Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design

Econometrica ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 1523 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Moore
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Incentive Constraints

Forestry: The Mechanisms of the Accordance of the Rights of User Analysis

2006 ◽  
pp. 57-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Manakov
Keyword(s):  
International Experience ◽  
Auction Design

The author considers the ways in which the rights of user of the forestry in Russia are granted. The article analyzes the international experience of forest auctions and describes the main problems of the auction design.

Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saeed Alaei ◽  
Alexandre Belloni ◽  
Ali Makhdoumi ◽  
Azarakhsh Malekian
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design ◽  
Optimal Auction

scholarly journals Variation margins, fires sales, and information-constrained optimality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Biais ◽  
Florian Heider ◽  
Marie Hoerova
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Asset Prices ◽  
Counterparty Risk ◽  
Fire Sales ◽  
Risk Protection ◽  
Incentive Constraints

Abstract In order to share risk, protection buyers trade derivatives with protection sellers. Protection sellers’ actions affect the riskiness of their assets, which can create counterparty risk. Because these actions are unobservable, moral hazard limits risk sharing. To mitigate this problem, privately optimal derivative contracts involve variation margins. When margins are called, protection sellers must liquidate some assets, depressing asset prices. This tightens the incentive constraints of other protection sellers and reduces their ability to provide insurance. Despite this fire-sale externality, equilibrium is information-constrained efficient. Investors, who benefit from buying assets at fire-sale prices, optimally supply insurance against the risk of fire sales.

scholarly journals Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Negin Golrezaei ◽  
Ilan Lobel ◽  
Renato Paes Leme
Keyword(s):  
Auction Design

scholarly journals Inference and auction design in online advertising

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (7) ◽  
pp. 70-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Nekipelov ◽  
Tammy Wang
Keyword(s):  
Online Advertising ◽  
Auction Design

Combinatorial Auction Design

2003 ◽  
Vol 49 (11) ◽  
pp. 1485-1503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Pekeč ◽  
Michael H. Rothkopf
Keyword(s):  
Combinatorial Auction ◽  
Auction Design

Is the local wheat market a ‘market for lemons’? Certifying the supply of individual wheat farmers in Ethiopia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Banawe Plambou Anissa ◽  
Gashaw Abate ◽  
Tanguy Bernard ◽  
Erwin Bulte
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Wheat Quality ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Market For Lemons ◽  
Wheat Market ◽  
Ex Ante

Abstract Bulking and mixing of smallholder supply dilutes incentives to supply high quality. We introduce wheat ‘grading and certification shops’ in Ethiopia and use an auction design to gauge willingness-to-pay (WTP) for certification. Bids correlate positively with wheat quality, and ex ante notification of the opportunity of certification improves wheat quality. These findings suggest that local wheat markets resemble a ‘market for lemons’, crippled by asymmetric information. However, aggregate WTP for grading and certification services does not re-coup the sum of fixed, flow and variable costs associated with running a single certification shop.

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