion

The third part of the essay on the Hellenic Crisis, which has happily received a satisfactory solution, will deal with the incidents which are connected with the law of nations and inquire as to how far the European belligerents in their dealings with Greece, and the Greek Government in its relations with them, adhered to the tenets and usages of international law.The points to be here discussed are of a manifold character.First, it will be examined whether the serious charge made by the Entente Powers against Constantine, the ex-King of the Hellenes, that he violated the obligations arising out of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, by which the two states bound themselves to assist each other for the defense of their respective territories in case of attack by a third Power, and particularly by Bulgaria, is well founded according to the letter and spirit of the instrument of alliance.Secondly, whether the military occupation of portions of the territory of the Hellenic Kingdom by both sets of belligerents, the seizure of its war material and other public property, and particularly the coercive measures employed by the Entente Powers against the Government and people of Greece and their forcible intervention in the internal affairs of that country, can be justified either by reason of treaty stipulations or on account of the unneutral conduct of the then King and his government towards the Entente Allies. The first point to be examined is the obligation arising out of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.


Worldview ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Stephen Rousseas

Modern Greece has been a hapless country. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Greece was occupied for almost four hundred years by the Turks. The War of Independence, which began in 1821, continued for twelve years before it was finally resolved and the Triple Alliance implanted the Bavarian King Otho on the throne. Great Britain soon came to dominate Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean—a dominance that lasted, except for the German occupation of 1941-44, until 1947, when the U.S. stepped in with the Truman Doctrine. Thus began the period of the latest domination of Greece.At the outbreak of World War II, Greece was under the dictatorship of General Metaxas. When, on October 28, 1940, Mussolini issued his ultimatum to Greece, Metaxas replied with his now famous “Ohi” and the Greek troops humiliated Mussolini's minions in the mountains of Albania.


1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Wilford Garner

The above is the title of an article by. Mr. E. G. Trimble in the January (1930) issue of this Journal, which contains a rather severe indictment of the Allied Powers, and particularly of Great Britain, for having violated during the World War various well-settled rules of international law regarding the conduct of maritime warfare. I do not deny at all that there were violations of certain rules and practices which had come to be generally, if not universally, recognized as a part of the customary law of nations—violations not only by the Allied Powers, but on an even larger scale by their opponents, which latter, however, the author passes over in silence. But, in my opinion, his charges in some cases are not well founded either upon principles of international law, reason or the logic of the actual conditions under which the rules had to be applied. In presenting here a different view of the case, my object is not so much to defend the Allied Powers against the charges contained in Mr. Trimble's indictment as to reaffirm and maintain views which I expressed during the war regarding certain rights of belligerents in naval warfare, especially under the peculiar conditions which prevailed during that war—rights the exercise of which I believe was justified in principle by those conditions, whatever may have been the opinion of statesmen and prize judges a century ago, and which would have been claimed and exercised by Germany had the geographical situation as between her and Great Britain been reversed.


1950 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Edward H. Buehrig

Before our entry into the First World War American policy was labeled as one of neutrality, which implied that the proper measure of relations with the belligerents was to be found in international law and, more particularly, in the rules of maritimewarfare. The content of that policy failed to correspond with its label, for actually it was sharply inclined to the side of Great Britain. However, the Administration refrained from acknowledging the fact that British naval actions were not being scrupulouslysubjected to the test of the rules of maritime warfare. Freedom of the seas and support of Great Britainwere quite different points from which to proceed.Each might have been used as the basis of separate phases of a changing policy. In fact, however, they were employed simultaneously. Since they not only failed to complement each other but were actually contradictory, the result was to subject American policy toa terrific internal tension.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. G. Trimble

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Secretary of State Bryan wisely approached the belligerent governments proposing that both sides agree to conduct their naval warfare in accordance with the rules embodied in the Declaration of London. This document was drawn up at the London Naval Conference called by Great Britain in 1908, and was signed by the delegates of all the nations represented. The conference agreed that the rules contained in the document “correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.” The Declaration never became legally binding on the nations, however, having failed of ratification by the British Government itself. Legally, therefore, Great Britain was not bound by it in 1914, except in so far as it embodied preexisting rules of law.


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alpheus Henry Snow

It is a truism that the science of law proper – the science dealing with the United States or the law of Great Britain, one finds the whole science based on the fact of the existence of a political society known as the United States or Great Britain, which formulates, applies and enforces the law which governs these nations in their internal relations. When one enters upon the study of what is called international law, one finds himself expected to accept as a fundamental proposition that there is no political society which formulates, applies and enforces the law which he is told governs all nations in their external relations, and that this law is formulated, applied and enforced among or between the nations. This difference in fundamentals leads to corresponding differences in the derivative notions. Practitioners of law proper take little or no interest in what is called international law. From their point of view, that which is called international law is only a collection of the rules of a highly interesting game, success in which depends largely upon “face ” and personality; nor can it be denied that there is much to justify this opinion. Students of law reflect the attitude of mind of the practitioner, and the great majority of students end their legal education when they finish the courses in national domestic law, giving no consideration to the law which governs the actions and relations of the nations.


1917 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-357
Author(s):  
Theodore P. Ion

The summary review in the previous article of the historical events which culminated in the creation of the Hellenic Kingdom, and the vicissitudes which Greece underwent from the time of the declaration of her independence up to the year 1911, when her Constitution of 1864 was revised, plainly show that the Hellenic people never for a moment thought of submitting themselves to autocracy, but on the contrary asserted their determination to live under a democracy. Hence the murder of their first president, or governor Capodistrias, the deposition of their first king, Otho, and the abjuration now by a large section of the Hellenic nation both in and out of Greece, of their present ruler, Constantine, who, under the cloak of the Constitution, rules the part of the country still under his dominion, not as a constitutional King of the Hellenes, but as an absolute monarch.


Author(s):  
Giulio Bartolini

Abstract The centennial anniversary of World War I has generated renewed interest in the complex relationship between this event, international law and its community of scholars. In this regard the largely unexplored Italian context may represent a stimulating source of material from the point of view of both contemporary scholarly debate and current research, as Italy was one of the leading states involved in the conflict and boasts a vibrant and influential community of scholars of international law. As a result this article will focus on the shifting and active role played by Italian scholars in relation to the conflict, not only in their traditional academic and scientific activities, but also through their involvement in public debate, propaganda activities, contributions to newspapers and non-specialized journals, as well as their support to the Government.


1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 562-588
Author(s):  
Theodore P. Ion

Having examined the question of the casus foederìs of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, we shall now inquire whether the use of Greek territory by the Entente Powers for the purpose of carrying on military and naval operations against their enemies and the other forcible measures resorted to against Greece were justified either by reason of rights resulting from treaties, or on account of unneutral acts or omissions of the Government of Constantine.Before discussing the points at issue, it will be necessary to summarize seriatim the facts connected with each.It should be remembered that from the very beginning of the present war the Entente Powers have utilized the territorial waters of some islands in the Ægean Sea which were either under the military occupation of Greece or form part of her territory, and which the Allies subsequently occupied in order to further their military enterprises against Turkey. Thus, during the autumn of the year 1914, shortly after the entrance (November 5th) of the latter Power into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria, the fleets of the Entente Powers utilized the harbors and territory of some of the islands in the vicinity of the Straits of the Dardanelles as bases for their naval and, subsequently, military operations. The islands thus used for the prosecution of the war were Tenedos, Imbros, and Lemnos, and particularly the latter, on account of its convenient and safe harbor.


2019 ◽  
Vol Special Issue ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Andrzejczak-Świątek

This article aims to show the problem of self-determination of the people in the light of contemporary standards of international law, as well as to compare them with the factual and legal basis of regaining independence by Poland in 1918. The principle of the right of people to self-determination as one of the basic rules of international law was proclaimed only after World War II, however, concepts conferring on the population living in a given territory to decide about themselves appeared before the French Revolution. The issue of the right to self-determination of people is extremely complex — after World War II, there was in this respect the development of treaty guarantees concluded with international agreements for the system of human rights protection, which sanctioned this right as the only subjective collective right. On the other hand, the practice of contemporary states on this issue is not uniform and largely depends on the acceptance of the facts by the international community. From the point of view of developing the right to self-determination of people, and thus the right to independence, the case of Poland is extremely interesting not only because of the historical and political background, but also because it can be treated as a precedent in international law in the context of recognition and acceptance of independence by the state.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document