Belief Congruence between Interest-Group Leaders and Members: An Empirical Analysis of Three Theories and a Suggested Synthesis

1990 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 914-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Sabatier ◽  
Susan M. McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Belief Congruence

French Interest Group Politics: Pluralist or Neocorporatist?

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank L. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Political System ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Limited Impact ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
Interest Group Politics ◽  
Group Politics ◽  
Willingness To Engage

Although France is not among those countries most frequently cited as examples of the trend toward corporatism, some observers have seen evidence of corporatist patterns of interest group-government contacts. Others assert that French groups have a distinctive protest form of action, and still others see France as a preserve of traditional pluralism. Interviews with 99 French interest group leaders in 1979 suggest that the pluralist model most accurately describes the actions reported by these leaders. Although the group leaders described some corporatist activities, such as participation in statutory commissions, and indicated a willingness to engage in protest, the most common actions were those more consistent with pluralism: personal contacts with government officials and lobbying. These activities were also the forms judged to be most effective in influencing policy, although the overall impression was of a political system in which organized interests had relatively limited impact.

Leaders' Communications in Public-interest and Material-interest Groups

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-540
Author(s):  
R. A. Young ◽  
Shirley M. Forsyth
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Material Interest ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Internal Communications ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractThis article analyzes the internal communications between interest group leaders and their memberships. The case is Bill C-22, which increased patent protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada. The object was to test for differences between “material” groups seeking benefits for their members and “purposive” groups pursuing policies which will benefit others. Significant differences were found in the kinds of appeals made by group leaders. This implies that it can be realistic and useful to distinguish between types of group according to their purposes and the motivations of their members. The findings also provide some insight into the language of policy debates and allow some speculation about the perennial question of why people adhere to large public-interest groups.

scholarly journals Competing for Endorsements

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M Grossman ◽  
Elhanan Helpman
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
General Public ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Simple Language ◽  
Group Members

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 612-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Voluntary Associations ◽  
Carter Administration ◽  
First Year ◽  
Consensus Building ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
White House ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
The Relationship

Studies of the relationship between the presidency and organized interests generally focus on presidential assistants and their communications with the interest group community. I take a different perspective. Based on presidential strategic interests and choices illuminated for several administrations through interviews with White House officials, four kinds of interest group liaison are identified: governing party, consensus building, outreach, and legitimization. These approaches are then empirically evaluated for the Reagan White House using interviews with Reagan's staff and the responses of several hundred interest group leaders to 1980 and 1985 surveys of national voluntary associations. Like the Carter administration after its first year, the Reagan White House initially emphasized “liaison as governing party” built on exclusive and programmatic ties to groups. A less activist legislative agenda and new circumstances later shifted the emphasis of the Reagan and Bush administrations to other forms of interest group liaison.

scholarly journals Interest Groups in Multi-Level Contexts: European Integration as Cross-Cutting Issue in Party-Interest Group Contacts

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Berkhout ◽  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Patrick Statsch
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
European Policy ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
European Public ◽  
Multi Level

Policy-specific actor-constellations consisting of party- and group-representatives commonly drive the effective establishment of new policy programmes or changes in existing policies. In the EU multi-level system, the creation of such constellations is complicated because it practically requires consensus on two dimensions: the European public policy at stake and the issue of European integration. This means that, for interest groups with interests in particular policy domains, and with limited interest in the actual issue of European integration, non-Eurosceptic parties must be their main ally in their policy battles. We hypothesise that interest groups with relevant European domain-specific interests will ally with non-Eurosceptic parties, whereas interest groups whose interests are hardly affected by the European policy process will have party-political allies across the full range of positions on European integration. We assess this argument on the basis of an elite-survey of interest group leaders and study group-party dyads in several European countries (i.e., Belgium, Lithuania, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia) in a large number of policy domains. Our dependent variable is the group-party dyad and the main independent variables are the European policy interests of the group and the level of Euroscepticism of the party. We broadly find support for our hypotheses. The findings of our study speak to the debate concerning the implications of the politicisation of European integration and, more specifically, the way in which party-political polarisation of Europe may divide domestic interest group systems and potentially drive group and party systems apart.

Explaining State Preemption of Local Laws: Political, Institutional, and Demographic Factors

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Flavin ◽  
Gregory Shufeldt
Keyword(s):  
African Americans ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Demographic Factors ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Media Attention ◽  
Institutional Forces

Abstract Despite increasing popular and media attention to the preemption of local policymaking by state governments, the empirical political science literature on preemption remains relatively scarce. After first identifying and discussing state preemption laws across twenty-one diverse public policies, we investigate how political, institutional, and demographic factors predict the implementation of these laws. Our empirical analysis reveals that states where Republicans control both legislative chambers and the governorship, with more politically conservative citizens, a higher percentage of African Americans, and a stronger conservative interest group presence passes more laws that preempt local policymaking. Our results demonstrate that state preemption efforts are more closely associated with political and demographic factors and less associated with institutional forces.

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