Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 525-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. Cameron ◽  
Albert D. Cover ◽  
Jeffrey A. Segal

We develop and test a neoinstitutional model of Senate roll call voting on nominees to the Supreme Court. The statistical model assumes that Senators examine the characteristics of nominees and use their roll call votes to establish an electorally attractive position on the nominees. The model is tested with probit estimates on the 2,054 confirmation votes from Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy. The model performs remarkably well in predicting the individual votes of Senators to confirm or reject nominees. Senators routinely vote to confirm nominees who are perceived as well qualified and ideologically proximate to Senators' constituents. When nominees are less well qualified and are relatively distant, however, Senators' votes depend to a large degree on the political environment, especially the status of the president.

Author(s):  
Khan Hamid

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the constitutional and political history of Pakistan. It then discusses how the judiciary in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, had to function in a difficult and complex constitutional and political environment during the last sixty years. It details acts of judicial activism; efforts of lawyers throughout Pakistan to restore the status quo in the judiciary as it had existed on November 2, 2007; and the challenges faced by the restored Chief Justice and the Supreme Court.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Heard

In the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Senate Reform Reference, there was considerable talk about the limitations that the Supreme Court had put on Senate reform. Some political leaders expressed frustration and declared that we are left with the status quo. But, that view both misunderstands what the Court said and underestimates what can be achieved through non-constitutional means. There is much that can be done simply with the political will to change the Senate situation without resorting to constitutional amendment; senators already have the power to effect some serious reform from within. This paper focuses on an unorthodox suggestion: that substantive reforms might be achieved through changes to the Rules of the Senate governing its legislative process. With some changes to both the legislative and appointment processes, substantial improvements to the Senate are both possible and achievable. The result would be a Senate better able to perform its intended function as a chamber of sober second thought. It would also answer the most serious concerns about an appointed Senate’s role in a modern democratic system.


Author(s):  
O. I. Popov

The presented work highlights the possible ways of the advocate's influence on the implementation by the Supreme Court of the function of ensuring the unity of judicial practice in civil cases. Without denying the status of the Supreme Court as a central institution in the field of forming unified approaches to law enforcement, attention is focused on the fact that the dynamics of procedural legislation in terms of regulating procedures for access to cassation in civil cases allows us to rethink the mission and content of the representative function of a lawyer at the appropriate stage of the civil process. Based on the analysis of the current edition of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, it is argued that the ability of the advocate to be an active subject of influence on the formation of a unified law enforcement practice is most noticeably manifested when overcoming existing filters of access to cassation, in particular, when applying to the Supreme Court with a cassation appeal, which today demands from the advocate extended argumentation when proving the existence of grounds for cassation revision, with a thorough analysis of the established practice of the cassation court and, at times, giving reasons for the need to deviate from such practice and form new law enforcement approaches.          Along with the above, among the individual methods of influence of the advocate on ensuring the unity of judicial practice, the filing of a petition for the suspension of proceedings on the basis of a review of a court decision in similar legal relations (in another case) by way of appeal by the chambers of the Supreme Court, as well as a petition to transfer the case for consideration The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in connection with the need to resolve an exceptional legal problem.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-167
Author(s):  
Chukwunweike A. Ogbuabor ◽  
Damian U. Ajah ◽  
Anthony O. Nwafor

Sovereign nations generally exert control over land within the individual nation's boundaries. This is done for a variety of reasons including the political and economic. There is nothing wrong with that as the essence of sovereignty lies in exclusivity. Economic considerations, however, demand some level of relaxation of government control on land for investment purposes to galvanise development. Such relaxation of control is usually entrenched in the enabling law that regulates land administration. Nigeria has witnessed such regulatory land instruments operated in different regions of the country from the colonial regime until the unifying Land Use Act of 1978. The Nigerian courts' interpretations of the provisions of that Act have continued to attract controversy, not least the recent Supreme Court decision in Huebner suggesting that aliens cannot hold interest in land in Nigeria. The article dissects that decision, highlighting the social and economic implications with inferences drawn from cognate jurisdictions, arriving at the conclusion that the Supreme Court could not be right in its interpretation of that piece of Nigerian legislation and that the social and economic implications of such decisions cannot be underestimated.


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


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