scholarly journals The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies

1986 ◽  
Vol 1986 (6) ◽  
pp. 948 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Mayton
Keyword(s):  
Collective Choice ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
Arrow's Theorem

The General Will and Social Choice Theory

1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Radcliff
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
General Will ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Impossibility Results ◽  
Arrow's Theorem ◽  
Choice Literature

The concept of the General Will has been criticized as being either tyrannical or empirically unattainable. From a social choice perspective, Riker (1982) and others have merged the substance of both perspectives. The new argument maintains that Arrow's Theorem and similar impossibility results imply that the General Will is both dangerous and “intellectually absurd.” While not denying the relevance of the collective choice literature, it is argued that such apocalyptic conclusions are premature.

Arrow's Theorem and Engineering Design Decision Making

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Scott ◽  
Erik K. Antonsson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Engineering Design ◽  
Design Decision ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Arrow's Theorem

Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem?

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-442
Author(s):  
Murat Ali Çengelci ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver
Keyword(s):  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Arrow's Theorem

Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (513) ◽  
pp. 71-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Cresto ◽  
Diego Tajer
Keyword(s):  
Theory Choice ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Evidence Amalgamation ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow's Theorem ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Sources ◽  
Positive Light

Abstract In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters (the dictator), provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of evidence; the ‘voters’ here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha’s proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow’s pessimistic conclusion. In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow’s result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms (or disconfirms) complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow’s conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see the Duhem problem under a different, positive light – namely, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table.

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