Comment on Inside Money, Outside Money, and Short-Term Interest Rates

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilbur John Coleman
10.3386/w5269 ◽  
1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Chari ◽  
Lawrence Christiano ◽  
Martin Eichenbaum

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 1354 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. V. Chari ◽  
Lawrence J. Christiano ◽  
Martin Eichenbaum

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-80
Author(s):  
Romain Baeriswyl

The 100%-Money plan advocated by Fisher (1936) has a Misesian flavor as it aims at mitigating intertemporal discoordination by reducing (i) the discrepancy between investment and voluntary savings, and (ii) the manipula­ tion of interest rates by monetary injections. Recent proposals to adopt the 100% reserve banking system, such as the Chicago Plan Revisited by Benes and Kumhof (2013) or the Limited Purpose Banking by Kotlikoff (2010), take, however, a fundamentally different attitude towards the role of the central bank in the credit market and ignore that intertemporal discoordination arises inde­ pendently from whether the credit expansion is financed by the creation of outside or inside money. These plans allow the central bank to inject outside money into the credit market and to effectively lower interest rates in negative territory in order to overcome the limit that the liquidity trap sets to credit expan­ sion in the fractional reserve system. Although such an attempt may succeed in stimulating the economy in the short run, it exacerbates intertemporal discoor­ dination and weakens economic stability in the long run. Key words: monetary systems, 100% reserve banking, Chicago Plan, Austrian Business Cycle Theory. JEL Classification: E30, E42, E58, B53. Resumen: El plan «dinero 100%» defendido por Fisher (1936) tiene connotacio­ nes misianas en el sentido en que tiene como objetivo mitigar la descoordinación intertemporal reduciendo (i) la diferencia entre la inversión y el ahorro voluntario y (ii) la manipulación de los tipos de interés a través de inyecciones de dinero. Las recientes propuestas para adoptar un sistema de coficiente de reservas ban­ carias del 100%, tales como el Chicago Plan Revisited de Benes y Kumhof (2013) o el Limited Purpose Banking de Kotlikoff (2010), toman, sin embargo, una actitud esencialmente diferente hacia el papel del banco central en el mercado de cré­ dito, e ignora que la descoordinación intertemporal surge independientemente de si la expansión crediticia se financia mediante la creación de dinero desde dentro (inside money) o fuera (outside money). Estos planes permiten al banco central inyectar dinero desde fuera en el mercado de crédito y reducir los tipos de interés de manera efectiva en valores negativos con el fin de superar el límite que establece la trampa de la liquidez a la expansión del crédito en el sistema de reserva fraccionaria. Aunque tal intento puede tener éxito a la hora de esti­ mular la economía en el corto plazo, acentúa la descoordinación intertemporal y debilita la estabilidad económica a largo plazo. Palabras clave: Sistemas monetarios, banca de reserva del 100%, Plan Chica­ go, teoría austriaca del ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: E30, E42, E58, B53.


2014 ◽  
pp. 107-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Andryushin

The paper analyzes monetary policy of the Bank of Russia from 2008 to 2014. It presents the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators testifying to inability of the Bank of Russia to transit to inflation targeting regime. It is shown that the presence of short-term interest rates in the top borders of the percentage corridor does not allow to consider the key rate as a basic tool of monetary policy. The article justifies that stability of domestic prices is impossible with-out exchange rate stability. It is proved that to decrease excessive volatility on national consumer and financial markets it is reasonable to apply a policy of managing financial account, actively using for this purpose direct and indirect control tools for the cross-border flows of the private and public capital.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Kreiner

Abstract In 21 CE, a series of localized movements broke out in Gallia Comata due to heavy debts among provincials according to Tacitus. Modern scholars have long argued that the indebtedness occurred because of rising interest rates, resulting from dwindling currency in circulation after decades of free-spending following Augustus’ victory at Actium, and that Gallic communities were subjected to an additional tribute to support the wars of Germanicus (14–16 CE), which continued unabated after the wars and pushed Gauls beyond their means. These claims are misguided, however, in that there is no certain evidence of a special tax to support Germanicus’ wars and that the argument for a dwindling circulation of currency in Gaul falters under closer inspection. Rather, the pressing statal and military needs imposed on communities in Gallia Comata after 9 CE on top of routine exactions could significantly increase burden levels levied on provincial populations, thus contributing to rising debts. Through examining how Roman logistics and conscription operated in this period, it is possible to trace how populations were impacted by such demands and which communities were most heavily affected by them, too. Individually, the impact of each factor is unlikely to have been burdensome enough to have caused large-scale resistance, it is only the cumulative effect that these explanations had on top of routine Roman extraction schemes that could create the conditions for this revolt. This paper argues that in extraordinary circumstances, such as the period after the Varian Disaster for Gallia Comata, the costs of supporting military campaigns places real short-term strains on local economies, which creates the conditions for revolt. The benefit of this approach is that it may explain other episodes of anti-fiscal resistance that broke out during or within a decade of wars in neighboring regions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-103
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Aubry ◽  
Pierre Duguay

Abstract In this paper we deal with the financial sector of CANDIDE 1.1. We are concerned with the determination of the short-term interest rate, the term structure equations, and the channels through which monetary policy influences the real sector. The short-term rate is determined by a straightforward application of Keynesian liquidity preference theory. A serious problem arises from the directly estimated reduced form equation, which implies that the demand for high powered money, but not the demand for actual deposits, is a stable function of income and interest rates. The structural equations imply the opposite. In the term structure equations, allowance is made for the smaller variance of the long-term rates, but insufficient explanation is given for their sharper upward trend. This leads to an overstatement of the significance of the U.S. long-term rate that must perform the explanatory role. Moreover a strong structural hierarchy, by which the long Canada rate wags the industrial rate, is imposed without prior testing. In CANDIDE two channels of monetary influence are recognized: the costs of capital and the availability of credit. They affect the business fixed investment and housing sectors. The potential of the personal consumption sector is not recognized, the wealth and real balance effects are bypassed, the credit availability proxy is incorrect, the interest rate used in the real sector is nominal rather than real, and the specification of the housing sector is dubious.


2005 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 687-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. K. Malhotra ◽  
Vivek Bhargava ◽  
Mukesh Chaudhry

Using data from the Treasury versus London Interbank Offer Swap Rates (LIBOR) for October 1987 to June 1998, this paper examines the determinants of swap spreads in the Treasury-LIBOR interest rate swap market. This study hypothesizes Treasury-LIBOR swap spreads as a function of the Treasury rate of comparable maturity, the slope of the yield curve, the volatility of short-term interest rates, a proxy for default risk, and liquidity in the swap market. The study finds that, in the long-run, swap spreads are negatively related to the yield curve slope and liquidity in the swap market. We also find that swap spreads are positively related to the short-term interest rate volatility. In the short-run, swap market's response to higher default risk seems to be higher spread between the bid and offer rates.


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