Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

1988 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 179 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
James M. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

scholarly journals Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Xu ◽  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Liangcong Fan ◽  
Fei Song
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Group Treatment ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Good Efficiency ◽  
Marginal Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Individual

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from each dollar that is contributed, is held constant. Moreover, the efficiency gains from the punishment mechanism are significantly higher in the 40-participant than in the four-participant treatment. This is true despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. It reflects increased per capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return (MGR), i.e. the return to the entire group of participants, stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good. Efficiency is not significantly different from the small-group treatment.

scholarly journals Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Xu ◽  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Liangcong Fan ◽  
Fei Song
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Group Treatment ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Good Efficiency ◽  
Marginal Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Individual

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from each dollar that is contributed, is held constant. Moreover, the efficiency gains from the punishment mechanism are significantly higher in the 40-participant than in the four-participant treatment. This is true despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. It reflects increased per capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return (MGR), i.e. the return to the entire group of participants, stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good. Efficiency is not significantly different from the small-group treatment.

scholarly journals Group Size Effects and Critical Mass in Public Goods Games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Pereda ◽  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
María Pereda ◽  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Author Correction: Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
María Pereda ◽  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Angel Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Public Goods Games

Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Public Choice ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 85 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Fisher ◽  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
Jeffrey W. Schatzberg ◽  
James M. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
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