Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (513) ◽  
pp. 71-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Cresto ◽  
Diego Tajer

Abstract In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters (the dictator), provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of evidence; the ‘voters’ here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha’s proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow’s pessimistic conclusion. In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow’s result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms (or disconfirms) complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow’s conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see the Duhem problem under a different, positive light – namely, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table.

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald G. Saari

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and Sen’s Minimal Liberalism example impose ‘impossibility’ roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow’s and Sen’s assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the ‘dark matter’ mystery confronting astronomers.


Author(s):  
Conal Duddy ◽  
Ashley Piggins

Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem is rightly considered to be a landmark result in economic theory. It is a far-reaching result with implications not just for economics but for political science, philosophy, and many other fields. It has inspired an enormous literature, “social choice theory,” which lies on the interface of economics, politics, and philosophy. Arrow first proved the impossibility theorem in his doctoral dissertation—Social Choice and Individual Values—published in 1951. It is a remarkable result, and had Arrow not proved it, it is unlikely that the theorem would be known today. A social choice is simply a choice made by, or on behalf of, a group of people. Arrow’s theorem is concerned more specifically with the following problem. Suppose that we have a given set of options to choose from and that each member of a group of individuals has his or her own preference over these options. By what method should we construct a single ranking of the options for the group as a whole? Any such method may be represented mathematically by a “social welfare function.” This is a function that receives as its input the preference ordering of each individual and then generates as its output a social preference ordering. Arrow defined some properties that would seem to be essential to any reasonable social welfare function. These properties are called “unrestricted domain,” “weak Pareto,” “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” and “non-dictatorship.” Each of these properties, when taken alone, does appear to be very necessary indeed. Yet, Arrow proved that these properties are in fact mutually incompatible. This troubling fact has been central to the study of social choice ever since.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred M. Frohock

The impossibility theorem developed by Kenneth Arrow has implications for both rationality and morality in political thought. Transitivity in a collective ordering can be assured only with a decisive set, but this outcome is acknowledged as morally undesirable. The alternatives exhibited by the theorem thus seem to require a choice between rationality and morality. But exit routes can be cut out of this dilemma with the idea of a conditional ordering, one where warranting factors attach to a ranking of alternatives. Conditional orderings form two senses of collective rationality. One is represented by compound directives, which avoid the rational problems of the theorem by warranting local orderings. The second is moral fusion, which requires a reasoned dominance in collective outcomes. These two forms of conditional rationality put into relief the restricted scope of the composition rules and individualism of Arrow's theorem, and suggest alternative relationships of individual and social whole.


Synthese ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 191 (8) ◽  
pp. 1847-1856 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Rizza

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 2358-2371
Author(s):  
S.A. Moskal'onov

Subject. The article addresses the history of development and provides the criticism of existing criteria for aggregate social welfare (on the simple exchange economy (the Edgeworth box) case). Objectives. The purpose is to develop a unique classification of criteria to assess the aggregate social welfare. Methods. The study draws on methods of logical and mathematical analysis. Results. The paper considers strong, strict and weak versions of the Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria, introduces the notion of equivalence and constructs orderings by Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson. The Pareto and Samuelson's criteria are transitive, however, not complete. The Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky citeria are not transitive in the general case. Conclusions. The lack of an ideal social welfare criterion is the consequence of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and of the group of impossibility theorems in economics. It is necessary to develop new approaches to the assessment of aggregate welfare.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel W. Smith

This paper examines the intersecting of the themes of temporality and truth in Deleuze's philosophy. For the ancients, truth was something eternal: what was true was true in all times and in all places. Temporality (coming to be and passing away) was the realm of the mutable, not the eternal. In the seventeenth century, change began to be seen in a positive light (progress, evolution, and so on), but this change was seen to be possible only because of the immutable laws of nature that govern change. It was not until philosophers such as Bergson, James, Whitehead – and then Deleuze – that time began to be taken seriously on its own account. On the one hand, in Deleuze, time, freed from its subordination to movement, now becomes autonomous: it is the pure form of change (continuous variation) that lies at the basis of Deleuze's metaphysics in Difference and Repetition (and is explored more thematically in The Time-Image). As a result, on the other hand, the false, freed from its subordination to the form of the true, assumes a power of its own (the power of the false), which in turn implies a new ‘analytic of the concept’ that Deleuze develops in What Is Philosophy?


1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Scott ◽  
Erik K. Antonsson

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-442
Author(s):  
Murat Ali Çengelci ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document