Judicial Determinations by Administrative Commissions

1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-250
Author(s):  
Charles W. Needham

One of the most striking features of our constitutional law is the persistent purpose to protect the liberties of the people from arbitrary power by vesting the functions of sovereignty in three coördinate departments of government. This division is accomplished by express provisions in some state constitutions and by necessary implication in all constitutions, federal and state. By judicial construction the legislature may not exercise judicial or administrative powers; the executive may not exercise legislative or judicial powers, and the judiciary is denied the exercise of legislative or administrative powers. This fundamental principle of constitutional law is established by judicial decisions, both state and federal, of long standing and uninterrupted unanimity.A commission is an administrative body; may it exercise judicial functions, and if so to what extent? The question involves, first, a definition of judicial functions; second, a statement of the exceptions to the rule that judicial powers may not be exercised by the administrative department; and, third, an appreciation of the relation of judicial determinations to the regulatory powers vested in commissions. We may then consider whether or not the present scope of judicial determinations by commissions, and the court review of such determinations, are satisfactory.

Author(s):  
Emily Zackin

This chapter examines why state constitutions have been so widely criticized and consistently excluded from descriptions of America's constitutional tradition. It seems that the people who wrote the state constitutions failed to grasp the purpose and the nature of constitutional law. Their recognizable features are surrounded, even engulfed, by hundreds of mundane administrative details. Indeed, many state constitutions contain provisions about policy choices as detailed as the construction of ski trails. In order to recognize the principled nature of state constitutionalism, the chapter analyzes the ubiquitous assumptions about “higher lawmaking” and states' idiosyncrasies that have animated its critics. It explores whether we should really revise our conception of American constitutional rights based solely on the state constitutions' (highly detailed) contents. It argues that the criticisms leveled against state constitutions are misplaced and demonstrates that they are actually constitutional.


1975 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Fellman

The conventional wisdom on the basic philosophy of the constitutional concept of the separation of powers is well stated in The Federalist. In No. 47, citing the authority of the “celebrated Montesquieu,” James Madison wrote that “the accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Clearly the Founding Fathers feared the corrupting influence of power. As Madison asked in No. 51, “what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” Another concise statement of the separation of powers concept is found in the famous remark made by Justice Brandeis in 1926, in his dissenting opinion in the Myers case, that “the doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-446
Author(s):  
Ruth Rubio-Marín

Abstract Modern constitutions play, to a larger or lesser extent, several simultaneous political functions, including the definition of a rights-based political order, the organization of state powers, and the crafting of the nation. Feminist analysis of constitutional law has so far primarily focused on the denial or limitation of an equal rights status to women since the inception of constitutions. More recently, it has also challenged the gender composition of state institutions as well as the gendered implications of the various forms of government and power structures. In times of worldwide expanding nationalism, serious reflection on the many ways in which nationalism has always been, and still is, a gendered enterprise is called for. Relying on the categories identified in the work of Yuval-Davis, this article distinguishes between nationalist ideologies that focus on the definition of citizenship in specific states and territories (the “Staatnation”), those that place an emphasis on specific cultures or religions (the “Kulturnation”), and those that are constructed around the specific origin of the people and its continuation into the future (the “Volknation”). This article also shows, relying on the example of several contemporary constitutional struggles across the world, how these three dimensions of nationalism often continue to deny equal constitutional citizenship to women and sexual minorities.


Think India ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-83
Author(s):  
Tushar Kadian

Actually, basic needs postulates securing of the elementary conditions of existence to every human being. Despite of the practical and theoretical importance of the subject the greatest irony is non- availability of any universal preliminary definition of the concept of basic needs. Moreover, this becomes the reason for unpredictability of various political programmes aiming at providing basic needs to the people. The shift is necessary for development of this or any other conception. No labour reforms could be made in history till labours were treated as objects. Its only after they were started being treating as subjects, labour unions were allowed to represent themselves in strategy formulations that labour reforms could become a reality. The present research paper highlights the basic needs of Human Rights in life.


Author(s):  
Dinesh Kumar ◽  
Dr. Jyotirmaya Mahapatra

Scholars could not come to unanimity on definition of entrepreneurship but agreement exist that an entrepreneur should be a natural leader having thorough understanding of the business and visualize the changes and take calculated risk. Skills and abilities required for entrepreneurship are so great and numerous that it is difficult to find persons having entrepreneurship trailts. Most of the entrepreneurs either fail at early stages or unable to expand the business beyond a small shop. A successful entrepreneur in addition to being a visionary and possessing qualities like innovativeness, resilience, perseverance etc. should have the honest belief in self and unflinching faith in ‘Karma’ like ‘Rama of Ramayana’ so that he can face the challenges and pursue the goal with limited resources. Religious philosophy helps the people in developing traits useful in life. Holy books like the Ramayana not just deals with spirituality but management principles hidden in it help an individual to develop entrepreneurship skills and role effectiveness. Primarily, Ramayana is a story and pursuit of the Ramayana does not automatically get translated into entrepreneurship qualities as background was quite different than today’s business scenario. However, Rama, a role-model of Gyan-yog and Karm-yog, can be compared with an entrepreneur who started from scraps like entrepreneur but by linking of his goals with social values and following highest standard of ethics, he could make strategic alliances with Sugriva and Vibheeshana and created Ram and Company and inducted less skilled, less equipped but well dedicated Vanar in army and fought against Ravana (the greatest demon) having well equipped army, to make the earth free from devils and liberate Sita and save the dignity of women (social cause). Principles hidden in the Ramayana show holistic vision and, if followed, by an entrepreneur will help him to establish a successful business model.This article is a modest attempt of exploring attributes of Ram and principles/ methodology adopted by him in his fight against Ravana understood through interpretation of stanzas/ verses mentioned in Ramcharit Manas and correlate them with formation of strategy, goal orientation, strategic alliance, change management etc. ideally required by entrepreneurs to establish and grow his business in modern day competitive scenario.


Author(s):  
Takis S. Pappas

Based on an original definition of modern populism as “democratic illiberalism” and many years of meticulous research, Takis Pappas marshals extraordinary empirical evidence from Argentina, Greece, Peru, Italy, Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, the United States, Spain, and Brazil to develop a comprehensive theory about populism. He addresses all key issues in the debate about populism and answers significant questions of great relevance for today’s liberal democracy, including: • What is modern populism and how can it be differentiated from comparable phenomena like nativism and autocracy? • Where in Latin America has populism become most successful? Where in Europe did it emerge first? Why did its rise to power in the United States come so late? • Is Trump a populist and, if so, could he be compared best with Venezuela’s Chávez, France’s Le Pens, or Turkey’s Erdoğan? • Why has populism thrived in post-authoritarian Greece but not in Spain? And why in Argentina and not in Brazil? • Can populism ever succeed without a charismatic leader? If not, what does leadership tell us about how to challenge populism? • Who are “the people” who vote for populist parties, how are these “made” into a group, and what is in their minds? • Is there a “populist blueprint” that all populists use when in power? And what are the long-term consequences of populist rule? • What does the expansion, and possibly solidification, of populism mean for the very nature and future of contemporary democracy? Populism and Liberal Democracy will change the ways the reader understands populism and imagines the prospects of liberal democracy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
BUYANOVA LYUDMILA YU. ◽  
◽  
GUKASOVA ERA M. ◽  

The features of linguistic conceptualization and representation of traditional confessional and cultural values in the linguocultural space of various societies are analyzed from ethnocultural, cognitive, socio-mental and linguo-confessional positions; identifies and characterizes constant and newest transformations and modifications of the denotative-semantic content of the most important concepts in the Russian and European mentality in the modern conditions of globalization. The theoretical significance lies in the presentation of a sharp socio-cultural "gap" in the definition of some confessional-conditioned phenomena in the Russian and Western cultural-historical traditions; in the representation of the mental and semantic transformation of some confessional value concepts in the Western linguocultural space while preserving, at the same time, the inviolability of the most important categorical and semantic features of the nominations of traditional axiological dominants in Russian culture as the foundations of the life of Russian society and Russian statehood as a whole. It is concluded that the linguistic representation of confessional-conditioned cultural values and their consolidation in the confessional memory of generations is a special mechanism for preserving the ethnocultural and spiritual identity of the people. It is shown that the so-called. “Cultural” globalization as an extralinguistic factor is currently in Western societies a process of gradual destruction of national, traditional and confessional values, which results in a significant change in semantics, denotative image and semantic code in the interpretation of some linguistic phenomena that represent the national axiological fund. The practical value of the presented material and observations lies in the possibility of its application in the practice of teaching university courses in language theory, ethnolinguistics, sociolinguistics, cultural linguistics, linguoconfessionology and intercultural communication.


Author(s):  
Abigail Berry

The famous anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu argued that there is an “unnatural idea of inborn culture, of a gift of culture, bestowed on certain people by Nature.” [1] Bourdieu is arguing that people, who have not been born into a higher class, or who cannot receive a high level of education, are unable to appreciate and understand art. The study of art history is expensive, and often involves extremely high travel costs, thus making it inaccessible to anybody who does not enjoy the means to pursue it. How can we address this accessibility problem in the study of art history? Is there any way to bring art to the people who do not possess “inborn culture?” Bourdieu wrote his book on art and class in 1984, at a time when the computer, and its democratizing potential, was a new and little -understood invention. My research proposes that modern technology provides an answer to this problem, which has plagued the discipline of art history. This presentation will examine three research projects that I’ve been working on at Queen’s. Each project uses digital technologies to improve the general public’s knowledge and access to art. The projects are all different: the first focuses on creating a digital model of 18th - century Canterbury Cathedral based on a book from W.D. Jordan Rare Books and Special Collections, the second project works on understanding Herstmonceux Castle and medieval England through technology, and the third involves image processing for art historical investigations. Despite their differences, each project makes art accessible to people who do not possess Bourdieu’s definition of “inborn culture.”        


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-607
Author(s):  
David T. Konig

The controversy surrounding the Second Amendment—“the right of the people to keep and bear arms”—is, to a large extent, historical in nature, redolent of other matters in this country’s legal and constitutional past. But the historical analogies that might support the Amendment’s repeal do not permit easy conclusions. The issue demands that legal historians venture beyond familiar territory to confront unavoidable problems at the intersection of theory and practice and of constitutional law and popular constitutionalism. An interdisciplinary analysis of Lichtman’s Repeal the Second Amendment illuminates the political, legal, and constitutional dimensions—as well as the perils—of undertaking the arduous amending process permitted by Article V of the U.S. Constitution.


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