Representable Choice Functions

Econometrica ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 1033 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Fishburn
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Alec Sandroni ◽  
Alvaro Sandroni

AbstractArrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-178
Author(s):  
Huiyi Guo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)


2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semih Koray ◽  
Arkadii Slinko

2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-116
Author(s):  
Milan Taskovic
Keyword(s):  

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