Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Public Choice ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 85 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Fisher ◽  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
Jeffrey W. Schatzberg ◽  
James M. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

scholarly journals Group Size, Coordination, and the Effectiveness of Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Xu ◽  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Liangcong Fan ◽  
Fei Song
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Group Treatment ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Good Efficiency ◽  
Marginal Group ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Individual

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from each dollar that is contributed, is held constant. Moreover, the efficiency gains from the punishment mechanism are significantly higher in the 40-participant than in the four-participant treatment. This is true despite the coordination problems inherent in an institution relying on decentralized individual punishment decisions in the context of a larger group. It reflects increased per capita expenditures on punishment that offset the greater coordination difficulties in the larger group. However, if the marginal group return (MGR), i.e. the return to the entire group of participants, stays constant, resulting in an MPCR that shrinks with group size, no such offset occurs and punishment loses much but not all of its effectiveness at encouraging voluntary contributions to a public good. Efficiency is not significantly different from the small-group treatment.

scholarly journals Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urs Fischbacher ◽  
Simon Gächter
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
D 83 ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)

scholarly journals Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism

2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 366-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Masclet ◽  
Charles Noussair ◽  
Steven Tucker ◽  
Marie-Claire Villeval
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Contributions ◽  
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document