Constitutional Law. Separation of Powers. Reduction of Salaries of Judges of District of Columbia and Court of Claims

1933 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 133
1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-105
Author(s):  
Judith Hippler Bello ◽  
Jacques Semmelman

U.S. District Court, D.C., August 31, 1995; modified September 15, 1995.This action involved a constitutional challenge to the 147-year-old extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. §3184, on die ground that it violates the separation of powers. Plaintiffs were two individuals who had been found extraditable to Canada, pursuant to the extradition treaty between die United States and Canada, by a U.S. magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois. They brought an action in the District of Columbia against the Secretary of State, the Department of State, and the United States for a judgment declaring the extradition statute unconstitutional, and an injunction against their extradition. Plaintiffs also sought certification of a class consisting of persons who are or will be under threat of extradition from the United States pursuant to the statute, and an injunction against any such extradition. The court held (per Lamberth, J.) that (1) the extradition statute violates the separation of powers and is therefore unconstitutional; (2) the United States is enjoined from taking any further act toward the surrender of the plaintiffs to Canada; and (3) the proposed class is certified, and the United States is enjoined from surrendering anyone under the statute.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Troper

It suffices to examine two of the most important texts which form the basis of France's constitutional system, the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, and the Law of June 3, 1958, in order to become convinced that separation of powers is one of those immutable principles which imposes itself as self-evident on every liberal constituent body. Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789 proclaims that “any society in which the protection of rights is not ensured, nor the separation of powers established, has no constitution”. The constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, for its part, authorizes the government to establish a constitutional project, provided that five principles be respected; among these principles appears, immediately following the necessity of universal suffrage, the separation of powers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

Resumen:La presente contribución adopta como hipótesis de partida la relativa influencia de los estándares internacionales en la redacción de la Constitución de 1978 y la absoluta necesidad de adaptación a la realidad del Estado supranacional e internacionalmente integrado. En este sentido, un primer enfoque permite comprobar que, a pesar del juego potencial de las disposiciones constitucionales de apertura internacional, y tras cuatro décadas de vigencia de la Carta Magna Española de 1978, la justicia constitucional y la doctrina constitucionalista no han mostrado una actitud clara y abierta hacia las exigencias jurídicas internacionales, con la excepción de un relativo entusiasmo hacia los parámetros europeos. En efecto, en la parte central del artículo, el análisis de los cuarenta años constitucionalismo democrático bajo la Constitución de 1978 revela, primeramente, un déficit de interpretación basado en soluciones internacionales más favorables, así como una incorrecta e inexplorada concepción del impacto de los tratados internacionales en el sistema constitucional de fuentes.En segundo término, se examina la proyección positiva de los estándares internacionales tanto en la «parte dogmática» (valores, principios y derechos constitucionales) como en la «parte orgánica» de la Constitución (separación de poderes y organización territorial del poder), sin olvidar el peso de los instrumentos internacionales en la defensa del orden constitucional (mecanismos ordinario —tribunal constitucional— y extraordinario —reforma constitucional—). En tercer lugar, se somete a escrutinio la responsabilidad social de la Universidad en sus tareas de enseñanza y de investigación (especialmente en situaciones domésticas conflictivas), con objeto de transferir un conocimiento avanzado a la sociedad sin banalizar o trivializar la importancia del Derecho internacional y del Derecho constitucional en la defensa democrática del orden constitucional. Por último, se completa el análisis propuesto a través de la toma en consideración del lugar que también ocupan las normas constitucionales en los tratados internacionales y el impacto de nociones como margen de apreciación nacional, identidad constitucional y otras.La conclusión principal del trabajo consiste en sostener la necesaria retroalimentación de los estándares internacionales y constitucionales, puesto que esas sinergias positivas (incluido un diálogo judicial global) seguirán propiciando el fortalecimiento del sentimiento constitucional bajo una Carta Magna Española de 1978 inserta en un contexto cada vez más globalizado.Abstract:This papers adopts as a starting hypothesis the relative degree of influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the absolute need to accommodate to the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. In this sense, a first approach shows that, despite the potential role of constitutional clauses opening to international standards, and after four decades since the entry into force of the Spanish Magna Carta of 1978, constitutional justice and constitutional doctrine have not shown clear nor open behaviour towards international legal requirements, with the exception of its relative enthusiasm towards European parameters.Indeed, in the main part of this paper, the analysis of the past forty yearsof democratic constitutionalism under the 1978 Constitution reveals, first and foremost, an interpretative deficit based on more favourable international solutions, as well as an incorrect and unexplored view of the impact of international treaties within the constitutional system of sources of law.Secondly, the positive impact of international standards is examined in  connection with both the «dogmatic part» (constitutional values, principlesand rights) and the «organic part» of the Constitution (separation of powers and territorial organization of the State), without forgetting the weight of international instruments in defending the constitutional order (ordinary —constitutional court— and extraordinary —constitutional amendment— mechanisms). Thirdly, the social responsibility of Universities in their teaching and research (especially in conflicting domestic situations) is submitted to scrutiny, in order to show its key role in transferring advanced knowledge to society without trivializing the importance of both international law and constitutional law in the democratic defense of the constitutional order. Finally, the place that constitutional norms occupy in international treaties, as well as the impact of notions such as (national) margin of appreciation, constitutional identity and others, are proposed so as to complete the analysis.The main conclusion of this paper holds the necessary feedback of internationaland constitutional standards, since these positive synergies (including a global judicial dialogue) will continue to promote the strengthening of a «constitutional feeling» under the 1978 Spanish Magna Carta, which is inserted in an increasingly globalized context.Summary:1. Preliminary issues: the influence of international standards in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution and the need for consistency with the reality of an integrated State at supranational and international levels. 2. Subsequent issues: the weight of constitutional jurisdiction confinement in light of international parameters. 3. Further questions: the presence of a self-absorbed constitutionalism with respect to international sources in general and relatively enthusiastic about European sources in particular. 4. Constitutional clauses on the open acceptance of international standards: particular focus on human rights instruments. 5. The constitutional approach international treaties and the so-called control of conventionality. 6. The favourable impact of international standards on the set of constitutional values, principles and rights. 7. The impact of international standards on the organization of powers. 8. The positive role of international instruments in defending the constitutional order: 8.1. Internationalization of the constituent function and the weighting of constitutional amendments. 8.2. International standards and constitutional jurisdiction. 8.3. The inadmissible trivialization of both International and Constitutional Law. 9. International instruments’s regard for constitutional norms: the margin of (national) appreciation, the counter-limits and related notions doctrine. 10. Final remarks: the feedback between international andconstitutional standards  


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (Especial 2) ◽  
pp. 175-180
Author(s):  
Luís Henrique Ramos Alves ◽  
Shirley Oliveira Lima Nomura

The separation of powers is a general principle of Brazilian Constitutional law prescribed in article 2 of the Federal Constitution following the model idealized by Montesquieu, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, each of the powers has its respective characteristics and also has its typical and atypical functions. In the system of separation of powers there is a theory called System of Brakes and Counterweights, where it controls the division of powers and ensures that each one acts within its respective sphere of competence. With the passage of time within the Brazilian scenario has been emerging the so-called Judicial Activism, a phenomenon that arises when the judiciary proceeds to intervene proactively in the sphere of competence of other powers. With this, the present article seeks to show judicial activism, focusing on the exorbitance of the atypical function of the judiciary and how this judicial activism is triggered within the system of separation of powers.


Author(s):  
Margit Cohn

This chapter provides the basis of the model advanced in the book. Based on the internal tension model, governing constitutionalism-at-large, the chapter submits that the executive is best viewed as straddling the line between subjection to law and dominance beyond law. This is no ‘paradox:’ embodying one of the tensions ingrained in constitutional law, the executive draws on an irresolvable tension between its role as executor of law, under the separation of powers ideal, and its function as manager, or dominant decision-maker in the political sphere, in which it acts above and beyond the law. Under the internal tension model, normative theory can be better expounded, and the extent of required constraints over excessive power can be better addressed. The chapter discusses, and rejects, three models of the executive branch, all of which are based on hierarchical and dichotomous thinking. The subservient executive model connotes full supremacy of the constitution and legislation over the executive; the imperial executive model draws on a vision of executive supremacy; and the third, bipolar model offers a vision of alternating modes of operation. All are set aside in favour of a model that recognizes the internal tension which underlies executive action.


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