Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Clause: Constitutionality of State Law Denying to Persons Ineligible to Citizenship the Right to Engage in Commercial Fishing

On November 8, 1994, Oregon became the first state in the nation to legalize assisted suicide. Passage of Proposition 16 was a milestone in the campaign to make assisted suicide a legal option. The culmination of years of effort, the Oregon vote followed on the heels of failed referenda in California and Washington, and other unsuccessful attempts to enact state laws guaranteeing the right to suicide assistance. Indeed, in 1993, four states passed laws strengthening or clarifying their ban against assisted suicide. No doubt, Proposition 16 is likely to renew the effort to legalize assisted suicide at the state level.The battle over assisted suicide is also unfolding in the courts. Litigation challenging Proposition 16 on the grounds that it violates the equal protection clause is ongoing in Oregon. More significantly, three cases, two in federal courts and one in Michigan state court, have been brought to establish assisted suicide as a constitutionally protected right.

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Murray, J., concurring.

What Obergefell v. Hodges Should Have Said ◽

10.12987/yale/9780300221558.003.0010 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 202-220

Keyword(s):

Sexual Orientation ◽

Fourteenth Amendment ◽

Equal Protection ◽

Same Sex ◽

Equal Protection Clause ◽

The Right

Today, a majority of the Court strikes down laws banning the performance and recognition of same-sex marriages on the ground that such laws constitute caste or class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing, the Court reiterates that the right to marry is a fundamental right and denominates sexual orientation a quasi-suspect classification subject to heightened scrutiny....

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O que Brown e Obergefell nos Ensinam sobre Contramajoritarismo? / What do Brown and Obergefell Teach us about Countermajoritarism?

Revista Direito Estado e Sociedade ◽

10.17808/des.50.512 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Henrique Rangel ◽

Carlos Bolonha ◽

Igor De Lazari

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Constitutional Law ◽

Status Quo ◽

Equal Protection ◽

Board Of Education ◽

Equal Protection Clause ◽

American States ◽

Qualified Majority ◽

Social Minorities ◽

The U.S

O presente artigo propõe uma comparação entre Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) e Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). A primeira decisão, por ser sensivelmente abstrata e influente no direito constitucional norte-americano, passou por um processo marcante de mitificação acerca de seu caráter contramajoritário. A segunda também protegeu uma minoria social com base na interpretação da cláusula de proteção igualitária e, assim, pode ser alvo desse mesmo fenômeno. Diante desse processo de mitificação, sustenta-se a hipótese de que há natureza majoritarista nas decisões de Brown e Obergefell. Embora ambas as decisões tenham protegido direitos de minorias sociais, tais mudanças interpretativas foram adiadas pela Suprema Corte norte-americana até que uma maioria qualificada de Estados já as tivesse implementado. A metodologia se baseou em dois parâmetros: o comportamento decisório da Corte e o status quo constitucional da matéria, representado pelo número de Estados favoráveis ou contrários a determinada interpretação constitucional. AbstractThis article proposes a comparison between Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015). The first decision is significantly abstract and influential in American constitutional law. In this sense, it has passed through a remarkable process of mystification about its countermajoritarian character. The second one also has protected a social minority based on the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Thus, it is supposed to be aimed by the same phenomenon. Before this mystification process, this article supports the follow hypothesis: Brown and Obergefell decisions indicate a majoritarian profile. Both decisions have protected rights of social minorities, but the U.S. Supreme Court has delayed such interpretative changes until a qualified majority of the American States has already provided it. The methodology consists of two analytical parameters: the decision-making of the Court and the constitutional status quo of the matter defined by the number of States favorable or contrary to certain constitutional interpretation.

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