scholarly journals Antidiscrimination or Reverse Discrimination: The Impact of Changing Demographics, Title VII, and Affirmative Action on Productivity

1984 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Leonard
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Title Vii ◽  
Reverse Discrimination ◽  
Changing Demographics ◽  
The Impact

Reverse Discrimination and Remedial Affirmative Action in Employment

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Ray Gullett
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Title Vii ◽  
Reverse Discrimination ◽  
Remedial Action ◽  
Civil Rights Act ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Public Employer

Public sector employers are governed by two standards in the design and application of voluntary remedial affirmative action plans: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) and the equal protection provisions of the Constitution. Since these plans are subject to challenge under reverse discrimination claims, they must be carefully designed to avoid vulnerability to such charges under either a statutory or constitutional claim. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the legal acceptability of voluntary affirmative action differently under the statute than under the Constitution. Title VII allows a more permissive standard than does the 14th or 5th amendments. An analysis and comparison of Court rulings under both standards illustrate these differences. To avoid successful challenge of a voluntary remedial plan, a public employer must abide by the more conservative criteria of the Constitution. In so doing, some kinds of remedial action available to those in the private sector is barred to their public sector counterparts. Further Court rulings may clarify these apparent differences.

Using Establishment Size to Measure the Impact of Title VII and Affirmative Action

2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 503 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Carrington ◽  
Kristin McCue ◽  
Brooks Pierce
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Title Vii ◽  
Establishment Size ◽  
The Impact

After Kalanke and Marschall: Affirming Affirmative Action

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 199-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Fredman
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Reverse Discrimination ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Advocate General ◽  
Affirmative Action Policy ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Near Future ◽  
Action Case

Is it legitimate to use discriminatory policies to achieve equality? As official support for reverse discrimination or affirmative action policies becomes more common among member states of the European Union, so does the potential for legal challenge. Yet no clear answer has yet been given by the European Court of Justice. The controversial European Court of Justice decision in Kalanke, striking down an affirmative action policy, was followed only two years later by that in Marschall, which signalled a significant change in approach to affirmative action policies. This change of attitude is likely to be tested in a variety of different ways in the near future. The next affirmative action case, Badeck, is now awaiting the opinion of the Advocate General, and a Swedish case is waiting in the wings. Both these cases are likely to take the Court into far stormier waters than those already traversed in Kalanke and Marschall.

Reverse discrimination

2020 ◽  
pp. 159-172
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
Reverse Discrimination ◽  
The Core ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Specific Sense ◽  
Generic Sense

This chapter argues that there simply is no cogent objection to affirmative action based on the fact that, by its very nature, it is a form of unjust discrimination. The core of the chapter’s argument can be stated in the form of a dilemma: Either affirmative action amounts to discrimination in a generic sense, or it amounts to discrimination in some more specific sense, e.g., unjust differential treatment of people because of their membership of different socially salient groups. If the former, then it is true that affirmative action involves discrimination, but discrimination in a generic sense is not morally objectionable. If the latter, it is not the case that all forms of affirmative action involve discrimination in this sense. Thus, affirmative action is not unjust discrimination—so-called reverse discrimination—per se.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document