Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation

1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 772-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin J. Hinich ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook

Spatial models of party competition constitute a recent and incrementally developing literature which seeks to explore the relationships between citizens' decisions and candidates' strategies. Despite the mathematical and deductive rigor of this approach, it is only now that political scientists can begin to see the incorporation of those considerations which less formal analyses identify as salient, and perhaps crucial, features of election contests.One such consideration concerns the candidates' objectives. Specifically, spatial analysis often confuses the distinction between candidates who maximize votes and candidates who maximize plurality. Downs and Garvey, for example, assume explicitly that candidates maximize votes, though plurality maximization is clearly the assumption which Garvey actually employs, while Downs frequently assumes that vote maximization, plurality maximization, and the goal of winning are equivalent. Downs, nevertheless, attempts to disentangle these objectives, observing that plurality maximization is the appropriate objective for candidates in a single-member district, while vote maximization is appropriate in proportional representation systems with many parties. All subsequent spatial analysis research, however, assumes either implicitly or explicitly that candidates maximize plurality. If Downs is correct, therefore, this research may not be relevant for a general understanding of electoral competition in diverse constitutional or historical circumstances. The question then is whether those strategies that maximize votes differ from those strategies that maximize plurality.

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox ◽  
Jon H. Fiva ◽  
Daniel M. Smith

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).


Author(s):  
John Graeber

Abstract In recent decades, citizenship policies in Europe have changed significantly: some governments have introduced restrictive new requirements for citizenship, while others have made citizenship more accessible. What explains this variation? Despite a burgeoning literature on both comparative citizenship and spatial competition among parties, scholarship on this question remains in its infancy and primarily focused on the influence of the far right. Expanding on this growing research, this article argues that citizenship policy change results from electoral competition on both sides of the political spectrum, in conjunction with governments’ ideological orientation. Using new data on citizenship policies across sixteen European countries from 1975 to 2014, the author demonstrates that left-of-center governments facing increasing levels of left party competition are associated with more accessible policy changes, while increasing levels of party competition from the far right yield more restrictive policy changes under not only right-of-center governments, but also centrist and left-of-center governments as well.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annika Fredén ◽  
Sverker Sikström

We propose that leaders play a more important role in voters’ party sympathy in proportional representation systems (PR) than previous research has suggested. Voters, from the 2018 Swedish General Election, were in an experiment asked to describe leaders and parties with three indicative keywords. Statistical models were conducted on these text data to predict their vote choice. The results show that despite that the voters vote for a party, the descriptions of leaders predicted vote choice to a similar extent as descriptions of parties. However, the order of the questions mattered, so that the first questions were more predictive than the second question. These analyses indicate that voters tend to conflate characteristics of leaders with their parties during election campaigns, and that leaders are a more important aspect of voting under PR than previous literature has suggested. Overall, this suggests that statistical analysis of words sheds new light of underlying sympathies related to voting.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110282
Author(s):  
Yesola Kweon ◽  
Josh M. Ryan

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Meyer-Gutbrod

Abstract The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant states the authority to reject Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act without penalty threatened the implementation of this polarized health policy. While many Republican-controlled states followed their national allies and rejected Medicaid expansion, others engaged in bipartisan implementation. Why were some Republican states willing to reject the national partisan agenda and cooperate with Democrats in Washington? I focus on the role of electoral competition within states. I conclude that although electoral competition has been shown to encourage partisan polarization within the states, the combination of intergovernmental implementation and Medicaid expansion’s association with public welfare reverses this dynamic. I employ a Cox proportional-hazards model to examine the impact of state partisan ideology and competition on the likelihood of state Medicaid expansion. I find that strong inter-party competition mitigates the impact of more extreme partisan ideologies, encouraging potentially bipartisan negotiation with the federal administration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 589-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey André ◽  
Sam Depauw ◽  
Matthew S Shugart ◽  
Roman Chytilek

A paradox in the comparative literature on electoral systems is that one of the most common systems in Europe – flexible-list proportional representation systems – may be the least understood. Any study of flexible-list systems must start by acknowledging a puzzle: why candidates spend time and effort striving to win preference votes when typically these votes make no difference between election and defeat. Offering the first comprehensive multi-country test of this key puzzle, we provide evidence from Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia that parties will promote to better list ranks in the next election those candidates who are successful at winning preference votes, thereby improving their prospects of election in the longer term and incentivizing them to cultivate personal reputations. Our findings have important implications for party scholars and practitioners when designing, or reforming, political institutions.


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