Violations of Maritime Law by The Allied Powers During The World War

1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. G. Trimble

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Secretary of State Bryan wisely approached the belligerent governments proposing that both sides agree to conduct their naval warfare in accordance with the rules embodied in the Declaration of London. This document was drawn up at the London Naval Conference called by Great Britain in 1908, and was signed by the delegates of all the nations represented. The conference agreed that the rules contained in the document “correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.” The Declaration never became legally binding on the nations, however, having failed of ratification by the British Government itself. Legally, therefore, Great Britain was not bound by it in 1914, except in so far as it embodied preexisting rules of law.

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Wilford Garner

The above is the title of an article by. Mr. E. G. Trimble in the January (1930) issue of this Journal, which contains a rather severe indictment of the Allied Powers, and particularly of Great Britain, for having violated during the World War various well-settled rules of international law regarding the conduct of maritime warfare. I do not deny at all that there were violations of certain rules and practices which had come to be generally, if not universally, recognized as a part of the customary law of nations—violations not only by the Allied Powers, but on an even larger scale by their opponents, which latter, however, the author passes over in silence. But, in my opinion, his charges in some cases are not well founded either upon principles of international law, reason or the logic of the actual conditions under which the rules had to be applied. In presenting here a different view of the case, my object is not so much to defend the Allied Powers against the charges contained in Mr. Trimble's indictment as to reaffirm and maintain views which I expressed during the war regarding certain rights of belligerents in naval warfare, especially under the peculiar conditions which prevailed during that war—rights the exercise of which I believe was justified in principle by those conditions, whatever may have been the opinion of statesmen and prize judges a century ago, and which would have been claimed and exercised by Germany had the geographical situation as between her and Great Britain been reversed.


1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Baxter

In the controversy between Great Britain and the United States as to neutral rights from 1914 to 1917, both governments appealed again and again to precedents of the American Civil War. British prize courts as well as British diplomats made effective use of the Civil War decisions. Indeed, Professor A. Pearce Higgins has recently gone so far as to assert that, if one views the decisions as a whole, there was no greater extension of the principles of international law by the decisions of British prize courts during the World War than in the American cases.


Author(s):  
Gabriela A. Frei

The book addresses the interaction between international maritime law and maritime strategy in a historical context, arguing that both international law and maritime strategy are based on long-term state interests. Great Britain as the predominant sea power in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the relationship between international law and maritime strategy like no other power. The book explores how Great Britain used international maritime law as an instrument of foreign policy to protect its strategic and economic interests, and how maritime strategic thought evolved in parallel to the development of international legal norms. The book offers an analysis of British state practice as well as an examination of the efforts of the international community to codify international maritime law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the predominant sea power and also the world’s largest carrier of goods, Great Britain had to balance its interests as both a belligerent and a neutral power. With the growing importance of international law in international politics, the book examines the role of international lawyers, strategists, and government officials who shaped state practice. Great Britain’s neutrality for most of the period between 1856 and 1914 influenced its state practice and its perceptions of a future maritime conflict. Yet, the codification of international maritime law at The Hague and London conferences at the beginning of the twentieth century demanded a reassessment of Great Britain’s legal position.


1927 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 716-736
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

The scientific organizations which flourished before the World War have had great difficulty in continuing their labors after its termination. The Institute of International Law has been no exception. It was to have met in Munich in September, 1914, and its program had been completely arranged; but the war which started in August, 1914, necessarily put an end to all arrangements for the session. A resort to arms inevitably brings with it a desire for its avoidance; and the greater the war, the greater the desire. A decade, a generation struggles in the mists and shadows, seeking to extricate itself from the post-war spirit, condemning the past somewhat indiscriminately and advocating innovations which, new in expression, are nevertheless the aspirations of those who, in all time, crushed and bruised by force, seek to replace it by justice.


1924 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-39
Author(s):  
Philip Baker

Author(s):  
Nicholas A. Lambert

The world war that began in the summer of 1914 confirmed widespread prewar expectations that a third war in the Balkans could drag in the superpowers. In the weeks that followed, Turkey, still neutral, became increasingly belligerent. British government policy was to appease Turkey in order to avoid conflict. Churchill disagreed with this policy, believing that war with Turkey was unavoidable and that the sooner it came, the better. At his instigation, the government reviewed contingency war plans to capture the Gallipoli but found that Britain lacked the resources to implement them. After Turkey joined the Central Powers in November 1914, Britain had no strategy for prosecuting the war against Turkey. But the British government was not much concerned, incorrectly believing that Turkey was incapable of hurting any vital British interests.


1921 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 511
Author(s):  
Henry F. Munro ◽  
James Wilford Garner

Social Forces ◽  
1928 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-489
Author(s):  
P. Bradley

2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Schwietzke ◽  
Peter Macalister-Smith

This Bibliographical Calendar focuses on a general armed conflict within Europe that spread to most parts of the world. It started during the second decade of the twentieth century. In this context the present Calendar offers an overview of the chronology leading up to the First World War. It is also a documented survey of official transactions relating to the World War with particular attention to the sources of record. The main focus of the work is on diplomatic acts of the belligerent and neutral parties that accompanied the military dimension of the conflict.The Calendar assumes the form of a compilation of related kinds of information situated between a bibliography and a repertory, with the aim of elucidating the course of World War One from the perspectives of international law and diplomacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 233339282093232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Boretti

Here, we review modeling predictions for Covid-19 mortality based on recent data. The Imperial College model trusted by the British Government predicted peak mortalities above 170 deaths per million in the United States, and above 215 deaths per million in Great Britain, after more than 2 months from the outbreak, and a length for the outbreak well above 4 months. These predictions drove the world to adopt harsh distancing measures and forget the concept of herd immunity. China had peak mortalities of less than 0.1 deaths per million after 40 days since first deaths, and an 80-day-long outbreak. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, or Great Britain flattened the curve at 13.6, 28.6, 9.0, 10.6, and 13.9 deaths per million after 40, 39, 33, 44, and 39 days from first deaths, or 31, 29, 24, 38, and 29 days since the daily confirmed deaths reached 0.1 per million people, respectively. The declining curve is much slower for Italy, the Netherlands, or Great Britain than Belgium or Sweden. Opposite to Great Britain, Italy, or Belgium that enforced a complete lockdown, the Netherlands only adopted an “intelligent” lockdown, and Sweden did not adopt any lockdown. However, they achieved better results. Coupled to new evidence for minimal impact of Covid-19 on the healthy population, with the most part not infected even if challenged, or only mild or asymptomatic if infected, there are many good reasons to question the validity of the specific epidemiological model simulations and the policies they produced. Fewer restrictions on the healthy while better protecting the vulnerable would have been a much better option, permitting more sustainable protection of countries otherwise at risk of second waves as soon as the strict measures are lifted.


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