Rational Behavior under Complete Ignorance

Econometrica ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 1281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Cohen ◽  
Jean-Yves Jaffray
Keyword(s):  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Complete Ignorance

Thomas Schelling, Robert Aumann and Interactive Decision Theory (2005 Nobel Prize in Economics)

2006 ◽  
pp. 4-21
Author(s):  
A. Belyanin
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Nobel Prize ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Human Interactions ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Applied Industrial Organization ◽  
Nobel Prize Laureates ◽  
Thomas Schelling ◽  
Human Rationality

The paper describes the contributions of T. Schelling and R. J. Aumann, the Nobel Prize laureates of 2005 in economics, to modern economics and social sciences. Their key contributions were in the field of the game theory - a major tool to study human interactions and rational behavior in a wide variety of contexts, from applied industrial organization to labor economics, public policy, international relations and political science. Works by Aumann and Schelling were pathbreaking in this respect, and have paved the way to many modern developments that enhance our understanding of human rationality.

A New Model of Man in Economics

2011 ◽  
pp. 78-98
Author(s):  
M. Storchevoy
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Social Factors ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
New Model ◽  
Common Framework

The paper draws on the most recent research in the field of behavioral economics, neuroscience, and other disciplines and shows how biological and social factors interact and co-determine real human behavior. The author considers in detail various affects and forms of non-rational behavior. He proposes a common framework for such analysis, where each of those forms of behavior becomes the result of conscious or evolutionary-driven choice.

Asymmetric Reaction is Rational Behavior

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip A. Horvath ◽  
Amit K. Sinha
Keyword(s):  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Asymmetric Reaction

Relationship between Rational Thinking and Belief in a Just World

1980 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton T. Shorkey
Keyword(s):  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
Just World ◽  
Rational Thinking ◽  
Pearson Coefficient ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between rational thinking and belief in a just world was examined using scores on the Rational Behavior Inventory and the Just World Scale from 129 undergraduate students. It was hypothesized that rational thinking would be incompatible with absolutistic beliefs that the world is a just place. A Pearson coefficient of —.11 was computed between scores on the two scales; this supports the hypothesis that neither absolutistic acceptance nor rejection of a belief in a just world is related to rational thinking.

scholarly journals THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 323-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
UWE DULLECK
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Rational Behavior ◽  
To Come ◽  
Boundedly Rational Behavior ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
E Mail

I study the robustness of Rubinstein's (1989) E-Mail Game results by varying the information that players can utilize. The article follows one of Morris' (2002) reactions to the E-Mail game "that one should try to come up with a model of boundedly rational behavior that delivers predictions that are insensitive to whether there is common knowledge or a large number of levels of knowledge". Players in my model are presumed to use 'rough inductive reasoning' because they cannot utilize exact information. The information structure in the E-Mail game is generalized and the conditions are characterized under which Rubinstein's results hold. I find that rough inductive reasoning generates a payoff dominant equilibrium where the expected payoffs change continuously (instead of discretely) in the probability of "faulty" communication.

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