Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives. By James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1982. Pp. ix + 160. $18.00.)

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 1041-1042
Author(s):  
John W. Randall
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting

Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACS

ILR Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Saltzman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
Action Committee ◽  
Labor Issues ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Significant Direct Effect

This study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions on the voting of members of the House of Representatives on labor issues during 1979–80. It also analyzes the allocation of labor PAC contributions among House candidates. PAC contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll-call voting, even controlling for the Representative's political party and characteristics of the constituency. Since PAC money also affects roll-call voting indirectly (by influencing which party wins elections), the overall impact of PAC money on Congressional voting is probably substantial. The author also finds that labor PACs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the House who are likely to be re-elected anyway.

Gender Turnover and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives

2004 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
LESLIE A. SCHWINDT-BAYER ◽  
RENATO CORBETTA
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
The U.S

A Further Look at Universalism and Partisanship in Congressional Roll Call Voting

2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian J. Gaines ◽  
Brian R. Sala
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Negative Correlation ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Time Span ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Legislative Activity ◽  
The U.S

This note extends Melissa P. Collie's “Universalism and the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921–80,” American Journal of Political Science 32, 4 (November 1988): 865–883. Detecting a strongly negative correlation between the time series of universalism and partisanship in roll call votes for the 67th through 96th U.S. Houses, Collie concluded that consensus and partisanship are alternative, rival means of organizing legislative activity. If robust, this finding ought not to be time- or chamber-specific: it should be in evidence over the whole (partisan) histories of both House and Senate, session by session. Moreover, the inverse relationship should persist under alternative operationalizations of both partisanship and universalism. Using several measures of partisanship and universalism, mostly based on roll call votes tabulated for sessions of Congress, we reassess this relationship for the 43rd through 105th Congresses. Collie's core finding persists for both chambers over the longer time span provided that one uses her measures. But results are weaker when sessions of Congress rather than Congresses are used as units of observation, and alternative operationalizations of partisanship and universalism do not strongly replicate the original finding.

scholarly journals Exploring Responsiveness in the U.S. House of Representatives

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-85
Author(s):  
Philip D. Waggoner
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Electoral Connection ◽  
Bill Sponsorship ◽  
The Voice ◽  
The U.S

Legislators are elected to be the voice of their constituents in government. Implicit in this electoral connection is the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of constituents. Many past approaches only examine successful legislative behavior blessed by the majority party, not all legislative behavior, thereby limiting inference generalizability. I seek to overcome this limitation by considering bill sponsorship as an outlet in which all members are free to engage. Testing expectations on bill sponsorship in the 109th and 110th Congresses, I find that legislators are responsive, though only on “safely-owned” issues. I compare these findings to roll call voting on the same issues in the same Congresses and find a different pattern, suggesting legislators leverage bill sponsorship differently than roll call voting as they signal legislative priorities.

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