Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic

1966 ◽  
Vol 63 (17) ◽  
pp. 481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas C. van Fraassen
1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Trew

In this paper a number of nonstandard systems of predicate logic with or without identity, are translated with subsystems of applied standard system of predicate logic with identity. There are nonstandard theories of quantification which, following [16], are described as inclusive systems; their theorems are valid in all domains, including the empty domain. Theories of quantification which allow for the substitution of denotationless terms for free variables, are described, following [21], as systems of free logic; they are said to be free of the requirement that all singular terms must have denotations. Free logics and inclusive logics may each be of the other type. A nonstandard theory of identity, described, following [12] as a theory of nonreflexive identity, may be combined with a standard or with a nonstandard theory of quantification. Another kind of nonstandard system of predicate logic examined is a nonstandard version of a system of monadic predicate logic in which a distinction is made between sentence and predicate negation, and which is nonstandard in the sense that the laws relating sentence and predicate negation diverge from the standard ones. In the systems examined, this is combined with an inclusive quantification theory.


Author(s):  
Karel Lambert

The expression ‘free logic’ is a contraction of the more cumbersome ‘logic free of existence assumptions with respect to both its general terms (predicates) and its singular terms’. Its most distinctive feature is the rejection of the principle of universal specification, a principle of classical predicate logic which licenses the logical truth of statements such as ‘If everything rotates then (the planet) Mars rotates’. If a free logic contains the general term ‘exists’, this principle is replaced by a restricted version, one which licenses the logical truth only of statements such as ‘If everything rotates then Mars rotates, provided that Mars exists’. If the free logic does not contain the general term ‘exists’, but contains the term ‘is the same as’, the principle is replaced by a version which licenses only statements such as ‘If everything rotates then Mars rotates, provided that there is an object the same as Mars’. Most free logicians regard the restricted version of universal specification as simply making explicit an implicit assumption, namely, that Mars exists. Indeed, free logic is the culmination of a long historical trend to rid logic of existence assumptions with respect to its terms. Just as classical predicate logic purports to be free of the hidden existence assumptions which pervaded the medieval theory of inference with respect to its general terms, so free logic rids classical predicate logic of hidden existence assumptions with respect to its singular terms. There are various kinds of free logic, with many interesting and novel philosophical applications. These cover a wide range of issues from the philosophy of mathematics to the philosophy of religion. In addition to the issue of how to analyse singular existence statements, of the form ‘3 + 7 exists’ and ‘That than which nothing greater can be conceived exists’, of special importance are issues in the theory of definite descriptions, set theory, the theory of reference, modal logic and the theory of complex general terms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
GREG RESTALL

AbstractIn this paper, I motivate a cut free sequent calculus for classical logic with first order quantification, allowing for singular terms free of existential import. Along the way, I motivate a criterion for rules designed to answer Prior’s question about what distinguishes rules for logical concepts, like conjunction from apparently similar rules for putative concepts like Prior’s tonk, and I show that the rules for the quantifiers—and the existence predicate—satisfy that condition.


1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 943-950 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter W. Woodruff

The concepts “classical valuation” and “supervaluation” were introduced by van Fraassen around 1966, to provide a semantic analysis of the then extant axiomatic systems of free logic. Consider an atomic sentenceand a “partial” model which fails to interpret c. Then (1) has no truth value in , nor doesWhile the valuelessness of (1) was found intuitively acceptable, that of (2) was not. Indeed, (2) and all other tautologies are theorems of free logic.Van Fraassen found a way to accommodate both intuitions. He interprets the unproblematic atomic sentences as usual, while “interpreting” those like (1) by simply assigning them a truth-value in arbitrary fashion. Then a truth-value for every sentence can be defined in the usual way; the result van Fraassen calls a “classical valuation” of the language. The arbitrary element in any given classical valuation is then eliminated by passage to the “supervaluation” over , which agrees with the classical valuations where they agree among themselves, and otherwise is undefined. In the supervaluation over , (1) is valueless but (2) true (since true on all classical valuations), as was required.There is a slight, but crucial oversimplification in the preceding account. Evaluation of the sentencerequires prior evaluation of the open formulaBut here mere assignment of truth-value is not enough; a whole set must be arbitrarily assigned as extension. The quantification over classical valuations involved in passage to the supervaluation thus involves an implicit quantification over subsets of the domain of : supervaluations are second order.


Author(s):  
Ellen Winner

This book is an examination of what psychologists have discovered about how art works—what it does to us, how we experience art, how we react to it emotionally, how we judge it, and what we learn from it. The questions investigate include the following: What makes us call something art? Do we experience “real” emotions from the arts? Do aesthetic judgments have any objective truth value? Does learning to play music raise a child’s IQ? Is modern art something my kid could do? Is achieving greatness in an art form just a matter of hard work? Philosophers have grappled with these questions for centuries, and laypeople have often puzzled about them too and offered their own views. But now psychologists have begun to explore these questions empirically, and have made many fascinating discoveries using the methods of social science (interviews, experimentation, data collection, statistical analysis).


Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

This chapter considers whether internal categoricity can be used to leverage any claims about mathematical truth. We begin by noting that internal categoricity allows us to introduce a truth-operator which gives an object-language expression to the supervaluationist semantics. In this way, the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude towards model theory itself. We then use this to illuminate the cryptic conclusions of Putnam's justly-famous paper ‘Models and Reality’. We close this chapter by presenting Tarski’s famous result that truth for lower-order languages can be defined in higher-order languages.


1961 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-417
Author(s):  
Hugues Leblanc
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