The Leadership of the United States in the Postwar World

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-248
Author(s):  
Clarence A. Berdahl

It is now more than one hundred years since the substance of the Connally Resolution was first adopted by a legislative body in the United States; it is almost fifty years since the United States, at the Hague Conferences, took the lead in pressing for an international court with much more power than the Court we have since failed to join; it is about thirty-five years since Congress itself, by a unanimous vote in both houses, adopted a resolution urging that the United States Navy be combined with other navies into an international police force for the preservation of peace; it is not quite thirty years ago that the political parties, without any of the present hullabaloo on the point, and at a time when the United States was not itself at war, achieved such a unity of position in their stand for effective American participation in world order as to make debate between them on that issue virtually nil; and it is not quite thirty years ago that the man soon to become the Republican leader in the Senate joined from the same platform with the Democratic President in an appeal for a League of Nations, and a League with force, both economic and military, at its command.

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-106
Author(s):  
Khaled Elgindy

This essay looks at the hearing held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 1922 on the subject of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as well as the broader congressional debate over the Balfour Declaration at that crucial time. The landmark hearing, which took place against the backdrop of growing unrest in Palestine and just prior to the League of Nations' formal approval of Britain's Mandate over Palestine, offers a glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time as well as the ways in which the political discourse in the United States has, or has not, changed since then. Despite the overwhelming support for the Zionist project in Congress, which unanimously endorsed Balfour in September 1922, the hearing examined all aspects of the issue and included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints, including both anti-Zionist Jewish and Palestinian Arab voices.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wyatt Wells

AbstractIn the 1890s, questions about whether to base the American currency upon gold or silver dominated public discourse and eventually forced a realignment of the political parties. The matter often confuses modern observers, who have trouble understanding how such a technically complex—even arcane—issue could arouse such passions. The fact that no major nation currently backs its currency with precious metal creates the suspicion that the issue was a “red herring” that distracted from matters of far greater importance. Yet the rhetoric surrounding the “Battle of the Standards” indicates that the more sophisticated advocates of both sides understood that, in the financial context of the 1890s, the contest between gold and silver not only had important economic implications but would substantially affect the future development of the United States.


Author(s):  
Duncan Bell

This chapter focuses on John Robert Seeley (1834–95), the most prominent imperial thinker in late nineteenth-century Britain. It dissects Seeley's understanding of theology and religion, probes his views on the sacred character of nationality, and shows how he attempted to reconcile particularism and universalism in a so-called “cosmopolitan nationalist” vision. It argues that Seeley's most famous book, The Expansion of England (1883) should be understood as an expression of his basic political-theological commitments. The chapter also makes the case that he conceived of Greater Britain as a global federal nation-state, modeled on the United States. It concludes by discussing the role of India and Ireland in his polychronic, stratified conception of world order.


1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-324
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott

On February 15, 1911, the Senate of the United States advised and consented to the ratification of the International Prize Court Convention adopted by the Second Hague Peace Conference and signed by the American delegates October 18, 1907. Although transmitted to the Senate with the various Hague conventions on February 27, 1908, and favorably recommended by the President and Secretary of State, action upon the convention was deferred by the Committee on Foreign Relations because the convention in its original form involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the international court at The Hague. This feature of the otherwise acceptable convention raised doubts as to its constitutionality, because Article 3, section 1, of the Constitution provides that “ the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” An appeal from the Supreme Court to the court at The Hague seemed to some inconsistent with this provision, for a court can not be considered supreme if an appeal lies from its decisions. To this it may be answered that the court to be established at The Hague is not a court of the United States, and, therefore, is not contemplated by the Constitution; for the Hague court is a diplomatic tribunal for the settlement of questions which would otherwise be adjusted by diplomacy, or referred to a mixed commission specially constituted for their determination, or which if not determined by either of these methods, might result in war.


Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This chapter examines the dynamic of American imperialism in the Philippines since 1898 and the role played by the United States in determining the values, practices, and institutions that constitute democracy in the islands today. It first explains why the United States decided to sponsor democracy in the Philippines after defeating Spain in the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. It then considers the political and socioeconomic dimensions of the United States' democratization of the Philippines, focusing on its introduction of the trappings of modern government such as political parties, elections, and the rise of a Filipino landed class whose wealth was based on the production of export commodities. It also discusses the negative effects of a landowning oligarchy on Philippine democracy and concludes with an assessment of the reasons why General Douglas MacArthur did not mandate land reform for the Philippines.


1964 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall B. Ripley

In the literature on political parties in the United States Congress two points are usually stressed. First, it is said that the political party label lacks a precise programmatic content because “party government” in the British sense is absent in the American Congress. Second, however, it is contended that the party label is the single most important and reliable attribute in predicting the voting behavior of a Senator or Representative.Between these two contentions lies a sizeable area of unexplored territory. If party is the best predictive device in analyzing voting behavior in Congress then, despite the lack of “party government,” the party machinery in both houses must have effects that deserve study. Professor Huitt has suggested the necessity and importance of this kind of study: “… the preoccupation with reform has obscured the fact that we have no really adequate model of party leadership as it exists in Congress, and that none can be constructed because we lack simple descriptions of many of the basic working parts of the present system.” Huitt himself and a few others have filled some of these gaps.


1970 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin David Dubin

A remarkable document in the history of international organization is a detailed constitution for a league of nations which was given limited distribution in March 1915 under the title “Proposals for the Avoidance of War”. Prepared by British liberal and socialist critics of prewar British diplomacy headed by Lord Bryce, the historian, jurist, and retired ambassador to the United States, it undoubtedly was the single most influential scheme for a league of nations produced during the First World War. Although the “Proposals” recommended neither international social or economic cooperation nor measures of international administration, it was known to the authors of the major league schemes prepared in the United Kingdom and the United States during the First World War and to officials in both countries. Indeed, the document was the source of key concepts and language embodied in 1919 in the Covenant of the League of Nations and subsequently in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and of its successor, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Yet discussion of the “Proposals” in the literature on the origins of the League of Nations is both cursory and imprecise. Even such writers as Henry R. Winkler and Alfred Zimmern who recognize its importance seem not to understand how the “Proposals” evolved and how early and pervasive an influence it had.


1912 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 799-829
Author(s):  
George C. Butte

On September 19, 1910, at The Hague, plenipotentiaries of the following nations: Germany, United States of America, Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Chile, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, signed an instrument entitled Protocole Additionnel á la Convention XII de la Haye du 18 Octobre, 1907. The protocol is by its own provisions (Art. 8) to be considered as forming an integral part of the Convention creating the International Court of Prize; and the acceptance of the protocole additionnel is likewise made a sine qua non to the acceptance of the original convention.The protocole additionnel seeks to create a different remedy and a modified procedure par dérogation to Articles 28 (paragraph one), 29 and 45 (paragraph two) of the Prize Court Convention and by eliminating Article 8 of the convention entirely and substituting therefor a method preserving the appearance of an action de novo in the International Court and confining its judgment to the ascertainment of the damages to be allowed an injured claimant. It is the practical embodiment of the voeu adopted by the London Naval Conference in 1909 at the instance of the delegation of the United States (acting under instructions from their government); and is intended to offer a means whereby certain nations named as parties to the protocol may obviate constitutional difficulties in the way of their ratifying the original convention.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-338

Two topics were the subject of discussion in the Allied Council and Executive Committee during August 1949: 1) the question of Allied Control over Austrian political parties; and 2) the western attempt to eliminate censorship over Austrian communications. Concerning the political parties two resolutions were submitted by the French and by the United Kingdom Commissions. The French draft was rejected by the three other commissions and the United Kingdom draft, declaring that the Allied Council had decided that political parties needed “no longer obtain the authorization of the Allied Council as required by the decision of the 11th September 1945“ and the “Austrian Government will be responsible for regulating the formation and activity of political parties or organizations according to provisions of international laws,“ was adopted by the Council. The Soviet representative objected to this and to a second French proposal. The United States and United Kingdom agreed to a French suggestion that the Allied Council meet in an extraordinary session to consider further the French position and the question in general but the Soviet High Commissioner refused to accept


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 568-583
Author(s):  
James P. Rowles

In a recent article entitled The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, Professor John Norton Moore, a staunch defender of United States actions toward Nicaragua, sets forth a comprehensive array of factual assertions and legal arguments to support his conclusions that support by the United States of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries or “contras” and its own actions against Nicaragua are justified as collective self-defense under international law. He also presents arguments to support his conclusion that the International Court of Justice has so exceeded its authority in exercising jurisdiction in the case of Nicaragua v. United States that its decisions are void, and consequently may be ignored by the United States—or, for that matter, Nicaragua. Professor Moore’s analysis and conclusions differ sharply from those of the present writer. It should therefore be useful to identify the main points of disagreement, and to suggest the policy implications of the different legal arguments and conclusions.


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