Constitutional Law. Equal Protection. School Financing System Based on Local Property Taxes Which Results in Inequalities of Spending by School Districts Violates the Equal Protection Clause. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)

1972 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1049 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
School Districts ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Local Property ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Property Taxes ◽  
Financing System ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
School Financing

O que Brown e Obergefell nos Ensinam sobre Contramajoritarismo? / What do Brown and Obergefell Teach us about Countermajoritarism?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrique Rangel ◽  
Carlos Bolonha ◽  
Igor De Lazari
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Board Of Education ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
American States ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Social Minorities ◽  
The U.S

O presente artigo propõe uma comparação entre Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) e Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). A primeira decisão, por ser sensivelmente abstrata e influente no direito constitucional norte-americano, passou por um processo marcante de mitificação acerca de seu caráter contramajoritário. A segunda também protegeu uma minoria social com base na interpretação da cláusula de proteção igualitária e, assim, pode ser alvo desse mesmo fenômeno. Diante desse processo de mitificação, sustenta-se a hipótese de que há natureza majoritarista nas decisões de Brown e Obergefell. Embora ambas as decisões tenham protegido direitos de minorias sociais, tais mudanças interpretativas foram adiadas pela Suprema Corte norte-americana até que uma maioria qualificada de Estados já as tivesse implementado. A metodologia se baseou em dois parâmetros: o comportamento decisório da Corte e o status quo constitucional da matéria, representado pelo número de Estados favoráveis ou contrários a determinada interpretação constitucional. AbstractThis article proposes a comparison between Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). The first decision is significantly abstract and influential in American constitutional law. In this sense, it has passed through a remarkable process of mystification about its countermajoritarian character. The second one also has protected a social minority based on the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Thus, it is supposed to be aimed by the same phenomenon. Before this mystification process, this article supports the follow hypothesis: Brown and Obergefell decisions indicate a majoritarian profile. Both decisions have protected rights of social minorities, but the U.S. Supreme Court has delayed such interpretative changes until a qualified majority of the American States has already provided it. The methodology consists of two analytical parameters: the decision-making of the Court and the constitutional status quo of the matter defined by the number of States favorable or contrary to certain constitutional interpretation.

Part II Rights Guarantees under State Constitutions: the New Judicial Federalism, 7 Lockstepping State Constitutional Rights with Federal Constitutional Law

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williams Robert F
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Judicial Federalism ◽  
Federal Constitutional

This chapter discusses the practice — adopted by a number of state courts — of stating that state constitutional rights provisions will be interpreted identically to, or in “lockstep” with, similar or identical federal constitutional rights provision. State courts do this in a variety of ways, ranging from cases where they do not seem to acknowledge the possible difference between state and federal rights protections; to case-by-case adoption of federal constitutional interpretations; to “prospective lockstepping” where they announce that in the future the state and federal rights provisions will be interpreted identically or according to some other similar formulation. The chapter gives examples of these different approaches, as well as variations on them. It includes a specific focus on the wide range of state constitutional equality provisions, which, according to many state courts, are to be interpreted the same way as the federal Equal Protection Clause. These various forms of prospective lockstepping are criticized, on the grounds that they cannot actually represent “holdings” and are therefore not binding on future courts.

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