Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented

1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur T. Denzau ◽  
Michael C. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Constrained Maximization ◽  
Committee Assignments ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Supply Price

This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort, as determined by committee assignments, priority and ability, and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district. Two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model. The prediction of the model is that interest groups will, in general, seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks. Thus, voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented, even though they are not organized.

scholarly journals Campaign Spending and Lobbying

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Sasso ◽  
Dan Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Multiple Channels ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Interest groups can influence governmental policy through multiple channels. First, they may spend money before elections to help elect their preferred candidate. Second, they may also lobby after the election to affect the implemented policy. We analyze a game-theoretic model of campaign spending and lobbying to understand the strategic relationship between these two means of outside influence. We consider how several lobbying environments, each featuring different access to the elected politician, affect both the willingness to spend during the campaign and the final policy. Campaign spending is a function of both expected final policy due to lobbying and also expected lobbying effort costs. We find that increased policy moderation often, but not always, accompanies decreased campaign spending. When extreme interest groups give campaign contributions in exchange for access, campaign spending decreases as policy becomes more extreme. Open-access lobbying, where all interest groups lobby regardless of ideological alignment, is always best for the voter. We then show that caps on campaign contributions may have minimal effect on policy because of later lobbying efficacy. Finally, we highlight comparative statics that predict different empirical patterns of contributions depending on whether politicians grant lobbying access to all interest groups or only to ideologically-aligned groups. Our results demonstrate that interest-group and candidate polarization must be considered relative to one another; the effect of greater interest-group polarization depends to a large extent on whether it implies more or less ideological proximity to the group's aligned candidate.

The role of super interest groups in public policy diffusion

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-541
Author(s):  
Stephanie L. DeMora ◽  
Loren Collingwood ◽  
Adriana Ninci
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Diffusion ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Policy Networks ◽  
Advocacy Coalition Framework ◽  
Field Of Study ◽  
Advocacy Coalition

In recent years scholarship has drawn attention to the role of large multi-issue interest groups in policy networks and in public policy diffusion. This paper develops this field of study by demonstrating empirically the leverage of the ‘sustained organisational influence’ theory of policy diffusion. Specifically, it focuses on the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in diffusing the Stand Your Ground policy across US state legislatures. By comparing ALEC’s template policy to bills introduced and legislation subsequently enacted within state legislatures, we demonstrate that ALEC has positioned itself as a ‘super interest group’, exerting sustained organisational influence across an expanding number of states. In doing so, this paper moves theory beyond the typical advocacy coalition framework that implicitly assumes policymaking occurs discretely among specialists on an issue-by-issue basis. It also highlights the democratic implications of the role of super interest groups in shaping policy behind the scenes.

scholarly journals “Outside Lobbying” over the Airwaves: A Randomized Field Experiment on Televised Issue Ads

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
JOSHUA L. KALLA ◽  
DAVID E. BROOCKMAN
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Persuasive Power ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Interest Group Influence

We present the first field experiment on how organized interest groups’ television ads affect issue opinions. We randomized 31,404 voters to three weeks of interest group ads about either immigration or transgender nondiscrimination. We then randomly assigned voters to receive ostensibly unrelated surveys either while the ads aired, one day after they stopped, or three days afterwards. Voters recalled the ads, but three ads had a minimal influence on public opinion, whereas a fourth’s effects decayed within one day. However, voters remembered a fact from one ad. Our results suggest issue ads can affect public opinion but that not every ad persuades and that persuasive effects decay. Despite the vast sums spent on television ads, our results are the first field experiment on their persuasive power on issues, shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning—and limits on—both televised persuasion and interest group influence.

scholarly journals The Effects of Voting Costs on the Democratic Process and Public Finances

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Hodler ◽  
Simon Luechinger ◽  
Alois Stutzer
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Knowledge ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Average Education ◽  
Swiss Cantons ◽  
Welfare Expenditures

Increasing the attractiveness of voting is often seen as a remedy for unequal participation and the influence of special-interest groups on public policy. However, lower voting costs may also bring less informed citizens to the poll, thereby inviting efforts to sway these voters. We substantiate this argument in a probabilistic voting model with campaign contributions. In an empirical analysis for the 26 Swiss cantons, we find that lower voting costs due to postal voting are related to higher turnout, lower average education and political knowledge of participants as well as lower government welfare expenditures and lower business taxation. (JEL D72, H25, H75, I20, I38)

Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Maloney ◽  
Grant Jordan ◽  
Andrew M. McLaughlin
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Group Status ◽  
Privileged Status ◽  
Consultative Process ◽  
Interest Group Strategies ◽  
Group Term

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the place of groups in the consultative process in British policymaking. It stresses the importance of consultation even under the Thatcher government and distinguishes between consultation, bargaining and negotiation. The paper identifies the important divide between the relatively few groups with privileged status and the greater number of groups who find themselves consigned to less influential positions. The discussion revisits the insider/outsider typology often used to differentiate interest group strategies and status in policy development. It suggests that the insider group term is associated with a particular style of policy making, and offers amendments to the existing use of the terms to avoid the difficulties which occur from the conflation of group strategy and group status.

scholarly journals How Much Can the U.S. Congress Resist Political Money? A Quantitative Assessment

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ferguson ◽  
Paul Jorgensen ◽  
Jie Chen
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Quantitative Assessment ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Panel Analysis ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Push Out ◽  
The U.S

The extent to which governments can resist pressures from organized interest groups, and especially from finance, is a perennial source of controversy. This paper tackles this classic question by analyzing votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on measures to weaken the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill in the years following its passage. To control as many factors as possible that could influence floor voting by individual legislators, the analysis focuses on representatives who originally cast votes in favor of the bill but then subsequently voted to dismantle key provisions of it. This design rules out from the start most factors normally advanced by skeptics to explain vote shifts, since these are the same representatives, belonging to the same political party, representing substantially the same districts. Our panel analysis, which also controls for spatial influences, highlights the importance of time-varying factors, especially political money, in moving representatives to shift their positions on amendments such as the “swaps push out” provision. Our results suggest that the links between campaign contributions from the financial sector and switches to a pro-bank vote were direct and substantial: For every $100,000 that Democratic representatives received from finance, the odds they would break with their party’s majority support for the Dodd-Frank legislation increased by 13.9 percent. Democratic representatives who voted in favor of finance often received $200,000–$300,000 from that sector, which raised the odds of switching by 25–40 percent.

scholarly journals Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Jorgensen
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Pharmaceutical Policy ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Policy Problems ◽  
Selective Information ◽  
Powerful Interest

The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don’t get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost, effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with selective information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing pharmaceutical policy.

Setting the Party Agenda: Interest Groups, Voters and Issue Attention

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 979-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Information Campaign ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Issue Attention ◽  
Group Mobilization ◽  
Policy Agendas

Do political parties respond to interest group mobilization? While party responsiveness to voters has received widespread attention, little is known about how interest groups affect parties’ policy agendas. I argue that political parties respond to interest groups as lobbyists offer valuable information, campaign contributions, electoral support and personal rewards, but that party responsiveness is conditioned by voter preferences. Based on a novel longitudinal analysis studying the responsiveness of German parties to interest groups across eleven issue areas and seven elections from 1987 until 2009, it is shown that parties adjust their policy agendas in response to interest group mobilization and that interest groups are more successful in shaping party policy when their priorities coincide with those of the electorate.

scholarly journals The Peasant Farmer Schools of Ávila as a Model for Rural Development: The Influence on the Agro-Food Quality Policy of the Ávila Peasant Farmers’ Union in the El Barco de Ávila-Piedrahita District (1977-1990)

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
José A. Peña-Ramos ◽  
Pedro L. Chapinal-Escudero
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Rural Development ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Food Quality ◽  
Peasant Farmer ◽  
Peasant Farmers ◽  
Quality Policy ◽  
Analysis Category

Introduction: Interest groups are a key analysis category in political science. However, agricultural interest groups have merited considerably less attention from Spanish academics in this field. Explanation: The aspect least adequately addressed in interest group studies is the influence they exert on public policy processes. The agricultural dimension of the Escuelas Campesinas (Peasant Farmer Schools) movement in the Barco de Ávila-Piedrahita area of Spain has not been examined from this perspective. Conclusion: The present article seeks to remedy this gap in knowledge by analysing the participation and influence of the Unión de Campesinos de Ávila (Ávila Peasant Farmers Union) on agro-food quality policy during the period 1977-1990.

Interest Groups and Order in Global Economic Relations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Osgood
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Order And Disorder ◽  
Prime Movers ◽  
The Many ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Scholars of international relations have long pointed to organized interest groups as prime movers in the creation of order and disorder in global economic relations. This review introduces interest groups, illustrating the many types—representing producers, workers, consumers, issues, ideologies, and identities—that are examined in current scholarship. The costs, benefits, and challenges of collective organization are highlighted. It also provides a synthetic overview of four stylized varieties of interest group explanations for international order, focusing on: preferences and group size; organization and parties; domestic political institutions; and international institutions and organizations. Each of these factors shaping interest group influence has been treated as fixed in some accounts and as an endogenous outcome of interest group activity in others. Interest group-centered explanations for global order remain a vital and variegated approach within International Political Economy (IPE).

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