Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China.

1983 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Davis-Friedmann ◽  
Susan L. Shirk
Keyword(s):  
Career Incentives

scholarly journals Delegating diplomacy: rhetoric across agents in the United Nations General Assembly

2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232199756
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Alex Baturo
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Single Voice ◽  
United Nations General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Career Incentives

When political principals send agents to international organizations, those agents are often assumed to speak in a single voice. Yet, various types of country representatives appear on the international stage, including permanent representatives as well as more overtly “political” government officials. We argue that permanent delegates at the United Nations face career incentives that align them with the bureaucracy, setting them apart from political delegates. To that end, they tend to speak more homogeneously than do other types of speakers, while also using relatively more technical, diplomatic rhetoric. In addition, career incentives will make them more reluctant to criticize the United Nations. In other words, permanent representatives speak more like bureaucratic agents than like political principals. We apply text analytics to study differences across agents’ rhetoric at the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate marked distinctions between the speech of different types of agents, contradictory to conventional assumptions, with implications for our understandings of the interplay between public administration and agency at international organizations. Points for practitioners Delegations to international organizations do not “speak with one voice.” This article illustrates that permanent representatives to the United Nations display more characteristics of bureaucratic culture than do other delegates from the same country. For practitioners, it is important to realize that the manner in which certain classes of international actors “conduct business” can differ markedly. These differences in tone—even among delegates from the same principal—can impact the process of negotiation and debate.

career incentives

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharina Holzinger
Keyword(s):  
Career Incentives

Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer ◽  
Stephen M. Walt
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Poor Quality ◽  
Ivory Tower ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Empirical Regularities ◽  
Critical Components ◽  
Cumulative Knowledge ◽  
Career Incentives

Theory creating and hypothesis testing are both critical components of social science, but the former is ultimately more important. Yet, in recent years, International Relations scholars have devoted less effort to creating and refining theories or using theory to guide empirical research. Instead, they increasingly focus on ‘simplistic hypothesis testing,’ which emphasizes discovering well-verified empirical regularities. Privileging simplistic hypothesis testing is a mistake, however, because insufficient attention to theory leads to misspecified empirical models or misleading measures of key concepts. In addition, the poor quality of much of the data in International Relations makes it less likely that these efforts will produce cumulative knowledge. This shift away from theory and toward simplistic hypothesis testing reflects a long-standing desire to professionalize and expand the International Relations field as well as the short-term career incentives of individual scholars. This tendency is also widening the gap between the ivory tower and the real world, making International Relations scholarship less useful to policymakers and concerned citizens. Unfortunately, this trend is likely to continue unless there is a collective decision to alter prevailing academic incentives.

The Emperor Strikes Back: Political Status, Career Incentives and Grain Procurement during China's Great Leap Famine

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-sing Kung
Keyword(s):  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Regression Discontinuity Design ◽  
Political Career ◽  
Demonstration Effect ◽  
Political Status ◽  
Great Leap ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Career Incentives

Using China's Great Leap Famine as example, this article shows how political career incentives can produce disastrous outcomes under the well-intended policies of a dictator. By exploiting a regression discontinuity design, the study identifies the causal effect of membership status in the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee—full (FM) Versus alternate members (AM)—on grain procurement. It finds that the difference in grain procurement between AMs and FMs who ranked near the discontinuity threshold is three times that between all AMs and all FMs on average. This may explain why Mao exceptionally promoted some lower-ranked but radical FMs shortly before the Leap: to create a demonstration effect in order to spur other weakly motivated FMs into action.

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