Political Economy - The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. By Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. xiv, 153p. $34.50).

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1426-1427
Author(s):  
Karol Edward Soltan
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Cambridge University

Liberal Political Economy And Philosophy Of James Buchanan

2013 ◽  
pp. 34-52
Author(s):  
A. Zaostrovtsev
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Nobel Prize ◽  
Austrian Economic ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Scientific Legacy ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Constitutional Constraints ◽  
Liberal Political Economy ◽  
Generality Principle

The article examines the scientific legacy of the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan (1919—2013). The focus is on the evolution of his views on constitutional political economy. The article shows the displacement of Buchanan’s preferences from the expansion of inclusiveness of collective choice rules and the number of constitutional constraints to the generality principle — a non-discriminatory democracy as a means to counteract majoritarian democracy failures. It is concluded that finally Buchanan adopted radical subjectivism of the Austrian economic school and post-Keynesianism embodied in the concept of constitutionally limited evolution.

G. Brennan-J.M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules - Constitutional Political Economy

1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-116
Author(s):  
Domenico da Empoli
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Cambridge University

Abstract G. Brennan-J.M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules - Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 153, s.i.p.

James Buchanan on the nature of choice: ontology, artifactual man and the constitutional moment in political economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 1159-1179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Lewis ◽  
Malte Dold
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Structure ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Neoclassical Economics ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Human Agent

Abstract Historians of economic thought are paying greater attention to issues of social ontology (i.e. to the assumptions that economists make about the nature of social reality). We contribute to this burgeoning literature by exploring the hitherto neglected way in which James Buchanan invoked ontological considerations, concerning in particular the nature of human choice, both in criticising neoclassical economics and also in setting out his own contributions to constitutional political economy. We focus on Buchanan’s account of man as an artifactual being who has the capacity to choose the kind of person he wishes to become, in particular by selecting the kind of preferences he wishes to have and the kinds of rules under which he wishes to live. We discuss how Buchanan’s thinking on this issue was shaped by Frank Knight and G. L. S. Shackle and explain why Buchanan explicitly described his argument as ontological in nature. Finally, we contend that Buchanan’s approach would have benefited from further ontological elaboration, in two ways: first, because his arguments would have been stronger had he said more about the attributes of the human agent that help to secure their engagement in thinking creatively about themselves and the rules of society (‘the constitutional moment’), and second because his account would benefit from a deeper discussion of the interplay between human agency and social structure, especially with regard to the question of which structures might constrain or facilitate creative choices of the kind by which he set such great store.

The Limits of Liberty

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-281
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Short Term ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Way Of Knowing

James Buchanan argues that it is rational for persons to agree to restrain their liberty by rules in order to advance their interests. This view has been influential within the theory of constitutional political economy. If the view were valid, then it would answer the question of how agents can have a motive to behave justly. However, there are several problems with the argument. In the first place, it is inconsistent with the subjectivist methodology that Buchanan habitually employs, since within the subjectivist framework there is no way of knowing if people are better off constrained. In particular, within such a methodology, there is no reason for privileging supposedly long-term interests over short-term ones. The economics of temptation cannot be used appropriately to solve the problem of motivation.

scholarly journals Economia Política Constitucional: Programa de Pesquisa de James Buchanan e as Tecnologias Civis

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Cesário de Lima Albuquerque ◽  
Heraldo Elias Montarroyos
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Institutional Dynamics ◽  
Mancur Olson ◽  
Institutional Benefits ◽  
Legal Technology

ECONOMIA POLÍTICA CONSTITUCIONAL: PROGRAMA DE PESQUISA DE JAMES BUCHANAN E AS TECNOLOGIAS CIVIS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: JAMES BUCHANAN RESEARCH PROGRAM AND THE CIVIL LAW TECHNOLOGIES RESUMO: O objetivo desse artigo é identificar os custos e os benefícios projetados pelas tecnologias jurídicas do Código Civil, aplicando o programa de pesquisa da Economia Política Constitucional do economista James Buchanan (1975) que funciona como instrumento heurístico decisivo nesse estudo para compreender a dinâmica institucional da Lei a partir da lógica utilitarista-maximizadora do homem racional. Esse programa de pesquisa apresenta uma ontologia, metodologia, axiologia, teoria, práxis e um contexto social das ideias. Com essas categorias, é realizada a releitura instrumental do Código Civil que aponta como resultado a existência de quatro tecnologias contratuais (negociação, centralização, descentralização e coalizão) apresentando seus respectivos custos e benefícios institucionais. Também, procurando maximizar o programa de pesquisa buchaniano, acrescentamos o programa de pesquisa da ação coletiva do economista Mancur Olson, igualmente estruturado em categorias diversas, com o intuito de visualizar a interferência do indivíduo free rider no desempenho das tecnologias jurídicas. Como contribuição, essa pesquisa metodológica mostra que existe uma microeconomia política no Código Civil brasileiro. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Racionalidade Econômica; Tecnologia jurídica; Bem público; James Buchanan. ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to identify the costs and benefits designed by the legal technologies of the Civil Code, applying the research program of Constitutional Political Economy as defined by James Buchanan (1975) which is a fundamental heuristic tool in this study to understand the institutional dynamics of Law from the rational man’s utilitarian-maximizing logic. This research program presents an ontology, a methodology, an axiology, a theory, a praxis, and a social context of ideas. With these categories, it is performed the instrumental reinterpretation of the Civil Code which points as a result to the existence of four contractual technologies (trading, centralization, decentralization, and coalition) and their respective costs and institutional benefits. Also, in order to maximize the Buchanan-esque research program, it was introduced the research program of the collective action as defined by Mancur Olson, equally structured into several categories, in order to see the interference of the free rider individual in legal technologies’ performance. As a contribution, this article shows that there is a political microeconomics in the Brazilian Civil Code. KEYWORDS: Economic Rationality; Legal Technology; Public Good; James Buchanan. 

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