Paul W. Zagorski. Democracy vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. 217 pp.

1993 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-170
Author(s):  
Gamaliel Perruci
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
National Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations

Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives

2013 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Bruneau
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
National Security ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
South American ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

Trump faces new US national security pressures

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Border Security ◽  
Army Corps ◽  
Army Corps Of Engineers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
White House ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Mexico Border ◽  
Military Relations

Significance One feature of the plan is using the Army Corps of Engineers, which often works on natural disaster prevention and response, to build Trump's long-promised US-Mexico border wall. Yet White House lawyers are unsure if the military's mandate would include border security wall-building. Moreover, pulling the Department of Defense (DoD) into border security in this way would exacerbate concerns in Congress about Trump's departure from customary boundaries in US civil-military relations. Impacts Trump would likely veto legislation that threatened to curtail his national security and warfighting powers. Congress can vote down presidential vetoes, but only with a two-thirds vote; partisanship makes this unlikely. If Congress reaches bipartisan agreement, it can influence foreign policy by granting or withholding fiscal appropriations.

scholarly journals Nepal’s military diplomacy: Retrospect and prospect

Unity Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Pragya Ghimire
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Regional Environment ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
Survival And Development ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Military Diplomacy

Military diplomacy has been an important security and foreign policy tool for many centuries. However, in the age of globalization, its importance has grown more rapidly than ever because of the recognition that country’s survival and development also depend on a peaceful and stable national and regional environment. Some of the significant practices in the past reflect that various tools of military diplomacy could be implemented to strengthen country’s overall diplomacy, including bilateral and multi-lateral contacts of military and civilian defence officials of foreign countries; preparing bilateral/multilateral security and defence agreements; exchanging experience with foreign military and civilian defence officials; providing military assistance and support to other countries, such as aid, materials and equipment when there is need and request during the disaster or humanitarian crises. However, these tools of strengthening military diplomacy will not be as effective as expected if there is no effective civil-military relations and synergies between a country’s national security and foreign policy. Moreover, it will require strong expertise and good command of civilian diplomats on security issues and military diplomats on foreign policy issues. To strengthen its military diplomacy to contribute to Nepal’s overall diplomacy and foreign policy, it will require more military attaché in Nepal foreign diplomatic missions of vital security and development interest. Moreover, Nepal should continue building synergies between its national security, foreign and development policies as well as strengthening military diplomacy both at bilateral and regional levels.

Coup-Proofing Vulnerable Presidencies in Latin America

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Rittinger
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
New Left ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Corporate Identity ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations

In Latin America, democratization in the 1980s and 1990s brought greater military subordination to elected leaders and a promising new era of civil–military relations. Yet the threat of coups lingered—particularly where leaders most threatened elite interests and where coups could be justified as “restoring” democracy. Such was the case in the early 21st century for presidents on the radical, populist side of Latin America’s “New Left,” including Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Manuel Zelaya of Honduras, and Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela. In response, these presidents sought to guard their “contestatory” agenda by diminishing the armed forces’ ability and willingness to derail it. They adopted strategies like increasing spending on military hardware and salaries, stacking the officer corps with loyalists, indoctrinating the armed forces into the government’s political ideology, and raising citizen militias and parallel security forces. To different degrees—and with different degrees of success—they attempted to secure the military’s loyalty and to raise the costs of executing a coup. In other words, they engaged in coup-proofing, a practice used by vulnerable leaders around the world. The study of coup-proofing in Latin America can advance research on comparative civil–military relations and democratization in several ways. First, scholars usually treat coup-proofing strategies as a response to the elevated risk of a coup. But when they threaten the military’s conservative corporate identity or limit its autonomy from civilian control, those strategies themselves could end up elevating that risk. Cases of coup-proofing from Latin America’s New Left would prove relevant for research seeking to disentangle this complicated causal relationship. Second, coup-proofing could jeopardize democratic consolidation, if not survival, if it shifts the military’s loyalty from a democratic, constitutional order to a particular leader and ideology. But if coup-proofing prevents unelected leaders from usurping office, then it might protect democracy. The short and long-term effect of coup-proofing on democratic institutions thus remains an open question. And third, if coup-proofing is to retain its conceptual utility in a region populated by democracies and hybrid regimes, then the definition of a “coup” has to remain limited to an illegal, undemocratic seizure of power involving at least some elements of the armed forces. Otherwise, coup-proofing could become conflated with impeachment-proofing. In practice, however, it becomes difficult to distinguish efforts aimed at preventing a coup from efforts aimed at escaping legal constraints on presidential power. This presents a challenge but also an opportunity for future research. The record of coups and attempted coups in Latin America over the first two decades of the 21st century shows that while the coup d’état is no longer a fixture of political life in the region, it remains a real possibility. That reality calls for more research into coup risk, the ways that leaders respond to it, and the political consequences that follow.

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